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Plaint iff-appellant United Park City Mines Company ("United Park") appeals from 
the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing United Park's Amended 
Complaint against defendant-appellees Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO"), successor 
to The Anaconda Company ("Anaconda"); ASARCO, INC. ("ASARCO"); Greater Park City 
Company ("GPCC"), and its parent, Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. ("AMOT"); Royal 
Street Land Company, Deer Valley Resort Company, Royal Street of Utah and Royal 
Street Development Company, Inc. (collectively "Royal Street"); Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York ("Morgan"), Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia ("Fidelity"), and their 
wholly owned subsidiaries Greater Properties, Inc. ("GPI"), and Park Properties, Inc. 
("PPI") (collectively "Morgan-Fidelity"); and intervenor-appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
("Wells Fargo"). 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, Anaconda (now ARCO) and ASARCO, United Park's controlling 
shareholders, caused United Park to enter into a number of interrelated contracts and 
leases (the "1975 Resort Agreements"), which gave away for essentially nothing United 
Park's major equity interest in GPCC, including the profitable Park City Ski Resort 
operations and facilities, the planned development of the Deer Valley resort area, and 
other valuable developable real property and water rights. Anaconda and ASARCO did 
so, to the great detriment of United Park and its other shareholders, because they 
decided in late 1974 that the ski resort and land development business was a distraction 
from their paramount corporate interest — mining — and that United Park would "get out 
of the resort business." They gave away United Park's major equity interest in these ski 
resorts and their great potential, to concentrate on and to protect their discrete and 
disproportionate interests in Park City Ventures, a joint venture conducting mining 
operations on United Park's property. Through these actions, Anaconda and ASARCO 
breached their fiduciary duties as controlling shareholders to United Park and its other 
1 
shareholders. 
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity also owed fiduciary duties to United Park as co-
shareholders with United Park in GPCC, a closely-held corporation, and breached those 
duties by obtaining unfair advantage over United Park in the 1975 Resort Agreements. 
GPCC and AMOT aided and abetted the fiduciary duty breaches by Anaconda, ASARCO, 
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity to their financial advantage. Anaconda and ASARCO, 
assisted by the other defendants, concealed material facts regarding the 1975 Resort 
Agreements from United Park's outside shareholders. 
In August 1985, for the first time in its history, United Park had a Board of 
Directors and management independent of Anaconda and ASARCO. Prior to that time, 
United Park's Board was controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO through employees, former 
employees, attorneys, bankers, and persons who, due to business, contractual and 
historical relationships with Anaconda and ASARCO and other conflicts of interest, would 
not act independently for the best interests of United Park. After new management 
arrived in August 1985, certain apparent violations of the Resort Agreements by GPCC 
and Royal Street ultimately led new management to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the 1975 Resort Agreements. That investigation was difficult because many 
critical documents were not in United Park's files and certain key witnesses, affiliated 
with defendants, refused to talk to United Park management. 
The district court erroneously held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims are 
time-barred as a matter of law, because United Park discovered or should have discovered 
the claims through outside shareholders and independent directors in 1975. The critical 
fact issue in deciding whether United Park's fiduciary duty claims are time-barred is 
whether, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, United Park's outside shareholders 
could have discovered these claims prior to new management's arrival in August 1985. 
The combination of control by Anaconda and ASARCO, the directors' involvement in the 
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wrongdoing and defendants' concealment of certain critical facts, made it not possible, 
through reasonable diligence, for the claims to have been discovered or asserted earlier. 
In all events, that issue and several others raised by defendants' motions to dismiss and 
for summary judgment were issues of fact. The district court committed clear error in 
dismissing United Park's Amended Complaint as a matter of law. At a minimum, United 
Park should have been permitted to complete necessary discovery. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953, as 
amended). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district-court err when it granted summary judgment in the face of 
United Park's affidavit, filed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), which demonstrated 
United Park's need for additional discovery on the statute of limitations, breach of 
fiduciary duty and breach of contract issues? 
2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United 
Park's claims for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the 1975 Resort Agreements, 
as barred by the statute of limitations, when there are genuine issues of material fact 
as to whether United Park discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence could 
have discovered its fiduciary duty claims in 1975 or anytime prior to new management's 
arrival in 1985? 
3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United 
Park's claims for breach of fiduciary duty as barred by the Bangor Punta doctrine, even 
though (1) Anaconda and ASARCO owned and sold only 31% of the United Park stock; (2) 
only the Loeb Investors Company XL ("Loeb") purchased any stock from Anaconda or 
ASARCO; (3) defendants' presented no evidence that United Park would receive a 
windfall from a recovery from Anaconda or ASARCO; and (4) the Bangor Punta doctrine 
3 
has no application to claims against non-selling third parties? 
4. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United 
Park's breach of fiduciary duty claims against Anaconda and ASARCO based on the bald, 
unsupported conclusion that ff[n]o genuine issues of material fact exist regarding [United 
Park !s] allegations against Anaconda and ASARCO," when United Park alleged and 
presented evidence of the breaches of duty, and Anaconda and ASARCO did not even seek 
summary judgment on this ground? 
5. Did the district court err in dismissing, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
United Park's claims against AMOT and GPCC for aiding and abetting breaches of 
fiduciary duty, when the tort of aiding and abetting fiduciary breaches is clearly 
recognized and there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether these defendants 
are liable for that tort? 
6. Did the district court err in granting defendants' motions to dismiss or for 
summary judgment dismissing United Park's prayer for reformation of the Resort 
Agreements? 
7. Did the district court err in granting defendants GPCC and Royal Street 
summary judgment dismissing United Park's claims that GPCC and Royal Street breached 
the Resort Agreements? 
8. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United 
Park's trespass claims against GPCC? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for the district court 's refusal to permit United Park to 
complete discovery is abuse of discretion. Where, as here, the non-moving party makes 
a showing under Rule 56(f) that additional discovery is relevant to the issues on summary 
judgment and that the request for more time to complete discovery is not dilatory, it is 
an abuse of discretion for the court to deny the opportunity to complete discovery. Cox 
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v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-15 (Utah 1984); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. 
of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Utah 1977). 
The standard of review of the district court's grant of summary judgment under 
Rule 56 is a de novo determination whether, after construing all facts and reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to United Park, defendants, the moving parties, 
demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and their entitlement to 
judgment as a matter of law. Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, this 
Court gives no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Barber v. Farmers 
Ins. Exchange, 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988). 
The standard of review for the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) is the de novo determination as to whether, assuming the truth of United 
Park's allegations, the Amended Complaint, as a matter of law, fails to state any valid 
claim for which relief can be granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 
at 600-04 (1969); see also Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 348 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1960). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Sections 78-12-25(3) and 78-12-27, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended); Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and 56(c) & (f).1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Parties 
Plaintiff-appellant United Park, a Delaware corporation maintaining its principal 
place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a public company with more than 5,000 
shareholders. United Park is the successor of mining companies which, since the 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(f), these provisions and the district court 's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders are reproduced in the Addendum. 
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nineteenth century, operated mines around Park City, Utah. Due to adverse market and 
technological conditions, United Park has not actively mined its properties since 1982, 
but these conditions are dynamic and may permit renewed mining activity in the future. 
United Park continues to maintain its mill and mining properties. In 1963, United Park 
began operating the Park City Ski Resort. In 1971, United Park entered into interrelated 
contracts and leases conveying to GPCC the resort facilities, and certain water and real 
property rights. 
Defendant-appellee ARCO, a Delaware corporation, merged with Anaconda in 1977. 
The now merged Anaconda/ARCO interests are referred to as "Anaconda." At all material 
times, Anaconda was engaged in the mining business. From 1953 until 1985, Anaconda was 
a controlling shareholder of United Park. Defendant-appellee ASARCO is a New Jersey 
corporation also engaged in mining. From 1953 until 1985, ASARCO was a controlling 
shareholder of United Park. 
Defendant-appellee GPCC is a Utah corporation which has operated the Park City 
Ski Resort and engaged in land development since 1971. Between 1971 and 1975, GPCC 
was a closely-held corporation owned by United Park, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity and 
Unionamerica. As a result of the 1975 Resort Agreements, GPCC became a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of defendant-appellee AMOT, a Delaware corporation. Nicholas Badami 
("Badami") is the President of AMOT and the Chairman of GPCC. 
The defendants-appellees collectively referred to as "Royal Street" are several 
related entities owned or controlled by Edgar Stern. Deer Valley Resort Company ("Deer 
Valley") is a Utah limited partnership which operates the Deer Valley Ski Resort. Royal 
Street of Utah ("RSU"), a Utah corporation, is the general partner of Deer Valley. Royal 
Street Land Company ("Land"), a Utah corporation engaged in the ski resort and land 
development businesses, which owns virtually all of the stock of RSU, has effective 
control over RSU and, through RSU, control over Deer Valley. Royal Street Development 
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Company, Inc. ("RSDC") is a California corporation and is the affiliate and alter ego of 
Deer Valley, RSU and Land. RSDC was a shareholder of GPCC from 1971 to 1975 and 
operated GPCC during that period under a Management Agreement. 
Defendant-appellee Morgan is a New York corporation engaged in banking. 
Defendant-appellee Fidelity is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in banking. 
Defendants-appellees GPI and PPI are Delaware corporations wholly owned by Morgan 
and Fidelity on behalf of certain commingled pension trusts of which Morgan and Fidelity 
are Trustees. GPI and PPI were incorporated by Morgan and Fidelity in 1975 to receive 
a percentage of ski lease income from revenue generated by GPCC at the Park City Ski 
Resort and to own the ski resort base facility, Morgan, Fidelity, GPI and PPI are 
sometimes referred to collectively as "Morgan-Fidelity." 
Intervenor-appellee Wells Fargo has loaned money to Royal Street and its loans 
are secured by mortgages on certain real and personal property. 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
In May 1986 United Park filed its initial Complaint against GPCC and Royal Street 
alleging fraud and contract breaches. United Park filed an Amended Complaint in June 
1988. The Amended Complaint added as defendants Anaconda, ASARCO, AMOT and 
Morgan-Fidelity. 
United Park's Amended Complaint (R. 2760-2848) contains Twelve Claims for 
Relief. The First and Second Claims seek damages from Anaconda and ASARCO, United 
Park's controlling shareholders, for breaches of their fiduciary duties of loyalty, fairness 
and care in causing United Park to enter into the unfair 1975 Resort Agreements. The 
Third Claim asserts that GPCC, AMOT, Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity aided and 
abetted Anaconda's and ASARCO's breaches of duty and seeks damages and equitable 
remedies. The Fourth Claim asserts that Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity breached 
fiduciary duties they owed to United Park as co-shareholders in GPCC, and that AMOT 
7 
aided and abetted those breaches. The Fifth and Sixth Claims allege contractual and 
lease breaches by GPCC and Royal Street, The Seventh Claim alleges trespass by GPCC 
on United Park's land. The Eighth and Ninth Claims against GPCC and Royal Street, 
respectively, seek to remedy underpayment of ski lift revenues owing to United Park. 
The Tenth Claim alleges that GPCC violated its duty of good faith in its contractual 
relations with United Park. The Eleventh Claim, against Morgan-Fidelity, seeks a 
declaration of Morgan-Fidelity's rights under the 1975 Resort Agreements. The Twelfth 
Claim, against GPCC and Royal Street, seeks reformation of the Water Agreement to 
permit United Park to use its 2850 gallons per minute reservation for all purposes. 
Before any responsive pleadings to the Amended Complaint were filed and before 
any significant discovery could be obtained from Anaconda and ASARCO, or completed 
with the other parties, Anaconda and ASARCO filed motions to disqualify United Park's 
counsel. (R. 2920-36; 3119-90) These disqualification motions, although ultimately 
denied, (R. 3509-22; 3523-36) stayed discovery on the merits of United Park's claims 
through November 1989. (R. 3640-51) 
In December 1989, immediately after the stay was lifted, defendants filed motions 
to dismiss or for summary judgment. (R. 3682-3874 (GPCC); 3875-78, 4384-4404 (Morgan-
Fidelity); 3879-3922 (ASARCO); 3923-4127 (ARCO); 4128-4383 (Royal Street) ; and 4405-
34, 4505-07 (AMOT); 4449-4497 (Wells Fargo)) United Park filed a lengthy memorandum 
(R. 4523-4728) together with six affidavits (R. 4729-4867) and several volumes of exhibits 
(R. 4868-6777) which clearly demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material 
fact precluding summary judgment. One affidavit, submitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(f), demonstrated that significant and relevant discovery had not been completed. 
(R. 4862-67) The district court heard argument on all pending motions on April 4, 1990. 
On April 12, 1990, the court issued Memorandum Decisions granting defendants' motions 
to dismiss and for summary judgment essentially in their entirety. (R. 7651-97) 
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On May 15, 1990, over United Park's written objections (R. 7701-54), the district 
court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orders, drafted by defendants. 
(R. 7821-48; 7851-56) The Orders dismissed United Park's Amended Complaint with 
prejudice in its entirety as to all defendants except GPCC, and dismissed all claims with 
prejudice as to GPCC except for one factually distinct claim, Id. By Order of May 30, 
1990, the district court directed entry of final judgment against United Park pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). (R. 7881-82) 
The district court held, as a matter of law, that (1) United Park's claims 
challenging the 1975 Resort Agreements were barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 or the four-year limitation in § 78-12-25(3) 
because United Park knew or should have known of its claims in 1975; (2) the claims 
challenging the 1975 Resort Agreements were barred by the doctrine of Bangor Punta 
Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974) ("Bangor PuntaM); 
(3) no genuine issues of fact existed as to United Park's claims against Anaconda and 
ASARCO; (4) United Park had failed to state claims against GPCC or AMOT for aiding 
and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty; (5) United Park's claim for reformation of the 
Resort Agreements was barred due to United Park's acceptance of payments under the 
Agreements or because of the Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates; (6) GPCC's breach of 
the Water Agreement had been cured by payment of the price owing under that agreement 
and that United Park's other claims for breach were not breaches or had been cured or 
waived; and (7) GPCC has not committed trespass through the construction of a ski lift 
tower and maintenance building on United Park property. 
The district court committed fundamental and sweeping error. In its haste to be 
rid of United Park's Amended Complaint, the court denied United Park the right to 
complete discovery, misapplied the standards governing summary judgment and motions to 
dismiss, and resolved critical disputed factual issues and inferences in defendants' favor. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts provides this Court with an understanding of the 
Agreements at issue, the relationships among the parties, and the facts that support the 
allegations in United Park's Amended Complaint- To avoid repetition, the facts that 
directly controvert the district court 's findings are stated in detail in the Argument. 
Anaconda's and ASARCO fs Control of United Park 
When United Park was formed by consolidation in 1953, Anaconda and ASARCO 
acquired a combined 24% equity interest. By 1972, their interest in United Park had 
increased to 32%. Anaconda and ASARCO generally voted their stock as one block and 
were able to effectively control United Park from 1953 until the summer of 1985 when 
they sold their shares to Loeb. Through 1982, Anaconda and ASARCO each elected two 
of their employees to the seven-member United Park Board, thereby effectively 
controlling the Board.2 (R. 4818-20) All significant actions by United Park's Board were 
either at the direction or with the consent of Anaconda and ASARCO. Anaconda's 
representative on United Park's Board and counsel for Royal Street have admitted that 
Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park in 1975. (R. 7922 at 24; 7930 at 104) 
United Park's three outside directors were usually individuals with prior or existing 
business or professional relationships with Anaconda or ASARCO, such as retired 
employees, attorneys, bankers and mining consultants. In 1975 the three outside directors 
were Harold Steele, President of First Security Bank, Miles Romney, a mining consultant, 
2In 1981, Wheeler M. Sears, president of Cimarron Corp., joined United Park's Board. 
In 1982, one of Anaconda's employees on the board, Clark Wilson, was replaced by Ivan 
Yerger, also a representative of Cimarron Corp. Anaconda's other employee on the Board, 
Herbert Weed, retired from Anaconda in 1982, but remained on United Park's Board as 
an "independent" director. (R. 4113) Between 1982 and 1985, Cimarron pursued a merger 
with United Park, which required the support and approval of Anaconda and ASARCO. 
(R. 4770-75) Cimarron entered successive option agreements in 1981 and 1984 to 
purchase Anaconda's shares in United Park. (R. 4771-72, 4774-75) Cimarron 
representatives could take no action in conflict with the interests of Anaconda or 
ASARCO, who continued in effective control of United Park through 1985. 
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and S. N. Cornwall, formerly a member of the law firm of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy ("the Vancott firm"). 
In 1985, Anaconda and ASARCO sold their entire interest in United Park, 
approximately 1,681,549 shares, to Loeb for $3,978,034, or approximately $2.37 per share 
(R. 4737). In 1975, United Park stock traded at or substantially below $2.37 per share 
Id. Loeb is the only United Park shareholder to have purchased stock from Anaconda or 
ASARCO. United Park's other shareholders, representing approximately 68% of the 
outstanding shares, did not purchase shares from any defendant. (R. 4736-37; 6962) 
Regardless of the outcome of this litigation, it is unlikely that United Park will be able 
to pay a dividend in the foreseeable future (R. 4737). 
The 1971 Resort Agreements and Creation of GPCC 
Over the years, United Park acquired vast acreage and water rights in and around 
Park City, including the Deer Valley area. This property presented an excellent 
opportunity for a major ski resort, which United Park began to develop in the early 
1960fs. The Park City Ski Resort, then known as the Treasure Mountain Resort, opened 
in late 1963 with base and summit facilities, chair lifts and a gondola, and approximately 
27 miles of ski runs. United Park also developed a nine-hole golf course adjacent to the 
base facilities. (R. 4737-38) Resort operations grew each year, but additional 
development was required to establish Park City as a destination resort and realize its 
full profit potential. (R. 6305-07) 
In 1970, Edgar Stern of Royal Street made a proposal to Anaconda and ASARCO 
to expand and develop United Park's resort properties. Stern proposed a partnership in 
which United Park would contribute the land and water, including its existing Park City 
ski operations and resort properties. Royal Street would manage and develop the resort, 
and would find a third partner to contribute capital. (R. 7930 at 41-6; 7946 at 64-8) 
Anaconda and ASARCO agreed to Stern's proposal. For tax reasons, the parties formed 
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a closely-held corporation — GPCC — instead of a partnership, and agreed that United 
Park would sell its resort operations, real property, and other property rights to GPCC. 
(R. 7946 at 62-4) In May 1970, United Park and GPCC entered an Option Agreement 
(R. 6258-86), which provided that if GPCC obtained $4,500,000 from the contemplated 
financial partner, the following agreements would be executed: 
Land Purchase Agreement ("Land Agreement"). United Park would sell to GPCC 
approximately 4,200 acres suitable for commercial, condominium and subdivision 
development, together with the base resort facilities, golf course and other resort 
improvements for $5,400,000 payable over time, (R. 4872-5016) These terms were very 
favorable for GPCC. (R. 4740-41) 
Ski Area Leases ("Ski Leases"). United Park would lease to GPCC 432 acres under 
the Crescent Ridge Lease, 47 acres under the Deer Valley Lease, and 5,631 acres which 
included the then-existing ski runs under the Resort Area Lease. (R. 5167-88, 5217-38, 
5307-41) Each Ski Lease had an initial 20-year term and one additional 20-year 
extension. United Park would receive only 1% of the first $100,000 of ski lift revenue 
and one half of one percent (.5%) of the lift revenue over $100,000 for the first 20-year 
term with a one-half of one percent increase during the extension. This 40-year term and 
minimal rental was extremely favorable for GPCC even in contrast to public land leases, 
which generally have lower rentals than private land leases. (R. 4740-41) 
Water Rights Purchase Agreement ("Water Agreement"). United Park would sell 
certain valuable water rights to GPCC for $500,000 over time, but title would not pass 
until the other agreements were fully performed. (R. 5087-5116) United Park reserved 
the prior right to use 2850 gallons per minute from certain of the water rights for 
"mining, milling and related purposes." (R. 5089) 
The Land and Water Agreements and the Resort Area Lease each included a "cross-
default" provision which entitled United Park to declare a default on the other two 
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agreements if GPCC defaulted under any one of them. (R. 4899-4905; 5101; 5318-19) 
The cross-default provisions were to protect United Park so that United Park could 
reclaim a viable, operational ski resort if GPCC defaulted on any portion of the related 
agreements. (R. 4804-05; 4743-44) In return for conveying its ski resort, land and water 
rights to GPCC on such favorable terms, United Park received the right to participate 
as a major equity owner in the growth and development of Park City as a destination ski 
resort through an option to purchase up to 900,000 shares of GPCCfs common stock and 
900,000 shares of preferred stock over three years. (R. 6303) 
The 1971 Resort Agreements were approved by United Park shareholders, effective 
January 1, 1971. In mid-1972, Royal Street obtained the contemplated financial partner, 
Morgan-Fidelity, which together invested $4,000,000 in GPCC unsecured subordinated 
notes. In 1973, Morgan invested another $1,500,000 in GPCC unsecured subordinated 
notes. (R. 6397-98) Between 1972 and 1974, United Park purchased 900,000 shares 
(39%) of GPCC common stock and 900,000 shares (some two-thirds) of GPCC preferred 
stock, paying a total price of $972,000. (R. 5499) Royal Street acquired 24% and 
Morgan-Fidelity 20% of GPCC's common shares. (R. 6477) 
Royal Street ' s Mismanagement of GPCC and GPCC's Default 
In 1971, Royal Street began operating GPCC and developing the United Park 
properties subject to the Land Agreement. Unionamerica, a California lending institution, 
provided interim financing for the construction of condominiums and commercial business 
properties. (R. 6397-8; 6478A) Between 1972 and 1974, Unionamerica made secured 
loans to GPCC at three to six percent over the prime rate, and purchased a small number 
of shares in GPCC. (R. 7946 at 113-17) The land development and resort expansion, 
along with the growing success of the skiing operations, greatly enhanced the value of 
the real property, both developed and undeveloped, that United Park had contributed to 
GPCC. (R. 6392-93) Revenue from skiing continued to increase and generated significant 
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profits, and the number of actual skier days rose dramatically as Park City became a 
destination ski resort. (R. 6393) During the 1973-74 and 1974-75 ski seasons, the resort 
earned profits of more than $1 million each year, and accounted for one-third of Utah's 
ski market, (R. 4754; 6390) 
Throughout much of 1972, 1973 and 1974, however, Royal Street committed serious 
management errors, including over-expansion, negligent construction practices, 
construction cost overruns and continually unsound debt/equity ratios, which, when 
combined with rising interest rates, generated substantial book losses for GPCC. 
(R. 6390; 7954 at 26-7; 7921 at 130-32) Despite the successful expansion and profitability 
of the ski resort operations, Royal Street ' s land development projects generated such 
large losses and so impaired cash flow that by the summer of 1974 GPCC was 
highly-leveraged and unable to service its growing debt, then in excess of $20 million. 
(R. 6390; 7921 at 81-2; 7947 at 260-61; 7973, Ex. 21 at 827) In July 1974, Royal Street 
requested and received from GPCC's common stockholders a $2 million loan, pro rated 
in accordance with their stock ownership, until a long-term financial solution was found. 
In early 1975, GPCC failed to make substantial payments due United Park under 
the Land and Water Agreements. GPCC claimed that it was unable to make the payments, 
but it continued to make payments on other land purchase contracts with third parties. 
(R. 4748-49; 4782) Due to GPCC's defaults, United Park was entitled under the 
cross-default provisions to terminate all of the 1971 Resort Agreements, take possession 
of the Park City resort facilities and all other unconveyed properties subject to the Land 
Agreement (some 2,278 acres), all water rights subject to the Water Agreement, all real 
property subject to the Resort Area Leases and have the Deer Valley and Crescent Ridge 
Leases deemed non-exclusive. See supra at 12-13. 
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Anaconda's and ASARCOys Breach of Duty 
In 1970, Anaconda and ASARCO formed a joint venture, Park City Ventures, to 
mine United Park's properties. As controlling shareholders, Anaconda and ASARCO caused 
United Park to lease to Park City Ventures all of its mining property and equipment. 
Under the lease, Anaconda and ASARCO were to receive two-thirds of the net mining 
profits. (R. 6291-93) Because of their holdings in Park City Ventures, Anaconda's and 
ASARCOfs interests in United Park differed from the interests of United Park's other 
shareholders. (R. 7954 at 110; 7930 at 105, 112) With the Park City Ventures Mining 
Lease and the 1971 Resort Agreements, United Park was transformed into a holding 
company wholly dependent on Park City Ventures, operated by Anaconda and ASARCO, 
and on GPCC, operated by Royal Street. (R. 4744) 
In late 1974, Anaconda and ASARCO decided to cause United Park to get out of 
the ski resort and land development business. Clark Wilson, one of Anaconda's employees 
on the United Park and GPCC Boards, admitted in deposition that in 1975 Anaconda and 
ASARCO controlled United Park, and that it was their "policy" to "get out of the resort 
business" because their first interest was mining. (R. 7930 at 104-5) Wilson testified 
that Anaconda was very anxious to protect the mineral property (R. 7932 at 475), and 
believed that a threatened bankruptcy of GPCC could have a negative impact on the Park 
City Ventures mining lease. (R. 7932 at 474-76) Anaconda's principal goal was to 
protect the mining lease, and Wilson's first duty to Anaconda was to make sure that 
United Park did not do anything during any restructuring of GPCC that would interfere 
with the mining lease. (R. 7930 at 104-5, 112; 7932 at 473) "[A]nything we thought we 
could arrive at for the interests that Anaconda and ASARCO represented had to be 
cleared in New York." (R. 7932 at 411). Wilson also conceded that, with respect to 
United Park's surface assets, the interests of Anaconda and ASARCO differed from the 
interests of United Park's other shareholders. (R. 7930 at 112) Anaconda and ASARCO 
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refused to allow United Park to preserve its equity in GPCC or its interest in the resort's 
property and other assets, even though they knew that the value of the resort and the 
real property that United Park had contributed to GPCC had increased greatly since 1971. 
In a memorandum to the Anaconda files dated March 26, 1975, for example, Wilson wrote 
that the "value of the properties is now much greater than in the [1971] UPC contract, 
perhaps 10 times." (R. 6467) 
Royal Street's and Morgan-Fidelity's Breach of Duty 
During 1974 and early 1975, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity and Unionamerica held 
discussions about restructuring GPCC to relieve its debts and realize its future growth 
potential. Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity and Unionamerica3 knew that United Park was 
controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO, and that Anaconda and ASARCO had no interest in 
preserving United Park's interests in the ski resort but were concerned solely with 
protecting their mining interests. Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative in the 
restructuring of GPCC, testified in deposition that Anaconda and ASARCO "had zero 
interest in the future of the ski area, zero," and were "very, very serious about trying 
to protect their mining rights." (R. 7954 at 109-10) Butler testified that the focus of 
the mining companies was almost exclusively on the mining and the protection of the 
mining interests and what they had coming under the old 1971 agreements. Id. The 
mining companies did not attempt to obtain anything more than that (R. 7954 at 110-11), 
because "they basically wanted to protect their mine and protect their principal." 
(R. 7954 at 112) Consequently, Morgan "never really had any cause to negotiate very 
much" with Anaconda and ASARCO. Id. Donald Prell, Unionamerica?s representative, 
also testified in deposition that United Park "wanted to be sure that down the road they 
collected these funds" they were owed on the 1971 agreements. "They didn't want to 
3Unionamerica, which went out of existence in 1983, is not a party to this action. 
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wind up getting back" the resort properties because they "had the subsurface, the mines 
that they wanted, obviously, to keep." (R. 7921 at 49) 
Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity, and Unionamerica thus knew that Anaconda and 
ASARCO would agree to restructure GPCC on terms grossly unfair to United Park to 
protect Park City Ventures. (R. 7954 at 110, 148; 7930 at 104-5, 112) Royal Street, 
Morgan-Fidelity, and Unionamerica were each willing to restructure GPCC but only if 
each received substantial equity, property, or participation in the growth of the resort. 
By spring 1975, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity, and Unionamerica agreed to a division of 
GPCC's assets that enabled each to obtain its objectives. 
Unionamerica and Morgan-Fidelity had lost confidence in Royal Street ' s ability to 
manage the ski resort. Unionamerica decided not to provide capital to restructure GPCC, 
and to require satisfaction of its secured loans to GPCC and receive something for its 
equity. (R. 7921 at 127; 7953 at 73-4) Morgan-Fidelity recognized that the successful 
ski resort would be very profitable in the hands of competent management. Therefore, 
Morgan-Fidelity determined to convert their unsecured investment in GPCC to an 
ownership interest in the ski resort facilities and the ski mountain leasehold, which would 
provide them a large percentage of the ski lift revenue generated by new management. 
Morgan-Fidelity also determined to have United Park extend the terms of the Ski Leases 
on the same highly favorable rentals that United Park had given GPCC originally so that 
Morgan-Fidelity could reap those large profits for as long as possible. (R. 7954 at 49-
50, 55, 121) Morgan-Fidelity threatened a GPCC bankruptcy if United Park did not agree 
to at least two 20-year extensions. (R. 6373; 7954 at 55, 144) 
Royal Street wanted to develop all of the properties that United Park had 
contributed to GPCC, and had plans to develop the Deer Valley properties as a new and 
exclusive resort. (R. 4790-91; 4859-60; 7946 at 93; 7921 at 34) Like Anaconda and 
ASARCO, Royal Street knew that the real property United Park had contributed to GPCC 
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had increased greatly in value. In spring 1975, Royal Street prepared prospectuses for 
GPCC stating the residual values of the United Park properties at $37.8 million, excluding 
the Park City Resort base facilities, golf course, and water rights. (R. 6529) The 
prospectuses valued United Park's Deer Valley properties alone at more than $15 million. 
(R. 6521; 4751-52) Royal Street insisted that it receive United Park's Deer Valley 
properties, other properties near the resort facilities and Thaynes Canyon, and certain 
water rights, as part of any restructuring. (R. 7954 at 53; 7921 at 34) 
Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity and Unionamerica rejected alternatives for 
restructuring GPCC inconsistent with their objectives4 and sought an experienced operator 
to run the Park City Ski Resort. In early 1975, Royal Street negotiated with Vail 
Associates, the operator of the Vail Colorado ski resort, and Disney Properties of 
California. (R. 7921 at 110; 7954 at 51; 7940 at 33) Royal Street made clear that the 
Deer Valley properties were unavailable because Royal Street intended to retain these 
properties for itself. (R. 7954 at 53; 7921 at 34) Disney was not interested in this 
limited investment without developable real estate (R. 7940 at 33-34), and Vail indicated 
that for internal reasons it could not make a decision for several months. (R. 7975, 
4In fall 1974, GPCC requested Salomon Brothers, Inc. ("Salomon"), a prominent New 
York investment banking house, to analyze and recommend possible methods of 
recapitalizing GPCC. Salomon developed a number of recapitalization plans in which each 
of United Park's shareholders maintained its equity interest. The plans were designed 
to enable GPCC to meet its future obligations, with an appropriate margin of safety, 
assuming no additional capital investment by present security holders or outside investors. 
(R. 6332-44) The recapitalization plans also contemplated no changes in the 
miscellaneous secured notes held by non-GPCC affiliated persons, the construction notes 
held by Unionamerica or in the existing preferred stock. The plans described the United 
Park notes due in 1987 as "the most senior security in [GPCC's] capital structure, having 
a prior lien on substantially all the resort 's properties and facilities," and proposed that 
these notes would retain their senior, fully secured position. (R. 6335) Salomon stated 
that it believed the plans were "fair and equitable to all present security holders on the 
basis of their current position within [GPCC's] capital structure." (R. 6333) There is 
evidence that certain members of the United Park Board, such as S.N. Cornwall, were not 
informed of the Salomon recommendations. (R. 4802; 4786-87) Salomon's 
recommendations were never implemented. 
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Ex. 51) The Aspen Ski Resort owners notified United Park in April 1975 that Aspen would 
be interested in purchasing the operations if GPCC could not meet its obligations to 
United Park and United Park took back the ski area. (R. 6599) United Park's 
management did not pursue this option. (R. 4750) 
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity then negotiated with Nick Badami of AMOT, 
presenting AMOT with a most favorable opportunity: for a modest investment it could 
acquire a unique and profitable ski operation, together with valuable real estate, including 
a golf course and other commercial property suitable for hotel sites and condominiums, 
and one-half of United Park's water rights, all at the favorable 1971 prices. AMOT and 
Badami knew the increased 1975 values of the land and the ski resort from the GPCC 
prospectuses. (R. 7946 at 131) Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative, who 
favored Vail to acquire GPCC, said that Vail "walked away from the greatest corporate 
opportunity in their history and Nick Badami was smart enough to pick it up." (R. 7954 
at 94) In the negotiations, Badami joined Morgan-Fidelity in insisting on two additional 
20-year Ski Lease extensions from United Park. (R. 7921 at 58, 139-40; 7939 at 237) 
The 1975 Resort Agreements 
In June 1975, AMOT, Morgan-Fidelity, Royal Street, Unionamerica and United Park 
management entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (R. 6625-57), which divided up the 
assets of GPCC as follows: 
Royal Street. Royal Street was assigned GPCC's rights under the 1971 Land and 
Water Agreements to purchase from United Park — at the favorable 1971 prices but with 
further extended payments — the Deer Valley properties, other properties near the Park 
City resort facilities and Thaynes Canyon, and one-half of United Park's water rights. 
Royal Street valued these properties and water rights at more than $18 million. (R. 6521; 
4751-52) The amounts remaining to be paid for these properties and water rights under 
the 1971 Agreements was approximately $1.9 million. (R. 6638) 
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In addition, United Park agreed to sell other properties with great potential value 
as building sites that Royal Street needed to develop the Deer Valley area. These 
properties had not been included in the original 1971 Land Agreement, and were 
subsequently sold to Royal Street at prices below their market value and some at prices 
below United Park's cost. (R. 6374; 4752) Royal Street was also assigned the right to 
lease for skiing purposes 1,834 acres in an expanded Deer Valley Lease for the same low 
rentals as in the original 47-acre Deer Valley Lease, with two additional 20-year 
extensions at nominal rental increases. (R. 5291-97; 6639) 
In return, Royal Street cancelled $250,000 in subordinated notes, its shareholder 
loan to GPCC of $694,420, and a questionable claim for accrued management fees of 
$366,000. Royal Street also sold the GPCC preferred and common stock which it 
purchased for about $530,000 to AMOT and Unionamerica for $4,000. Royal Street also 
agreed to assume a $1.5 million loan which it had previously guaranteed. 
Morgan-Fidelity. Through their subsidiaries, GPI and PPI, Morgan-Fidelity became 
the owners of 210 acres on which the Park City base resort facilities are located and 53 
acres of contiguous property, and the lessees of United Park under the Resort Area and 
Crescent Ridge Leases. These two leases were extended for two additional 20-year 
terms, from the year 2011 to the year 2051. Morgan-Fidelity then sublet the ski resort 
property to GPCC for an increasing percentage of GPCC's ski lift revenue between 1975 
and 1983. For the remaining 67 years on the lease, Morgan-Fidelity received either 12-
3/4% of GPCCfs lift revenue for the base year 1983 (increased by a consumer price index 
factor), or 8-3/4% of GPCC's lift revenue for the current year, whichever was greater. 
Morgan-Fidelity was responsible for the 1/2 of 1% rental due United Park. As of 1986 
Morgan-Fidelity had received $5.5 million in Ski Lease revenues with 65 years remaining 
on the leases. In the past three years, 1987, 1988, 1989, their revenue percentage has 
averaged close to $1 million annually. (R. 4768-69) 
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In return, Morgan-Fidelity cancelled $5.5 million in subordinated notes; its 
shareholder loan to GPCC of $407,000; and sold for a nominal amount their 20% share of 
GPCC common stock which cost them $466,000. This unsecured investment, with accrued 
interest, totalled about $6.8 million. (R. 6635-38) 
Unionamerica. Unionamerica received developed and undeveloped GPCC real 
property with a 1975 value of $14,200,000; trust deeds, notes and contracts with a total 
balance owing of $695,000, prepaid water connection fees worth $477,000, and 
condominium furnishings and accessories. (R. 4768; 6651-53) Unionamerica also increased 
its equity share of GPCC from 5% to 20% and received 15% of the equity in the Morgan-
Fidelity subsidiaries and 6% of the equity in Royal Street Land. Shortly after the 
Memorandum of Agreement was signed, Unionamerica sold its 20% interest in GPCC to 
AMOT for $325,000 and its 15% equity interest in the Morgan-Fidelity subsidiaries for 
$317,500. (R. 4765-66) United Park believes that Unionamerica also sold its interest in 
Royal Street Land to Royal Street 's major equity holder, but the district court 's ruling 
has precluded United Park from discovering these facts. In return, Unionamerica 
cancelled its loans to GPCC totalling $9,223,655, and its notes and shareholder loan to 
GPCC which totalled $382,547. (R. 6626; 6653) 
AMOT. AMOT acquired 80% of the GPCC common stock, by agreeing to infuse 
$1,300,000 into GPCC to offset remaining book liabilities, and to guarantee GPCC loans, 
including a First Security Bank loan of $450,000. (R. 6647-48; 5940) For this modest 
investment, AMOT acquired through GPCC the right to lease the Park City Ski Resort 
operations from Morgan-Fidelity. Using a discounted cash flow analysis based on the 
actual 1974 skiing operations financial results, the Park City Ski Resort had a value of 
$15,600,000 at a 12% discount rate. (R. 4765) AMOT also received certain development 
properties including the golf course, worth $4.2 million in 1975, GPCC's share of United 
Park's water rights, worth $L17 million in 1975, and the benefit of GPCC's tax loss 
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carryforward of $6 million. (R. 4765; 7948 at 395-98) 
United Park. United Park relinquished its major equity interest in GPCC, which 
had been the primary justification for the very favorable terms of the 1971 Agreements, 
by selling its common and preferred stock in GPCC which had cost $972,000 for $2,000. 
United Park remained bound under the 1971 Land Agreement, but extended the time for 
payment by three years. United Park thus conveyed 4200 acres of real property, the ski 
resort base facilities and the golf course at the favorable 1971 prices — even though 
United Park was giving up its major equity interest, the properties had increased greatly 
in value, and United Park had the right to reclaim the properties pursuant to the cross-
default provisions of the 1971 Agreements.5 United Park also sold to Royal Street 
additional valuable building site properties that were not included in the 1971 Land 
Agreement at prices below market value and some even below cost. (R. 4757) 
United Park also remained bound under the favorable terms of the 1971 Water 
Agreement, and extended the time for payment from 11 to 14 years, even though United 
Park was entitled to terminate the Water Agreement. The 1971 Water Agreement had 
reserved to United Park only the water needed for "mining, milling and related purposes." 
(R. 5089) Because in 1971 United Park was to own a major share of GPCC and would 
benefit from GPCCfs property development and sale of water, United Park sold more 
water to GPCC than GPCC needed to develop all its Park City and Deer Valley properties. 
(R. 4766) With United Park relinquishing its equity in GPCC, however, there was no 
longer any reason to sell more water than GPCC and Royal Street actually needed. 
United Park should have and easily could have retained additional water to develop its 
sThere is evidence that some of United Park's directors, like S.N. Cornwall, may have 
agreed to do so based on the representations of GPCC that the land had no value. 
(R. 6024-25; 4802-03) However, representatives of United Park's controlling shareholders 
and the other parties to the transaction knew that the land had greatly appreciated in 
value between 1971 and 1975, and that the undeveloped Deer Valley properties were 
particularly valuable. See supra at 17-18. 
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own properties or to sell to others. 
United Park also agreed to extend the three Ski Leases for two 20-year terms, 
or until the year 2051, and to substantially enlarge the acreage of the Deer Valley lease. 
United Park received nothing for these extensions and enlargement, including no increase 
in ski lease revenues from 1975 until 2011, and only a nominal 1/2 of 1% increase from 
2011 until 2051. As a consequence, GPCC pays United Park approximately $60,000 
annually in ski lease revenue, and pays Morgan-Fidelity approximately $1 million.6 
(R. 4763-64) The refusal of Anaconda, ASARCO and United Park management to attempt 
to retain the additional water in 1975, or to increase the minimal ski lease revenue, in 
particular manifests their reckless indifference to the interests of United Park and its 
outside shareholders. 
In effect, the 1975 Resort Agreements restructured GPCC solely at the expense 
of United Park. Royal Street cancelled debts, some very questionable, of no more than 
$2 million, assumed a $1.5 million loan that it had previously guaranteed, and purchased 
for $1.9 million the Deer Valley and Park City properties and water rights that it valued 
at more than $18 million. Morgan-Fidelity cancelled debts of $6.8 million in return for 
the valuable Park City Resort base facilities and more than $8.5 million in ski lift revenue 
through 1989 and continuing to the year 2051. Unionamerica cancelled debts of $9.6 
million in return for properties worth nearly $16 million; and AMOT purchased GPCC, the 
golf course, and certain water rights worth more than $20 million in 1975, for less than 
$2 million. United Park in contrast gave away its equity in GPCC for nothing, extended 
the three Ski Leases from the year 2011 to the year 2051 for nothing, and sold its 
property and water rights, valued by defendants at nearly $40 million, for $4 million. 
6The unfairness of the Ski Lease terms is further demonstrated by the fact that the 
Memorandum of Agreement gave GPCC an option to develop the Deer Valley ski resort. 
If exercised, the option entitled Royal Street to 3.5% of lift revenues, or seven times the 
percentage paid to United Park. (R. 4751-52; 7940 at 160-62) 
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The June 23, 1975 Memorandum of Agreement required United Park's shareholders 
to approve the 1975 Resort Agreements at a special shareholder meeting which eventually 
was held on October 7, 1975. Many terms of the Agreements, however, were performed 
well before the scheduled shareholder meeting, Unionamerica received the property deeds 
and contract rights even before the Agreements were signed, and sold or liquidated some 
of the property during the summer of 1975. (R. 6626; 4753; 7953 at 97) In late spring 
1975, Royal Street surrendered control and management of GPCC to AMOT, which infused 
$675,000 into GPCC. (R. 7940 at 86; 5940) Anaconda and ASARCO caused United Park 
to make the undisclosed sale of valuable real property in Deer Valley to Royal Street at 
prices well below market value. (R. 4753-54) Unionamerica agreed to sell its twenty 
percent interest in GPCC to AMOT for $325,000 following United Park shareholder 
approval. (R. 7940 at 105-6) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court ignored the governing precedents of this Court, improperly 
resolved disputed issues of fact against United Park, entered findings on issues not raised 
by the motions, and violated "bedrock" principles of law in dismissing certain claims. 
Specifically, United Park appeals the following fundamental errors: 
First, the district court abused its discretion by denying United Park the 
opportunity to complete relevant discovery* 
Second, the district court improperly held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims 
were time-barred because United Park discovered or should have discovered the claims 
in 1975 through outside shareholders or independent directors. The court rejected 
compelling evidence that United Park could not discover or assert its fiduciary duty 
claims before independent management assumed control of United Park in August 1985. 
Those facts established that defendants ARCO and ASARCO, United Park's controlling 
shareholders, and other defendants misrepresented and concealed essential information 
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from United Park's outside shareholders; and that United Park's directors were not 
independent and would not or could not assert those claims. 
Third, the court improperly held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims were 
barred by the Bangor Punta doctrine, because Loeb purchased approximately 31% of 
United Park's shares from Anaconda and ASARCO in 1985. The Bangor Punta doctrine 
precludes a corporation from suing former management for mismanagement and corporate 
waste where the wrongdoers had sold virtually all of the shares of the corporation to the 
current shareholders at a price that reflected the wrongdoing. Bangor Punta does not 
apply to United Park's fiduciary duty claims because Anaconda and ASARCO sold less 
than one-third of United Park's shares. United Park, not Loeb, is the real party in 
interest and defendants did not attempt to prove that United Park would receive a 
windfall. Further, Bangor Punta does not apply to United Park's claims against 
defendants other than Anaconda and ASARCO. Finally, even if Bangor Punta applies, it 
requires at most a pro rata reduction for the shares purchased by Loeb, and not a 
complete bar of United Park's claims. The district court ruling stands Bangor Punta on 
its head, and grants defendants the windfall the doctrine is intended to avoid. 
Fourth, the district court improperly found that "no genuine issues of material fact 
exist" regarding United Park's breach of fiduciary duty claims against Anaconda and 
ASARCO. Anaconda and ASARCO unquestionably owed fiduciary duties to United Park 
as its controlling shareholders, and United Park presented substantial evidence that 
Anaconda and ASARCO breached those duties. These findings were particularly egregious 
because Anaconda and ASARCO never moved for summary judgment on the ground that 
they owed no duties or that they did not breach their duties. 
Fifth, the district court improperly dismissed United Park's claims against AMOT 
and GPCC for aiding and abetting Anaconda's and ASARCO's breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Aiding and abetting liability is a "bedrock" principle of law and United Park presented 
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to whether defendants breached fiduciary duties to United Park (or aided and abetted the 
breaches of others), whether United Park could have discovered or asserted its fiduciary 
duty claims in 1975, and whether GPCC and Royal Street have breached the Resort 
Agreements. Moreover, the stay of discovery obtained by ARCO and ASARCO precluded 
United Park's discovery. Under these circumstances, the district court abused its 
discretion in granting defendants' motions before permitting United Park to complete 
discovery. Thus, the judgment must be reversed. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-15 
(Utah 1984); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Utah 
1977). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
United Park's first four causes of action allege breaches of fiduciary duty in 
connection with the 1975 Resort Agreements. United Park alleges that Anaconda and 
ASARCO breached their duties of loyalty, fairness and care as controlling shareholders 
by causing United Park to give away its equity share in GPCC so they could concentrate 
on mining activities and protect their discrete interest in Park City Ventures. United 
Park alleges that the other defendants, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity, GPCC and AMOT, 
induced or aided and abetted these breaches by Anaconda and ASARCO, or breached their 
own fiduciary duties to United Park, by overreaching, making unwarranted threats, and 
taking unfair advantage of United Park, 
The district court held that these claims were time-barred because United Park, 
in 1975, "knew or should have known of any alleged wrongdoing resulting from" the 1975 
Resort Agreements. (R. 7854-55, H I ) 8 The court purported to make "factual findings" 
8The district court held that United Park's claims against Anaconda and ASARCO 
are governed by the three-year statute of limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 (1953) 
(actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation), and that United Park's claims 
against the other defendants are governed by the four-year statute of limitations in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1953, as amended) (actions not otherwise provided for by law). 
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that United Park's shareholders were informed of the terms of the Agreements and were 
on notice of facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of a cause of action. 
(R. 7854, U 12) The court also made "factual findings" that United Park's independent 
directors were fully informed about the Agreements, were free from conflict of interest, 
and were not otherwise implicated in the wrongdoing. (R. 7852-53, f 4) 
In making these factual findings, the court improperly rejected evidence that 
United Park could not discover and assert its claims before new management assumed 
control of United Park in August 1985.9 United Park established that defendants 
concealed from United Park's outside shareholders information essential to enable them 
to judge the fairness of the Agreements or discover that defendants had breached their 
fiduciary duties. Crucial information, including the value of the properties that United 
Park gave to GPCC and other defendants, was never disclosed to shareholders at the 
May 27, 1975 annual shareholder meeting (where the Agreements were first discussed), 
in the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement distributed to shareholders, or at the 
October 7, 1975 special meeting (where the Agreements were approved). United Park 
Because United Park's Amended Complaint was filed in June 1988 and United Park alleges 
that it could not discover and assert its claims before August 1985, the difference in the 
two statutes is immaterial to the district court's ruling and to the issues on appeal. 
9A corporation discovers wrongdoing by its officers, directors or controlling 
shareholders through outside shareholders or independent directors. "Discovery" of 
fiduciary duty claims thus has two components: the shareholders or directors must have 
knowledge of the wrongdoing, and must be sufficiently independent and disinterested to 
be able to assert claims on behalf of the corporation. As long as the wrongdoers remain 
in control of the corporation and/or conceal their wrongdoing from shareholders or 
independent directors, the statute of limitations on the corporation's claims against them 
is tolled. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876-79 
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); HT, an Int ' l . Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 
F.2d 909, 928-32 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
United Park alleges that it could not discover and assert its breach of fiduciary 
claims until August 1985, both because Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park and 
the other defendants were implicated in the wrongdoing and because they concealed 
information about their wrongdoing from United Park's outside shareholders. 
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also presented substantial evidence that United Park's outside directors Romney, Cornwall 
and Steele, had conflicts of interest or were implicated in the wrongdoing, or that 
defendants concealed crucial information from them. Finally, the district court ignored 
United Park's investigation beginning in 1985, which established that defendants 
continued to conceal information throughout 1985, and that United Park exercised 
reasonable, if not exceptional, diligence to discover its fiduciary duty claims, both before 
and after United Park filed its initial complaint in 1986. 
The district court 's findings are particularly egregious because defendants' motions 
were so fact-specific and because the issue of discovery is so seldom capable of 
resolution on summary judgment. Following a discussion of the appropriate legal standard, 
each of the facts that controverts the district court 's findings is presented below, 
A. United Park's Claims Did Not Accrue Until United Park 
Discovered or Should Have Discovered the Facts Constituting 
the Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, and Defendants Bore An 
Exceptionally Heavy Burden to Demonstrate No Genuine Issue 
of Material Fact 
As this Court has held again and again in a variety of contexts, an injured party 
discovers a cause of action when he or she discovers "that there is a wrong to be 
complained o f or "the facts constituting the cause of action." In Stewart v. K&S Co., 
591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979), this Court held that "where there is a fiduciary 
relationship, such as between corporate officers and a stockholder, the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until the stockholder discovers, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should discover, that there is a wrong to be complained of" (emphasis 
added). In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that in 
"some enumerated areas of the law, our Legislature has adopted the discovery rule by 
statute so that the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action" (emphasis added). And in Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989), this Court recently held that 
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discovery of fraudulent concealment in the context of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, includes the discovery of "legal injury" or "awareness of physical injury and 
knowledge that the injury may be attributable to negligence." 
United Park's fiduciary duty claims therefore did not accrue until United Park 
discovered or should have discovered the facts constituting the breaches of fiduciary 
duty. Knowledge of the 1975 Resort Agreements or their terms alone cannot trigger the 
statute, because it does not constitute knowledge that a wrongdoing has been committed. 
In Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1989), for example, a 
closely-held corporation repurchased the shares of one shareholder. Corporate officers 
told the shareholder that the purchase price had been determined by independent 
appraisal, when in fact the corporate officers directed the preparation and outcome of 
the appraisal. The court held that the shareholder's claims for fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty against the corporate officers did not accrue when the shareholder 
suspected the appraisal was too low, but only later when the shareholder discovered the 
"facts that are central" to his claims — that the appraisals were not independent. 866 
F.2d at 1494-95. In Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.) 
cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984), the Ninth Circuit held that a corporation's financial 
problems did not give its shareholders knowledge of fraud and malpractice by the 
corporation' s accountants: 
Financial problems, however, do not necessarily suggest 
accounting fraud. Sudden losses, the "going concern" qualif-
ication, a decline in stock price, suspension of trading, 
difficulty with creditors, and the resignation of top manage-
ment may also be explained by financial mismanagement, cost 
overruns, general market conditions, or other events unrelated 
to accounting fraud. 
727 F.2d at 878. 
So it is here. The Resort Agreements themselves do not give notice of 
wrongdoing. It is only when United Park discovered or should have discovered the facts 
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constituting the breaches of fiduciary duty — the wrongdoing — that United Park's 
fiduciary duty claims accrued.10 
The discovery rule imposes a heavy burden on summary judgment,11 because 
"discovery" is so fact specific: 
The question of when the alleged wrongdoing occurred or 
should have been discovered is a question of fact. It may be 
decided as a matter of law only when uncontroverted evidence 
irrefutably demonstrates that the plaintiff discovered or 
should have discovered the defendant's wrongful conduct. 
* * * 
The issue of what a reasonably prudent [person] should have 
known is one that is particularly suited to a jury 
determination. Because precedent dictates that the question 
of actual or constructive notice of a cause of action is for 
the trier of fact, the party seeking summary judgment has a 
heavy burden to show that there exists no issue of material 
fact regarding notice. 
Washington v. Baenziger, 673 F.Supp. 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (emphasis added), citing 
Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d at 877, 879; Admiralty Fund v. Hugh 
Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1982). Whether the injured person had 
See also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480-81 (1986) (although 
claimants knew that Social Security Administration had denied their claims for benefits, 
their causes of action did not accrue until they knew that the denial had been made 
pursuant to an internal and illegal governmental policy); Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 
69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (cause of action by federal employee, who had been coerced into 
resignation of employment under false charges of homosexuality, against employer for 
knowing and malicious use of false information accrued when employee learned that his 
employers had participated in the preparation of the false charges, not when he learned 
that the charges were false or when he resigned). 
nSummary judgment is proper, of course, only if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party demonstrates that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The facts forming the basis for summary judgment must be clearly established or admitted, 
and any and all doubts, uncertainty, and inferences must be resolved in favor of the non-
moving party. See, e.g., Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min. Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1307-08 
(Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). 
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knowledge sufficient to put him on notice,12 whether the injured person exercised 
diligence to discover the claims,13 and whether material information was concealed or the 
person was otherwise misled,14 are all fact questions that render summary judgment 
seldom appropriate. 
For this reason, this Court recently emphasized that even where it "may be a close 
call" whether a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered its cause of action, "[s]uch 
close calls are for juries, not judges, to make." Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 
784 P.2d at 1186. The facts here, however, do not present a close call. United Park 
presented compelling facts from which a jury could conclude that United Park could not 
have discovered its breach of fiduciary duty claims before 1985. The district court 
improperly resolved those questions of fact against United Park. 
l2See, e.g., Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 
1982) (because the "question of notice of fraud is for the trier of fact, the party seeking 
summary disposition has an extremely difficult burden to show that there exists no issue 
of material fact regarding notice"). 
13See, e.g., Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir. 1979) (issues 
of "due diligence and constructive knowledge depend on inferences drawn from the facts 
of each particular case" and render summary judgment inappropriate when conflicting 
inferences can be drawn); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 10 (5th Cir. 1967) 
("[i]nevitably the factual issue of due diligence involves, to some extent at least, the 
state of mind of the person whose conduct is to be measured against this test and it is 
simply not feasible to resolve such an issue on motion for summary judgment"); First 
Interstate Bank v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 744 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) 
(whether "at a fixed moment in time a particular plaintiff should have known the material 
facts forming the basis of one or more tort claims . . . is not a question . . . of lawff 
and must be deemed a question of fact for determination by the fact finder). 
14See, e.g., Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 701 F.2d 879, 888 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(whether fraud should have been discovered is question of fact, particularly where 
conduct of fraudulent party was calculated to mislead, deceive, or dissuade inquiry from 
the victim); Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 114 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Cal. App. 1974) (whether 
defendant fraudulently concealed fact material to claim for relief and whether plaintiff 
exercised reasonable diligence in discovering fraud are questions for the jury). 
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B. United Park Presented Compelling Evidence That Defendants 
Concealed Material Information And That United Park Could 
Not Discover Its Fiduciary Duty Claims Until 1985. 
1. Defendants Concealed From United Park's 
Outside Shareholders Information Essential to 
Discovery of the Claims. 
The district court found that United Park's outside shareholders had knowledge of 
the 1975 Resort Agreements through the discussion at the annual shareholder's meeting 
on May 27, 1975, through the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement distributed to 
shareholders and through the discussion of the Agreements at the October 7, 1975 special 
meeting. (R. 7826-27, 1ffl 14-15, 18-19; 7853-54, Ml 6-7, 10-11) The court concluded 
that United Park's shareholders had knowledge of the transactions and notice of facts 
that would put a reasonable person on notice that he may have a cause of action. 
(R. 7836-37, U 2; 7854-55, H 1) 
The district court did not specify what facts placed shareholders on "notice" of 
the breach of fiduciary claims, aside from the terms of the Agreements and the 
discussion of the Gartner letter at the special meeting (discussed infra at 38-44). 
Contrary to the implication in the district court 's findings of fact, shareholder knowledge 
of the Agreements alone cannot trigger the statute of limitations because it does not 
give shareholders knowledge, as this Court requires, that a wrongdoing has been 
committed. See supra at 30-31. 
Also contrary to the district court 's findings, the presentation at the May 27, 
1975 annual shareholder meeting did not provide shareholders with knowledge of the 
Agreements. That presentation consisted merely of a statement that the transactions 
were to be performed. (R. 5929-31) Management did not disclose to the few 
shareholders in attendance many critical facts, including the greatly enhanced values of 
the real property interests or water rights; the increasing value and profitability of the 
Park City Ski Resort operations; the full details of the Morgan-Fidelity leases; any 
34 
details regarding the Royal Street - GPCC ski lease option; the side agreements with 
Royal Street for the conveyance of additional United Park land; or Unionamerica1 s 
agreement to sell its 20% equity position in GPCC to AMOT for $325,000. Management 
also misrepresented that Unionamerica would receive only property on which it held 
mortgages, when in fact, Unionamerica received additional properties. Management 
represented that Royal Street was to receive "undeveloped properties in the resort area," 
but failed to disclose that these properties included the very valuable but undeveloped 
Deer Valley properties (R. 5929). 
The September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement continued to conceal information material 
to the fairness of the Agreements. The district court found that the Proxy Statement 
"stated in detail what UPCM was giving and what it was receiving," but the short, six-
page statement (R. 6662-67), made the following material misrepresentations and 
omissions: 
First, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose the value of United Park's land, ski 
resort, and water rights and misrepresented that United Park "does not know the current 
market value of these property interests." (R. 6666) In fact, Clark Wilson, Anaconda's 
representative on both the United Park and GPCC Board of Directors, knew in the spring 
of 1975 that "[t]he value of the properties is now much greater than in the [1971] UPC 
contract, perhaps 10 times." (R. 6467) Moreover, Royal Street and GPCC had substan-
tial information from which an informed opinion on market value could easily have been 
derived. Royal Street prepared prospectuses for GPCC in late 1974 and early 1975 
valuing the property that United Park had contributed to GPCC (excluding the ski resort, 
golf course, water rights and other assets) at $37.8 million. (R. 6529) 
Second, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose the increasing value and 
profitability of the Park City Ski Resort operations. The Proxy Statement did not 
disclose, for example, that the resort had earned $1 million in profit during each of the 
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1973-74 and the 1974-75 ski seasons, or that the operations were worth as much as $15.6 
million based on discounted cash flow analysis of the 1974 financials. (R. 6390; 4765) 
Third, The Proxy Statement stated the opinion of management that GPCC would 
be unable to continue business operations if the Resort Agreements were not approved. 
(R. 6663) This statement was false. Because Unionamerica had already cancelled 
GPCC's major debt in exchange for property, United Park's management knew or should 
have known that there was no real risk of bankruptcy, given the value of the real 
property, water rights and the ski resort. (R. 4756; 4782-84; 4788-89; 4859; 6346) 
Fourth, the Proxy Statement failed to provide any comparative analysis of what 
each of GPCCfs stockholders had contributed to GPCC and what each of them was 
receiving under the 1975 Resort Agreements or any facts which would permit a United 
Park shareholder to make this critical comparison. (R. 4757) 
Fifth, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that Morgan and Fidelity annually 
would receive more than 12% of Ski Lease revenues (R. 6636-37), or 24 times the 
revenues United Park received on its rentals. The Statement also failed to disclose that 
GPCC received an option from Royal Street to develop skiing at Deer Valley, which if 
exercised, would have required GPCC to pay Royal Street 3.5% of lift revenues (R. 4751-
52; 7940 at 160-62), seven times the percentage that United Park received. 
Sixth, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that Unionamerica would increase 
its equity in GPCC from 5.5% to 20%, and obtain a 15% interest in GPI and PPI and a 6% 
interest in Royal Street. (R. 6626-27) 
Seventh, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that United Park had additionally 
agreed to convey some valuable building site properties in the Deer Valley area, not 
included in the 1971 Agreements, to Royal Street at cost or below. (R. 4757) 
Eighth, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that AMOT acquired GPCC?s tax 
loss carry forward of approximately $6,000,000, and valuable United Park properties that 
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AMOT could sell to take full advantage of this tax benefit. (R. 4757; 7948 at 397-8) 
Ninth, the Proxy Statement falsely stated that the proposed transaction would 
have no material effect on United Park's income, assets, and future economic viability, 
and that the Agreements were in the best interests of United Park. (R. 6663; 6667) In 
fact, the transaction greatly impaired United Park's financial position by terminating all 
significant future participation in the expansion and development of the Park City and 
Deer Valley resort operations, property, and property rights. In short, all material 
benefits from the surface utilization of United Park's developable properties and water 
rights, including the operation of a world class ski area, were given away and United 
Park was left dependent on its underground mining interests then operated by Anaconda 
and ASARCO. (R. 4757-58) 
Finally, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose several conflicts of interest. It 
failed to disclose the policy of Anaconda and ASARCO to concentrate on mining and to 
have United Park get out of the resort and land development business, or that this policy 
conflicted with the interests of United Park's other shareholders. See supra at 15-16. 
It failed to disclose that the VanCott firm, which had drafted the Proxy Statement, was 
also representing Royal Street and GPCC. (R. 7932 at 485-90; 7942 at 32-3, 45-7, 99-
100, 104) It failed to disclose that Director Harold Steele's bank, First Security, had 
made a large loan to GPCC which AMOT had agreed to guarantee. (R. 5940) 
In short, the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement concealed information that 
would have enabled United Park's shareholders to assess the fairness of the Agreements 
or enabled them to discover that Anaconda and ASARCO and others had breached their 
fiduciary duties to United Park. Whether documents such as a prospectus give 
shareholders knowledge of a cause of action 
calls for a review of the documents in question by a trier of 
fact in light of all the evidence. A trial judge should not 
assign conclusive legal effect to such documents at the 
summary-judgment stage when there can be a genuine 
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difference of opinion as to their impact on a reasonable 
person. 
Briskin v. Ernst & Ernst, 589 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978). In light of the Proxy 
Statement's material omissions and misrepresentations, the court 's finding that the Proxy 
Statement "stated in detail what UPCM was giving and what it was receiving," is 
insupportable and improper. 
2. The Gartner Letter Is Not Evidence That United 
Park's Shareholders Had Notice Of The 
Fiduciary Duty Claims, And In Fact, Presents 
Compelling Evidence That United Park's 
Shareholders Could Not Discover United Park's 
Claims 
Shortly before the October 7, 1975 special meeting, a few shareholders sent 
letters to United Park's Board of Directors in response to the Proxy Statement. In one 
letter, Jerome Gartner, a New York attorney for shareholder Timothy Donath, complained 
that, based on his research at the SEC offices in New York, the Agreements appeared 
unfair and that the Proxy Statement failed to disclose certain material information. 
(R. 6669-82) Gartner requested that the Board of Directors postpone the special 
meeting until full and complete disclosure was made to shareholders. The district court 
devoted significant attention to the Gartner letter, finding that it was reviewed and 
discussed by United Park's Board of Directors, who voted to proceed with the special 
meeting, and that the letter was disclosed to shareholders who attended the meeting. 
(R. 7826-27, UH 16-18; 7853-54, Ml 8-10) 
The district court did not specify whether the Gartner letter was undisputed 
evidence that United Park's other shareholders had knowledge of the fiduciary duty 
claims, because it was discussed at the special meeting, or whether the letter was 
evidence that one shareholder — Donath — had knowledge of the claims, which could be 
attributed to United Park. Either way, the finding cannot stand as undisputed fact, 
because it gives defendants the benefit of every inference and ignores all the facts and 
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circumstances surrounding the letter. In fact, the letter is strong evidence that 
defendants concealed and misrepresented material information, because from the moment 
defendants received Gartner's letter, they tried to convince Gartner and other United 
Park shareholders that Gartner's assertions were utterly groundless, and to ensure that 
neither Gartner nor any shareholder challenged the Agreements. 
Clark Wilson, one of Anaconda's employees on the United Park Board, immediately 
sent the Gartner letter to Anaconda and ASARCO lawyers in New York, and asked 
Anaconda and ASARCO officials whether the meeting should be postponed. (R. 7930 at 
142) Anaconda and ASARCO instructed the United Park Board to proceed with the 
meeting as scheduled. Id. Representatives of Anaconda, ASARCO, and the other parties 
to the Agreements then met at the VanCott law offices and discussed how to handle 
Gartner and ensure shareholder approval. (R. 5940) Nick Badami, president of AMOT, 
agreed to attend the shareholder meeting and was "coached" as to how to persuade the 
United Park shareholders to approve the Agreements. (R. 7941 at 286) 
Wilson and S. N. Cornwall then contacted Gartner by telephone to dissuade 
Gartner and Donath from opposition. (R. 5940; 4759) Miles Romney, United Park's 
president, and other management officials sent letters to Gartner and a few other 
outside shareholders who had written letters raising questions, assuring them that the 
Resort Agreements, while "very complex and difficult to understand" (R. 7252) were in 
United Park's best interests and that "[t]he proposed arrangement was arrived at after 
careful consideration of other alternatives and after exhaustive studies. The proposal is 
the result of such studies and research . . . ." (R. 6934) These reassuring statements 
were demonstrably false because, among other things, the United Park Board had not 
carefully considered alternatives or made any exhaustive studies. In fact, United Park's 
position had been dictated by the policy of Anaconda and ASARCO to get United Park 
out of the resort and land development business. See supra at 15-16. 
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Only eighteen of United Park's more than 5,000 shareholders attended the October 
7, 1975 special meeting. (R. 5939; 6962) Miles Romney told those eighteen shareholders 
that a letter had been received requesting that the meeting be adjourned, and asked S. 
N. Cornwall to explain the demand. Cornwall then summarized the Gartner letter in the 
following terms: 
[T]he letter asserts that we did not in our proxy statement 
sufficiently inform the shareholders as to the nature of the 
transaction which we propose to approve here today and that 
the carrying out of this transaction would be detrimental to 
the interests of this Company . . . . Mr. Gartner, in setting 
out the reasons why he thought it was detrimental to the 
interests of the company made a great many statements which 
are not accurate in all details. 
(R. 5940) Cornwall then told the shareholders that GPCC would be in bankruptcy if the 
Agreements were not approved. Id. 
Nick Badami, who had assumed control of GPCC in May 1975, then urged the 
eighteen shareholders to approve the Agreements. Badami told the shareholders that time 
was of the essence, that the meeting could not be postponed, and that the Agreements 
were fair to United Park. (R. 5941-42) Badami characterized the Gartner letter as 
quite a letter, it compares in some cases the operation to 
Seward's folly in Alaska; however, the man doesn't know that 
they haven't sold any mineral rights. The letter is a diatribe 
of misfacts, really. Somebody had not done his homework and 
these are the kinds of things that always get me a little upset 
around the country when anybody can wite[sic] a crank letter. 
I don't know if this is a crank letter, particularly, but it has 
all the earmarks of being something upsetting, and I don't 
think it should prevent good business practice. 
(R. 5942) 
Badami's disparagement of the Gartner letter includes at least one flat 
misrepresentation of fact — because the Gartner letter never states that United Park 
was relinquishing any mineral rights. Badami made these statements to convince the 
eighteen shareholders that Gartner did not understand the Agreements and that his 
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concerns had no merit. Badami and AMOT knew, however, the substantial values of the 
United Park properties and ski resort, and knew that the Agreements were unfair to 
United Park. (R. 6529; 7946 at 131) 
Soon after the Special Meeting, Anaconda's Chairman John B. M. Place called 
Gartner. (R. 4759) United Park can only speculate as to what Place told Gartner, 
because neither of them has been deposed. Ordinarily, a plaintiff's lawyer in Gartner's 
position who received a phone call from the corporation chairman would conclude that 
he had hit the jackpot and file suit. The only reasonable inference — and an inference 
to which United Park was fully entitled — is that defendants somehow induced Gartner 
to forego opposition. 
If the district court intended to find that United Park's shareholders knew about 
the fiduciary duty claims from the Gartner letter, that finding is clearly wrong. 
Contrary to the district court's findings (R. 7826-27, 1! 18; 7854, U 10), defendants did 
not "disclose" the Gartner letter to United Park's shareholders. Defendants never 
showed the letter or disclosed its specific allegations to the eighteen shareholders who 
attended the special meeting. Those shareholders learned only what Cornwall and Badami 
told them about the letter, that it "made a great many statements which are not 
accurate," and was a "diatribe of misfacts" and a "crank letter." The vast majority of 
shareholders who voted by proxy before the meeting (other than Anaconda and ASARCO) 
never knew about the letter at all. In fact, this Court knows more about the letter than 
United Park's outside shareholders ever did. 
If the district court intended to find that United Park's shareholders had the same 
knowledge and the same duty of inquiry as Gartner, that finding is clearly wrong. 
Gartner was an experienced New York City lawyer who had litigated numerous plaintiff's 
securities lawsuits. Gartner's letter begins: 
The hurried presentation of this demand at this late 
date stems directly from the misleading and confusing 
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impression of the facts obtained from reading your proxy 
statement for the October 7, 1975 meeting of shareholders. 
Only intensive research and review of the incomplete set of 
documents available for inspection in the New York Stock 
Exchange and Securities and Exchange record room at Federal 
Plaza, New York, made possible the facts and analysis outlined 
below, to aid you to make the correct determination, before 
it is too late, to preserve the rights of the UPK stockholders 
to the valuable property being abandoned in the proposed 
agreement set forth in your October 7 proxy statement. 
(R. 6670) (emphasis added). 
After reviewing the Proxy Statement, Gartner, who knew that the New York Stock 
Exchange and the SEC maintain corporate records, took the first subway to Foley Square 
for hours of "intensive research." As a matter of law and fact, United Park's 
shareholders are not held to the same standard of knowledge and inquiry as a plaintiff's 
securities lawyer. They have no duty to review corporate books and records, much less 
the records of United Park, Anaconda and ASARCO on file at the SEC or the New York 
Stock Exchange. Nor do they have any duty to file a lawsuit to obtain concealed facts, 
Baskin v. Hawley, 807 F.2d 1120, 1131 (2d Cir. 1986), or to proceed from the outset as 
if they were "dealing with thieves," Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
United Park's shareholders were entitled to rely on the representations of defendants 
who, as fiduciaries, had an affirmative duty to disclose all material information. See, 
e^g., deHaas v. Empire State Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 1970) 
(stockholder reliance on corporate fiduciaries is to be expected, and where questions and 
doubts arise concerning corporate actions, it is reasonable for a stockholder to rely on 
the knowledge and integrity of corporate managers, although such reliance is not 
absolute). Defendants' failure to disclose lessens and may absolve United Park's 
shareholders of any duty to inquire, but again, that is a question of fact for the jury.15 
15See, e.g., Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1967); ("in the 
event that a fiduciary relationship was present, the standard of reasonableness or 
evidence of fraudulent concealment against which the plaintiff's diligence is measured 
is lessened"); Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 595 F.Supp. 1364, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 1984) 
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Finally, if the district court intended to find that one shareholder — Donath 
through Gartner — had knowledge of United Park's fiduciary duty claims, that finding is 
clearly wrong. Even if Gartner was on inquiry notice, Gartner acted on the inquiry. 
Defendants did not postpone the meeting or revise the Proxy Statement, as Gartner 
requested. They presumably did not tell Gartner — as their fiduciary duties required, but 
contrary to the Proxy Statement — that they believed that United Park's real property 
had increased in value ten times since 1971 and might be worth $37.8 million. And they 
certainly did not tell Gartner that, as he suggested, they did have a basis for valuing the 
properties, or that any of his other allegations might have any foundation. Instead, 
Anaconda and ASARCO kept their proxies in place and directed their employees on the 
United Park Board to proceed as scheduled. Defendants continued to conceal information 
and misrepresent the unfairness of the Agreements. They told Gartner by telephone and 
by letter before the meeting that he was mistaken, that the Agreements were fair to 
United Park, and that he should take no action. The chairman of Anaconda called 
Gartner again after the meeting, presumably to reassure him or dissuade him from taking 
further action. 
Thus, the Gartner letter did not give United Park's shareholders knowledge of the 
fiduciary duty claims. But even if it might have, defendants' false and misleading 
responses to Gartner and other shareholders absolved Gartner's client or any other 
shareholder of any duty to inquire further. As this Court has held, ff[o]ne cannot justly 
or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim 
(same holding as Azalea Meets); FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F.Supp. 1184, 1194-95 (D. Md. 
1984) (cause of action against former officers and directors of a corporation does not 
accrue until it is known or can be discovered by a nonculpable person with authority to 
bring the action; failure to use diligence may be excused where fiduciary duty exists 
between defendant and corporation); Lucas v. Abbott, 601 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Colo. 1979) 
(en banc) (n[j]ustified reliance on representations made within the ambit of such a 
fiduciary relationship lessens the duty of reasonable inquiry"). 
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to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the 
action when brought." Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969).16 
3. United Park's Directors Were Not Independent, 
Were Implicated In The Wrongdoing, Or Were 
Uninformed of Information Essential to United 
Park's Claims. 
The district court also made findings that United Park's three "independent" 
directors had "full knowledge concerning the terms of the restructuring and its effect" 
on United Park, were not "implicated in any alleged wrongdoing, did not have any 
conflict of interest and were fully informed of all the material facts." (R. 7825, 1111 11-
12; 7852-3, 11 3-4) These findings ignore substantial evidence that United Park's 
directors had conflicts of interest, were misinformed or uninformed about essential 
information, were implicated in the wrongdoing, or otherwise could not discover or assert 
claims on behalf of United Park. 
From prior to 1971 through 1982, United Park's seven-man board of directors was 
dominated and controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO, each of whom placed two employees 
on United Park's Board. In 1975, United Park's so-called "independent" directors were 
S. N. Cornwall, a retired partner of the VanCott firm ("VanCott"), Miles Romney, a 
retired mining consultant, and Harold Steele, president of First Security Bank. 
Each of these "independent" directors had prior or existing business relationships 
with Anaconda and ASARCO. Miles Romney, a mining consultant and former director of 
16See, e^g., United Indus. Syndicate, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 686 F.2d 1312, 
1318 (8th Cir. 1982) ("inquiry notice" does not defeat a fraud claim where affirmative 
representations have led the defrauded party to forego inquiry which it might otherwise 
have made) (Missouri law); Ballew v. A. H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 
1982) (reversing summary judgment where evidence was "equally susceptible of showing" 
that patient did not know Dalkon Shield caused her injuries and that "any suspicion she 
had was quashed when in the exercise of reasonable diligence she asked her physicians 
about a possible connection and they responded equivocally"); Augusta Bank & Trust v. 
Broomfield, 643 P.2d 100, 108 (Kan. 1982) (action timely filed where plaintiff's suspicions 
aroused but plaintiff was lulled into confidence by certain representations and abandoned 
further investigations until after limitations expired). 
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the Utah Mining Association, had longstanding business relationships with Anaconda and 
ASARCO. For many years Cornwall's law firm, VanCott, served as counsel for Anaconda 
as well as United Park. Cornwall remained on United Park's Board following his 
retirement from VanCott in 1969, and other VanCott attorneys continued to represent 
Anaconda and United Park. During the restructuring of GPCC in 1975, VanCott acted as 
counsel for United Park, Royal Street, GPCC and Anaconda. (R. 7932 at 485-90; 7942 
at 32-3, 45-7, 99-100, 104) These conflicts were not disclosed in the September 2, 1975 
Proxy Statement, which VanCott prepared. These conflicts precluded Cornwall from 
asserting a claim on behalf of United Park, even if he knew about it. Cornwall, 
however, told David Bernolfo and Louis Callister that he had been told by GPCC officials 
in 1975 that the United Park properties had no value, directly contrary to the knowledge 
of the principals of Anaconda and ASARCO. (R. 4803; 4786-87) 
Director Harold Steele was president of First Security Bank, which had a 
longstanding banking relationship with both Anaconda and ASARCO. Under the 1975 
Resort Agreements, AMOT guaranteed a loan from First Security Bank to GPCC. 
(R. 5940) This material conflict was not disclosed in the Proxy Statement. Steele may 
never have known the contents of the Proxy Statement or the Gartner letter, because 
he did not attend either the meeting approving the Proxy Statement or the special 
shareholder meeting. (R. 5934; 5936; 5939) 
Contrary to the district court's finding, Cornwall and Romney were implicated in 
the wrongdoing. They approved the false and misleading Proxy Statement (R. 5934; 
5936), and faced potential liability for its misrepresentations and omissions. Romney and 
Cornwall took active roles in assuring shareholder approval before and during the special 
meeting. Romney directed the shareholder meeting to proceed, following instructions 
from Anaconda and ASARCO, and sent letters to Gartner and other shareholders to 
dissuade them from opposition. Cornwall also actively dissuaded Gartner, and disparaged 
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the letter at the meeting. See supra at 39-40, 
United Park does not know whether these "independent" directors participated in 
the wrongdoing knowingly or recklessly, or because defendants concealed material 
information (such as property values) from them. They may have been precluded from 
asserting fiduciary duty claims on behalf of United Park because they had serious, 
material conflicts of interest, or because they were implicated in the breaches 
themselves. Or they may have been unable to discover the breaches because defendants 
concealed material information from them. The district court's ruling has prevented 
United Park from ascertaining the facts through discovery. On defendants' summary 
judgment motions, United Park was entitled to all reasonable inferences, and the district 
court's findings improperly resolved those facts and those inferences against United 
Park. 
4. United Park Could Not Discover Its Fiduciary 
Claims Until 1985. 
The district court's factual findings also ignored the investigation by independent 
management beginning in 1985 that led eventually to the discovery and the assertion of 
the fiduciary duty claims. United Park established that independent management 
exercised exceptional diligence and could not discover the fiduciary duty claims before 
United Park filed its initial Complaint in 1986, because defendants continued to conceal 
information and deflect inquiries through 1986, and because information essential to 
discovery could not be found in United Park's files. 
The Resort Agreements were approved in October 1975. The United Park Board 
thereafter did not review or analyze the fairness or propriety of the Agreements. 
(R. 5948-6235) United Park's Annual Reports to Shareholders for the year 1975 through 
the year 1984 summarized the Agreements in general terms, but did not inform 
shareholders of the values of United Park's properties or water rights as of the time of 
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the Agreements, the terms of the Morgan-Fidelity Ski Lease payments or the conflicts of 
interest of Anaconda, ASARCO, S. N. Cornwall, Harold Steele, or the VanCott firm. 
(R. 5506-5832) 
In August 1985, David Bernolfo, representing the Bambergers — United Park 
shareholders since 1953 — became president of United Park. (R. 4736; 4776) At that 
time, certain problems with the performance by GPCC and Royal Street under the Resort 
Agreements led Bernolfo to review documents in United Park's files relating to these 
problems. Bernolfo's review raised questions regarding the Agreements. Answers to 
those questions, including what properties United Park had given away and the values 
of those properties, could not be found in United Park's records. (R. 4778-79) Bernolfo 
directed United Park employees to review title to more than 1,500 parcelSo Ultimately, 
management was able to determine which properties had been transferred to Royal 
Street, Unionamerica, and others, and which had been retained by GPCC. United Park 
tried to assign values to these properties, but there were no applicable appraisals or 
other valuation information in the files. (R. 4779-80) 
During the fall of 1985, Bernolfo met with Clark L. Wilson, one of Anaconda's 
employees on the United Park Board in 1975. Wilson refused to answer any questions 
about the 1975 Resort Agreements and told Bernolfo that he would instruct the others 
who were involved not to discuss the Agreements. (R. 4781) 
Bernolfo then spoke with Mel Armstrong, a Park City property owner, who, in 
1971, had sold some tracts of land in Park City to GPCC on contract. Armstrong said 
that GPCC never defaulted or threatened bankruptcy. (R. 4782) In January 1986, 
Bernolfo first spoke with Ken Oswald, a GPCC property salesman in 1975, who said that 
he knew the values of the real property in 1975, and that GPCC employees considered 
the threat of GPCC's bankruptcy in 1975 "a joke/' (R. 4783) Several weeks later, 
Oswald provided Bernolfo with a copy of a three inch thick master plan prepared for 
47 
Royal Street around 1971. This plan showed that in 1971 Royal Street had a master plan 
for developing the entire Park City area, including Deer Valley, and that Royal Street 
considered the Deer Valley properties to be the most valuable properties in the area. Id. 
At Oswald's suggestion, Bernolfo spoke with Hal Taylor, then mayor of Park City, 
who had been a real estate broker for GPCC in 1975. Taylor told Bernolfo that he was 
able to sell GPCC condominiums as fast as they were built, but GPCC construction 
problems often delayed delivery. Taylor said that there were a number of buyers 
interested in GPCC's undeveloped properties but that GPCC would not sell any of them. 
Taylor also said that no informed GPCC employee believed the rumors in 1975 of a GPCC 
bankruptcy because of its valuable properties and profitable ski resort. (R. 4783-84; 
4858-59) 
Bernolfo requested information from Nick Badami of GPCC and Edgar Stern of 
Royal Street about the Agreements, but they would provide no information. At a meeting 
in February 1986, however, Badami told Bernolfo he had never understood why United 
Park had entered into the Agreements and that he had advised United Park not to enter 
the transaction as far as Morgan-Fidelity was concerned. (R. 4784-85) This comment 
by Badami was clearly inconsistent with Mr. Badamifs statements to the United Park 
stockholders at the 1975 Special Meeting. (R. 5941-42) See also supra at 40-41. 
In March 1986, Bernolfo met with Scott Woodland of VanCott. Mr. Woodland 
refused to discuss the Agreements, and told Bernolfo to let the matter rest. He refused 
to provide United Park documents in VanCott's files, even though he and VanCott had 
represented United Park for many years. United Park eventually obtained these 
documents by subpoena. Mr. Woodland told Bernolfo he had not represented United Park 
since 1971 and that he was not involved in any of the Resort Agreements. Woodland's 
statement is contradicted by United Park files which indicated that Woodland had 
received a retainer and represented United Park throughout and long after 1975 and that 
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the VanCott firm, with Woodland's assistance, had prepared the 1975 Proxy Statement. 
(R. 7932 at 485-88; 7942 at 99-100) 
In early April 1986, Bernolfo met with Robert Wells, a Royal Street employee who 
served as GPCCfs chief financial officer from 1971 until June 1975 when AMOT took 
over GPCC. Wells told Bernolfo about the 1974 Salomon restructuring proposals, which 
had recognized United Park's status as GPCC's senior secured creditor and protected 
United Park's interests in GPCC. (R. 4785-86) 
Bernolfo also met with S. N. Cornwall in April and July 1986. Cornwall said that 
he had been told by GPCC officials in 1975 that the United Park properties had no value. 
Cornwall said that he not only thought that the land was worthless in 1975 but also that 
the ski resort was losing money, and that the United Park Board members were told that 
if United Park did not agree to the Agreements, GPCC was facing bankruptcy. (R. 4786-
87; 4802-03, UH 5-6) 
Based on the information provided by Messrs. Taylor, Cornwall, Armstrong, Oswald, 
and others, and the refusal of Messrs. Badami, Stern, Wilson and Woodland to provide 
information, United Park concluded that GPCC and Royal Street had concealed vital 
information from Anaconda and ASARCO, United Park's minority shareholders, and United 
Park's Board of Directors. Accordingly, United Park's initial complaint, filed in May 
1986, alleged fraud and other legal violations against those defendants, but did not name 
Anaconda, ASARCO or Morgan-Fidelity as defendants. (R. 2-85) 
Limited discovery began in the summer of 1986 and continued intermittently 
through 1987. Through document production and deposition testimony, United Park 
learned crucial information that it had been unable to obtain beforehand, particularly 
with respect to 1975 values of United Park's land and the comparative values received 
by the parties to the Agreements. (Re 4790-91) United Park also learned through 
discovery and its further investigation that its controlling shareholders, Anaconda and 
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ASARCO, knew the property values as well. (R. 4791) Despite their knowledge of the 
property values, Anaconda and ASARCO decided in late 1974 to get United Park out of 
the resort and land development business and to concentrate on their joint venture and 
protect its ability to mine United Park's mining properties. 
* * * 
In summary, United Park presented compelling evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could conclude that United Park could not discover the fiduciary duty claims 
before 1985. Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park in 1975. Clark Wilson, 
Anaconda's representative on United Park's Board admitted in deposition that Anaconda 
and ASARCO had determined to "get out of the resort business" and protect the Park 
City Ventures mining lease. Concerned that a threatened bankruptcy of GPCC would 
impair their ability to mine United Park's property, Anaconda and ASARCO directed 
United Park to take no action that would interfere with the lease, but to give up its 
major equity interest in GPCC and the Park City Ski Resort. Anaconda and ASARCO 
breached their duty as controlling shareholders to obtain a restructuring of GPCC fair to 
United Park and its outside shareholders. To maximize the evident windfall at the 
expense of United Park, the other defendants threatened to force GPCC into bankruptcy 
if all of their demands were not met, and otherwise induced or aided and abetted 
Anaconda's and ASARCOfs breaches of fiduciary duties, or breached their own fiduciary 
duties to United Park. 
To ensure that United Park's shareholders approved the 1975 Resort Agreements, 
defendants concealed information showing that the Agreements were unfair. Defendants 
told shareholders they did not know the value of the properties United Park had 
contributed to GPCC, when in fact they had estimated the residual values of the real 
estate, excluding the resort and golf course, at nearly $37.8 million. They failed to tell 
shareholders what other parties received from the Agreements or that United Park was 
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conveying additional properties with substantial value. They failed to disclose the 
continuing growth and profitability of GPCC's skiing operations. Defendants falsely told 
shareholders that time was of the essence and that bankruptcy was imminent if the 
Agreements were not approved. When certain shareholders questioned the fairness of the 
Agreements, defendants reassured them with misleading statements and disparaged their 
concerns to a few other shareholders without disclosing the concerns themselves. United 
Park's "independent" directors had conflicts of interest which precluded them from 
asserting claims on behalf of United Park, or were themselves ignorant of essential 
information because defendants concealed it from them. 
Before independent management assumed control in 1985, therefore, neither United 
Park's shareholders nor its "independent directors" could discover or assert United Park's 
fiduciary duty claims. Those claims could be asserted only after independent 
management performed a thorough review of United Park's files, met with the principals, 
many of whom refused to provide meaningful information, and met with many other 
persons. Not until United Park conducted discovery on its initial complaint in 1986 and 
1987, could United Park discover that its former controlling shareholders had breached 
their fiduciary duties by causing United Park to enter into unconscionable Agreements to 
protect their own narrow and conflicting interests. The evidence that United Park 
presented to the district court is not even a "close call," and the district court 
committed plain error in resolving these disputed fact issues against United Park on 
summary judgment. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY 
BANGOR PUNTA. 
The district court improperly held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims are 
"precluded by the doctrine enunciated in" Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & 
Aroostock R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974). (R. 7855, H 4) The court held that because 
"Loeb Investments purchased all of the stock of ARCO and ASARCO" in United Park in 
1985 (R. 7854, H 13), it "would be inequitable and constitute a windfall for Loeb 
Investments or the Bamberger Group, which together now control UPCM, to receive any 
benefit resulting from suit against ARCO and ASARCO from whom the control stock was 
purchased." (R. 7855, H 3) 
The district court rulings stand Bangor Punta on its head, because the district 
court has enabled defendants to enjoy the windfall that Bangor Punta is intended to 
prevent. First, Bangor Punta bars claims by a corporation only where the current 
shareholders have purchased all or virtually all of the corporation's shares from the 
wrongdoers. Bangor Punta does not bar claims where, as here, the corporation is the 
real party in interest and asserts claims on behalf of itself and other shareholders 
damaged by the wrongdoing. Second, Bangor Punta applies only upon an established 
finding that the current shareholder would recover a "windfall" through recovery. 
Defendants failed to present any facts, much less establish as a matter of law, that Loeb 
or the Bambergers would receive an improper windfall by recovery from the wrongdoers. 
Third, even if Bangor Punta applies, it requires no more than a pro rata reduction in 
United Park's right to recover from Anaconda and ASARCO equal to the percentage of 
shares purchased by Loeb. Finally, Bangor Punta does not bar United Park's claims 
against non-selling third parties. 
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A. Bangor Punta Does Not Bar United Park's Claims Because 
Anaconda and ASARCO Held and Sold Less Than One-Third of 
United Park's Shares. 
Bangor Punta barred a corporation from suing its former controlling shareholders 
for mismanagement and other wrongs because the former shareholder had sold virtually 
all the corporation's shares — more than 98 percent —.to the current shareholder. 
Because the former shareholder had owned all the shares, the corporation in effect 
sought recovery for wrongs the former shareholder "did to itself." Because the current 
shareholder paid a price that reflected the wrongdoing, the current shareholder suffered 
no injury. And because the current shareholder owned all the shares, it was the real 
party in interest. The Court therefore disregarded the "corporate form" and held that 
"where equity would preclude the shareholders from maintaining an action in their own 
right, the corporation would also be precluded," 417 U.S. at 711-13. 
Bangor Punta does not bar a corporation from recovery for wrongdoing by former 
shareholders simply because those shareholders have sold their shares. Indeed, the case 
upon which Bangor Punta relies, Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W. 1024 (Neb. 
1903),17 states precisely the opposite. Dean (then Commissioner) Roscoe Pound barred 
a corporation from recovery because all current shareholders purchased their shares from 
the wrongdoers. Dean Pound explicitly stated that the corporation would not be barred 
if any of the current shareholders were shareholders at the time of the wrongdoing and 
therefore are 
entitled to complain of the acts of the defendant and of his 
past mismanagement of the company; for, if any of them are 
so entitled, there can be-no doubt of the right and duty of 
the corporation to maintain this suit. It would be 
maintainable in such a case, even though the wrongdoers 
continued to be stockholders and would share in the proceeds. 
93 N.W. at 1028 (emphasis added). 
17A copy of the Home Fire Insurance decision appears in the Addendum to this Brief. 
53 
As the court noted in National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 
498 F.Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1980), Bangor Punta announces a "narrow doctrine," 498 
F.Supp at 1005, whose principles are not "readily transferable beyond the factual 
circumstances in which they were employed." Id., at 1002. It "does not follow" that 
"recovery must be denied whenever a corporation seeks to recover for injury suffered 
before new owners acquired its shares." Id. Significantly, there could have been no 
lawsuit in either Bangor Punta or Home Fire Insurance until the wrongdoers sold their 
shares: 
[t]he former owners . . . had nothing to sell except a 
corporation wasted by their acts of mismanagement. An 
action brought by [the corporation] before the sale would 
have been an action against itself, for the injury suffered by 
[the corporation] was coextensive with the injury suffered by 
the wrongdoers. In such circumstances it makes no sense to 
adhere to the corporate fiction, for as a practical matter the 
corporation has not suffered any cognizable injury. 
Id., at 1003. See also In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Securities and Antitrust 
Litigation, 387 F.Supp. 906, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (corporation is entitled to recovery if 
"there are minority stockholders who were such at the time of the alleged wrongful 
transactions;" the "net result of the Bangor Punta case" is that "no recovery can be had 
by a plaintiff corporation where the beneficiary of a recovery would be a corporation 
which had purchased 99% of the stock of the plaintiff corporation after the alleged 
wrongful transactions") (emphasis in original).18 
Anaconda and ASARCO sold less than one-third of United Park's shares to one 
shareholder, Loeb. (R. 4736-37) Unlike the current shareholders in Bangor Punta and 
Home Fire Insurance, Loeb is not the real party in interest, and its purchase of one-third 
1
 Virtually all of the cases applying Bangor Punta to bar a corporation from recovery 
involve transfers of 99% or more of the stock. See, e.g., Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315, 
316 (10th Cir. 1984); In re Rea Express, Inc., Private Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation, 
412 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 n.27 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Ford Tank Maintenance Co. v. Ford, 203 
N.Y.S. 2d 542, 543 (1960). 
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of United Park's shares does not justify disregarding the corporate form.19 Unlike the 
wrongdoers in Bangor Punta and Home Fire Insurance, Anaconda and ASARCO injured the 
shareholders who owned the other sixty-eight percent of United Park's shares. Unlike 
the corporations in Bangor Punta and Home Fire Insurance, United Park's cause of action 
existed before Anaconda and ASARCO sold their shares to Loeb, if United Park had been 
able to discover and assert it. Indeed, defendants' statute of limitations motions 
asserted that United Park's shareholders, including the Bambergers should have 
discovered the wrongdoing in 1975. Because the Bambergers and other United Park 
shareholders were injured by Anaconda and ASARCO's wrongdoing, Bangor Punta does not 
bar United Park's fiduciary duty claims. 
B. Defendants Have Made No Showing That Loeb or the 
Bambergers Would Receive A Windfall From Recovery By 
United Park. 
Bangor Punta also rested on an established factual finding that the current 
shareholder received full value for its purchase price; i.e., it in effect paid a discounted 
price for the stock because of the wrongdoing of the defendants. See 417 U.S. at 
707-08. Defendants clearly bear the burden on summary judgment to establish a windfall 
as undisputed fact. See, e.g., El Dorado Bancshares, Inc. v. Martin, 701 F.Supp. 1515, 
1520-21 (D. Kan. 1988) (denying summary judgment where evidence of a windfall was in 
conflict); National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 498 F.Supp. at 1007-
19As a general matter, the corporate form may be disregarded only where the 
shareholder owns all or virtually all the shares. Disregard of the corporation form 
requires "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, and circumstances must indicate that the 
adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or 
promote injustice." Laborers' Pension Fund v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 709 
F.Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. 111. 1989), quoting Fletcher, 1 Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 41.30 (Rev. Ed. 1983). Since "it is the exceptional instance where a court 
will disregard the corporation form, the party who wishes the court to disregard that form 
bears the burden of proving that there are substantial reasons for doing so." Id., quoting 
Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers v. Hroch, 757 F.2d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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09 (denying summary judgment because there was material issue of fact whether 
wrongdoing was reflected in price of shares). 
Defendants made no attempt to prove that Loeb paid a discounted price for its 
shares or would receive a windfall from recovery by United Park. The only facts in the 
record indicate that the price paid by Loeb did not reflect Anaconda's and ASARCO ?s 
wrongdoing. In 1975 United Park stock sold at or substantially below the $2.37 average 
price per share Loeb paid for its stock. (R. 4737) The record demonstrates that it is 
unlikely that United Park will pay any dividend in the foreseeable future whether or not 
it recovers from Anaconda and ASARCO. (R. 4737) Thus, there is no evidence to 
support the district court's speculation that Loeb would receive a windfall. 
Further, there can be no conceivable evidence that the Bambergers would receive 
a windfall. Again, the Bambergers have been shareholders in United Park since 1953, and 
they purchased no shares from Anaconda or ASARCO. As outside shareholders, the 
Bambergers suffered injury from the wrongdoing of Anaconda and ASARCO, and are 
entitled to recovery under Bangor Punta and Home Fire Insurance. The court's finding 
that the Bambergers would enjoy a "windfall" is a non-sequitur with no basis in law or 
fact. 
C. At Most, Bangor Punta Requires Only a 31% Reduction in 
United Park's Recovery From Anaconda and ASARCO. 
Assuming arguendo that Bangor Punta precludes Loeb from benefitting from a 
recovery against Anaconda and ASARCO, United Park is entitled to pro rata recovery 
on behalf of its other stockholders. Bangor Punta did not address the propriety of pro 
rata recovery because the plaintiff specifically disavowed any intention to seek it. See 
417 U.S. at 718, n. 15. Subsequent cases, however, allow pro rata recovery for the 
benefit of stockholders who did not purchase stock from the wrongdoers. See, Jannes v. 
Microwave Communications, Inc., 385 F.Supp. 759, 760 (N.D. 111. 1974) (permitting 
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corporation pro rata recovery for the less than 10% of the stockholders who did not buy 
from the wrongdoers); Advanced Bus. Communications, Inc. v. Myers, 695 S.W. 2d 601, 
606-07 (Tex. App. 1985). Pro rata recovery is clearly appropriate here, where more than 
two-thirds of United Park stockholders did not buy from Anaconda or ASARCO. Anaconda 
acknowledged the principle of pro rata recovery before the district court, but argued 
that the Bambergers, as well as Loeb, should be precluded. For the reasons stated above, 
the district court committed clear error when it barred the Bambergers from recovery. 
(R. 7855, 11 3) 
D. Bangor Punta Does Not Bar Claims Against Non-Sellers. 
Anaconda and ASARCO are the only defendants who sold shares in United Park. 
The windfall that Bangor Punta seeks to avoid can occur only where a new purchaser, 
having recovered for the wrongs alleged through a discounted purchase price, seeks to 
recover again from the seller through litigation. Thus, Bangor Punta applies only to 
claims against the sellers and not to claims of wrongdoing against third parties. It 
certainly does not allow third-parties the windfall of avoiding liability for their 
wrongdoing simply because the corporation's shares have been sold. See FMC Corp. v. 
Boesky, 673 F. Supp. 242, 247 (N.D. 111. 1987), revTd on other grounds, 852 F.2d 981 
(7th Cir. 1988) (where corporation "seeks to recover from a third party for wrongdoing 
done to it . . . none of the equitable principles which informed the Bangor Punta decision 
have any relevance"); National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 498 
F.Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1050 & n.20 
(Del. 1984). The district court committed clear error when it concluded that Bangor 
Punta barred United Park's Third and Fourth Claims against Royal Street, Morgan-
Fidelity, AMOT and GPCC. (R. 7855) 
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AGAINST 
ANACONDA AND ASARCO. 
Anaconda and ASARCO did not seek summary judgment on the ground that they 
owed no fiduciary duties to United Park or its other shareholders, and did not assert that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether they breached these duties. 
Nonetheless, the district court entered a conclusion of law, drafted by counsel for 
Anaconda and ASARCO, which purported to resolve these issues even though they were 
not raised on summary judgment: 
[n]o genuine issues of material fact exist regarding [United 
Park's] allegations against ARCO and ASARCO. Therefore, 
Defendant [sic] is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter 
of law dismissing all claims for relief contained in [United 
Park's] Complaint. 
(R. 7855, H 5) This bald, unsupported conclusion was clear error. United Park's 
Amended Complaint stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty and presented substantial 
evidence that Anaconda and ASARCO breached those duties. 
United Park alleges that Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park and caused 
United Park to give away its equity interest in GPCC, including the Park City Ski Resort, 
its real property and water rights, to protect the Park City Ventures mining lease. This 
allegation states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law,20 and 
elsewhere. Controlling shareholders who affirmatively dictate the direction of a 
corporation are fiduciaries who owe the duties of loyalty, fairness and care to the 
corporation and its other shareholders. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining 
Corp. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977). 
United Park is a Delaware corporation. Claims involving the internal affairs of 
corporation, including fiduciary duty claims, are governed by the laws of the state of 
incorporation. See, e.g., Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1527 (9th Cir. 
1985); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1283, & n.16 (10th Cir. 1969); 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§302, 309 (1971). 
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Controlling shareholders are liable to the corporation if they breach those duties through 
self-dealing, through gross negligence or through a failure to disclose material facts. 
See, e.g., TWA v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. Ch. 1977); In re Reading Co., 551 
F.Supp. 1205, 1215 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying Delaware law). 
United Park presented substantial evidence that Anaconda and ASARCO controlled 
United Park and breached their fiduciary duties, including the admissions of Clark Wilson, 
Anaconda's representative on the United Park Board. Wilson admitted that Anaconda and 
ASARCO controlled United Park in 1975, that United Park's position in connection with 
the restructuring of GPCC was cleared with Anaconda and ASARCO management in New 
York and dictated by their policy to get out of the resort business, and that WilsonTs 
first duty was to make sure that United Park did nothing to interfere with the mining 
lease. See supra at 15-16. 
These facts were more than sufficient to defeat summary judgment even if 
Anaconda and ASARCO had made the motion. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S CLAIMS 
AGAINST AMOT AND GPCC FOR AIDING AND ABETTING THE BREACHES 
OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES BY ANACONDA, ASARCO, MORGAN-FIDELITY 
AND ROYAL STREET. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district court held, as a matter of law, 
that United Park failed to state claims for relief against AMOT and GPCC for aiding and 
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty by Anaconda, ASARCO, Royal Street and Morgan-
Fidelity. (R. 7836-37, Ml 2-3) The district court also purported to make findings of fact 
that AMOT and GPCC did not aid and abet any breaches of fiduciary duty. (R. 7827-29, 
1111 21-34) The district court clearly misapplied the standard governing dismissal under 
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Rule 12(b)(6), and improperly resolved disputed issues of fact under Rule 56. 
It is beyond serious dispute that one who aids and abets a breach of duty by a 
fiduciary is liable to the one to whom the duty is owed. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. 
v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.33 (Del. 1989) ("it is bedrock law that the 
conduct of one who knowingly joins with a fiduciary, including corporate officials, in 
breaching a fiduciary obligation, is equally culpable"); Lynch v. McDonald, 367 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1962) ("it has frequently been held that one who knowingly aids and abets a 
fiduciary to make secret profits may be held liable jointly with the fiduciary for such 
secret profits"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1979). United Park alleges that 
Anaconda and ASARCO breached their fiduciary duties they owed to United Park as its 
controlling shareholders, and that Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity breached their 
fiduciary duties to United Park as co-shareholders in GPCC.22 United Park also alleges 
that GPCC and AMOT aided and abetted those breaches. These allegations state claims 
21A motion to dismiss can be granted only where, assuming the truth of the 
allegations, it is clear as a matter of law that the complaint fails to state any valid claim 
for which relief can be granted. See Utah R, Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 
41, 45-46 (1957). 
22Neither Royal Street nor Morgan-Fidelity challenged the merits of United Park's 
claims that these two defendants, as co-shareholders with United Park in a closely-held 
corporation—GPCC—owed fiduciary duties of loyalty and fairness to United Park, and 
breached those duties by taking unfair advantage of United Park in the division of 
GPCCfs assets under the 1975 Resort Agreements. See, e.g., Shane v. Shane, 891 F.2d 
976, 986 (1st Cir. 1989) ("shareholders in a closely-held corporation owe one another a 
duty of utmost good faith and loyalty that requires full disclosure"); Alaska Plastics, Inc. 
v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980) ("stockholders in the close corporation owe 
one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that 
partners owe to one another"); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 564 P.2d 277, 281 (Or. 
1977) (en banc) (equal owners of close corporation are entitled to each other's 
performance of fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and full disclosure); Donahue v. 
Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (same holding as Alaska Plastics); 
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775, 776 (Utah 1978) (controlling shareholder of close 
corporation owes fiduciary duty to deal fairly and openly with other shareholders). 
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against GPCC and AMOT.23 
United Park presented substantial evidence that GPCC and AMOT aided and 
abetted these breaches of fiduciary duty by Anaconda, ASARCO, Royal Street and 
Morgan-Fidelity. GPCC mismanaged its affairs between 1971 and 1975, creating the 
financial difficulties that ultimately led to the division of GPCC pursuant to the 1975 
Resort Agreements. GPCC refused to take reasonable steps to solve its difficulties, such 
as selling off certain properties, because Royal Street, GPCCfs manager, wanted those 
properties for itself. It defaulted on its obligations to United Park, but at the same time 
did not default on obligations to other land vendors. (R. 4782) There is also evidence 
that GPCC officials told S. N. Cornwall that the GPCC properties had no value in 1975, 
when at the same time it was representing in prospectuses given to potential investors 
that the properties were worth $37.8 million.24 VanCott, while representing GPCC and 
Royal Street, prepared the false and misleading Proxy Statement. Through these acts, 
GPCC induced the breach of fiduciary duty by Anaconda and ASARCO, and substantially 
assisted the breaches of duty by Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity. 
AMOT also substantially assisted the breaches by Anaconda and ASARCO, and 
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity. When AMOT began negotiations with Royal Street 
and Morgan-Fidelity in the Spring of 1975, the owners of Aspen and Vail were still 
interested in pursuing discussions. AMOT knew the values of the real property and the 
ski resort from the GPCC Prospectuses. It joined with Morgan-Fidelity in insisting that 
United Park agree to two additional 20-year extensions on the Ski Leases, even though 
2JIt is no answer for AMOT to claim that it owed fiduciary duties to its own 
shareholders. Those duties do not absolve AMOT from liability for inducing breaches by 
United Park!s fiduciaries. See, e.g., Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. Ch. 
1984); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351-52 (Del. Ch. 1972). 
24There is also evidence that GPCC failed to disclose to Cornwall the Salomon 
restructuring proposals, under which United Park would have retained its equity interest 
in GPCC. See supra at 18, fn. 4. 
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United Park was to receive wholly inadequate consideration for those extensions. 
AMOT played a major role in assuring that United Park shareholders approved the 
1975 Resort Agreements and that there would be no legal opposition. After receipt of 
the Gartner letter, Mr. Badami of AMOT joined the other parties to the Agreements at 
a meeting in the VanCott offices and was "coached" as to how to insure shareholder 
approval. Badami told the shareholders that the meeting must not be postponed and 
essentially vouched for the adequacy of the Proxy Statement and the fairness of the 1975 
Resort Agreements. He then disparaged the Gartner letter as a "diatribe of misfacts" and 
factually misrepresented the content of the Gartner letter by telling the shareholders 
that Gartner believed that United Park was giving up mineral rights. (R. 5941-42) See 
also supra at 40-41. Badami's false and misleading attack on the Gartner letter was 
clearly part of an orchestrated effort by Badami, Anaconda and ASARCO through their 
control of United Park management, and other defendants, to convince the shareholders 
that Gartner's position had no merit and should be ignored. At a minimum, AMOT played 
a critical role in insuring that United Park shareholders were pressured into taking a 
hasty vote on inadequate information and that shareholders would not challenge the 
transaction. 
These facts squarely contradict the district court 's finding that Badami's 
statements were "opinions only." (R. 7828, H 25) Badami made at least one 
misrepresentation of fact, because he misrepresented the content of the Gartner letter. 
Equally important, the court 's findings that United Park's shareholders did not rely and 
were not entitled to rely on Badami's "opinions" misstate both fact and law. Once Mr. 
Badami volunteered to speak at the meeting, he had a duty to speak truthfully and to 
disclose all material facts. See, e.g., Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 
666 P.2d 302, 306 (Utah 1983); Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 764 P.2d 1350, 1353-
54 (Okla. 1988); Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556, 558-59 (Wyo. 1979). Even if Badami's 
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statements at the meeting were opinions only, they are actionable because they were 
made without a reasonable basis or genuine belief as to their truth, and Badami intended 
others to rely on them. See, e.g., Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d at 558; Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 525 (1977). 
Further, the court's finding that Badami's statements "were not detrimentally 
relied upon by the UPCM shareholders" (R. 7828, H 25), is unsupported in the record and 
gives AMOT the benefit of an inference to which it is not entitled. Badami attended the 
meeting at the invitation of United Park management and Anaconda and ASARCO after 
he was "coached" how to help obtain shareholder approval. He was presented to the 
shareholders in a context in which management was clearly urging the shareholders to 
rely on Mr. Badami in deciding whether to adjourn the meeting in order to permit fuller 
disclosure. After Badami's presentation, the shareholders voted not to adjourn the 
meeting, consistent with the wishes of Anaconda and ASARCO. Given these facts, the 
court could not properly conclude, as a matter of law, that the shareholders did not rely 
on Badami. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S PRAYER FOR REFORMATION OF THE 
RESORT AGREEMENTS. 
In addition to its damage claims, United Park seeks reformation of the 1975 Resort 
Agreements to remedy the unconscionable unfairness of those agreements resulting from 
defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting such breaches.25 While 
styled as "reformation," United Park's claim is that because the 1975 Resort Agreements 
are unconscionable, the court may, on equitable grounds, refuse to enforce the 
unconscionable provisions, or construe the agreements to avoid an unconscionable result. 
25In its Amended Complaint, United Park prayed for other alternative remedies, 
including rescission and termination of the 1975 Resort Agreements. United Park does 
not pursue those remedies on this appeal. 
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See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1040-
41 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983). 
Specifically, United Park seeks a construction of the Water Agreement to permit United 
Park to use its prior reservation of 2,850 gallons per minute of Group II water for all 
purposes rather than simply for "mining, milling and related purposes" as the agreement 
presently provides. United Park also asks the Court not to enforce the two additional 
extensions of the Ski Leases given in 1975. These remedies are appropriate because the 
1975 Agreements are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The district 
court dismissed United Park's reformation claims as a matter of law. This was error. 
A. Reformation Is An Appropriate Remedy Because the 1975 
Resort Agreements Were Unconscionable. 
The 1975 Resort Agreements were unconscionable, both procedurally and 
substantively. The Agreements required United Park shareholder approval to be 
effective. From the perspective of the shareholders, the Agreements bore many of the 
classic indicia of procedural unconscionability.26 The negotiations were not at arms 
length; indeed there were no negotiations. United Park's controlling shareholders 
dictated United Park's position — to get out of the resort and land development business 
— and did not attempt to protect United Park's equity interest in GPCC, including 
GPCC's resort operations and development properties. The Proxy Statement was 
demonstrably false and misleading. When a few shareholders raised questions, they were 
told that the Agreements were "very complex and difficult to understand" (R. 7252), but 
that the shareholders should trust management. When Gartner requested that 
26As this Court has stated, "[i]ndices of procedural unconscionability include . . . 
phrasing contractual terms in language that is incomprehensible to a layman . . . ; hiding 
key contractual provisions in a maze of fine print . . . ; minimizing key contractual 
provisions by deceptive sales practices; lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation, 
. . . ; [and] whether the aggrieved party was compelled to accept the terms . . . ." 
Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1042 (citations omitted). 
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consideration of the Agreements be deferred to permit fuller disclosure, Anaconda and 
ASARCO and management directed the special meeting to proceed. Management, with 
Badamifs help, coerced a quick vote by claiming that time was of the essence and that 
GPCC and the Park City Resort would cease to operate if the Agreements were not 
immediately approved.27 
These facts clearly demonstrate that United Park shareholders, in approving the 
1975 Resort Agreements, were confronted by an "absence of meaningful choice11, the 
essence of procedural unconscionability. Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1042, 
quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
The 1975 Resort Agreements were also substantively unconscionable28 at the time 
of their making.29 For $2,000, United Park relinquished its 39% equity interest in GPCC, 
which was critical to its 1971 sale of land and water to GPCC at discounted prices and 
for which it had paid nearly $1 million. (R. 6627-28) It sold land and a world class ski 
27Management knew the terms of the 1975 Resort Agreements as early as May 1975. 
Yet, it waited until early September to distribute the Proxy Statement and scheduled the 
meeting for early October. By that point in the year, defendants could and did coerce 
a quick vote by claiming that immediate approval was required if the ski resort was to 
open for the winter season. (R. 5941-42) However, it would have been possible to 
disseminate the Proxy Statement and hold the Special Meeting much earlier in the year. 
28Substantive unconscionability is indicated by "contract terms so one-sided as to 
oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party; an overall imbalance in the obligations and 
rights imposed by the bargain; excessive price; or significant cost-price disparity." 
Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041-42 (citations omitted). 
29United Park alleged in its Amended Complaint, and demonstrated on summary 
judgment, that the 1975 Resort Agreements were unconscionable when entered into. It 
also argued that the Water Agreement has become even more unconscionable with the 
passing of time, due to events not foreseen in 1975. The district court purported to 
dismiss United Park's claim for reformation because United Park was attempting to prove 
unconscionability through subsequent events alone. (R.7844, H 21) That was error 
because United Park also claims contemporaneous unconscionability. It was also error 
because "a court is not powerless in equity to remedy that which it perceives as present 
unconscionability, and may refuse to enforce a contract that, while equitable when made, 
has become unconscionable with passage of time." Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 
1045-46 (quotation omitted). 
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resort worth well over $40 million for $5 million payable over an extended period of 
time. It sold water worth more than $2 million in 1975 for a present value payment of 
$350,000 (R. 4762-63). It leased its land for minimal rentals for the first 40 years and 
then agreed to an additional 40 years, again for essentially no consideration. See supra 
at 22-23. These terms manifest an excessively low price and an inexplicably unfair cost-
price disparity. In sum, they are unconscionable. 
In the court below, defendants produced no evidence that the 1975 Resort 
Agreements were fair to United Park and the court made no finding that the Agreements 
were not unconscionable. The district court erred in dismissing United Park's claim for 
reformation. 
B. The District Court Erred In Holding That United Park Has 
Waived Or Is Estopped From Seeking Reformation. 
The district court's dismissal of United Park's reformation claim appears to be 
based on two grounds. First, the court suggested that United Park could not seek 
reformation because it continued to accept payment from defendants under the 1975 
Resort Agreements and, as of January 1990, the purchase price under the Water 
Agreement had been fully paid. (R. 7838, H 7) Second, it held that United Park was 
barred from seeking reformation against Royal Street because in 1981 and 1982 United 
Park had signed Estoppel Certificates and had consented to mortgages on the Deer Valley 
Resort given to Wells Fargo by Royal Street. (R. 7841-42, Ml 17-19) These legal 
conclusions were error. 
The focus of a claim of unconscionability is the fairness of the contract terms, 
and the circumstances surrounding its formation, not on the performance of either party. 
See Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041-49. Furthermore, the court may account for 
performance by the party against whom relief is sought by partially enforcing the 
contract so that the performing party is compensated, but the contract as enforced is not 
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unconscionable.30 
The court's reliance on the fact that United Park continued to accept payments 
under the various contracts suggests notions of waiver or estoppel. To establish waiver, 
defendants must prove that United Park intentionally relinquished a known right. Morgan 
v. Quailbrook Condo Co., 704 P.2d 573, 578 (Utah 1985); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 
499, 503 (Utah App. 1989); to establish estoppel, defendants must prove that they 
justifiably relied to their detriment on United Park's conduct. Rothey v. Walker Bank 
& Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1988); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). Defendants must prove each element 
of waiver or estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. See Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 
513 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1973); Mercer v. State, 739 P.2d 703, 706 (Wash. App. 1987); 
Kenneth P. Collins Agency v. Hagerott, 684 P.2d 487, 490 (Mont. 1984). 
Defendants, however, presented no evidence to support either waiver or estoppel, 
much less establish waiver or estoppel as a matter of law. The only evidence is that 
United Park accepted payments under the Agreements before new management 
investigated and discovered United Park's claims. Shortly after United Park discovered 
its claims, it put defendants on notice that it was challenging the 1975 Resort 
Agreements and was seeking equitable remedies, including reformation. (R. 2-85; 6732-
42; 6744-47) Defendants continued to make payments after that notice with knowledge 
of United Park's claims and there is no evidence whatsoever they have been unfairly 
prejudiced. Defendants owed the money in all events, because they have had beneficial 
use of the properties. 
Acceptance of benefits under a contract does not bar a claim for reformation. See, 
§ £ M Gablick v. Wolfe, 469 P.2d 391, 396 (Alaska 1970); Nab v. Hills, 452 P.2d 981, 988 
(Idaho 1969). 
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Similarly, the Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates do not bar United Park's 
unconscionability claim. The Estoppel Certificates state only that, as of 1981 and 1982, 
United Park was not aware of any defaults under the Deer Valley Lease. (R. 4473-
74; 4482-84) They say nothing about potential claims against Royal Street for breach of 
fiduciary duty. The record does not establish who drafted the Estoppel Certificates 
because United Park has not yet had discovery on that issue; however, United Park is 
entitled to the reasonable inference that Wells Fargo drafted the certificates, which 
should be construed against it. See Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 
410, 416 (Utah 1983) (contract language construed against drafting party). Thus, the 
record does not support the legal conclusion that United Park intentionally relinquished 
a known right to seek reformation of the Ski Leases or the Water Agreement against 
Royal Street on the basis of unconscionability when it executed the Estoppel 
Certificates. 
Moreover, Wells Fargo made no factual showing of any undue prejudice to support 
an estoppel of United Park's reformation claims. Reformation of the Water Agreement 
to permit United Park to use its reserved water for all purposes cannot possibly prejudice 
Wells Fargo. Due to United Park's prior reservation of water for mining, milling and 
related purposes, neither Royal Street nor its lender, Wells Fargo, could have relied on 
that water. As to United Park's prayer that the two 20-year lease extensions given in 
1975 for no consideration be cancelled, Wells Fargo made no showing that, or to what 
extent, its security would be impaired.31 Given defendants failure to establish any 
detrimental reliance, the district court's dismissal of United Park's unconscionability 
claims must be reversed. 
31Neither did Wells Fargo make any showing of prejudice that would estop United 
Park from its alternative reformation claim that defendants should be required to pay a 
fair rental under the Ski Leases if the extensions are not cancelled. 
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VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARKfS CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE RESORT 
AGREEMENTS. 
United Park alleges that GPCC and Royal Street breached the 1975 Agreements, 
and presented substantial evidence of these breaches in opposition to summary judgment. 
The district court granted summary judgment dismissing these claims on the grounds that 
(1) GPCC and Royal Street cured any alleged breach of the Water Agreement by making 
payment in full thereunder, and (2) that United Park has "waived and is estopped from 
asserting" all pre-August 1985 claims for breach of contract and lease against GPCC and 
Royal Street, and all continuing breaches that began before August 1985, "based on 
statements in its annual reports that GPCC and Royal Street were current on all 
agreements, and its certifications to the escrow agent that GPCC and Royal Street had 
paid all amounts of lift revenue that were owed." (R. 7835-36, 11 61 )32 This was error. 
United Park's Twelfth Claim for Relief alleges in part that GPCC and Royal Street 
breached paragraph 14 of the Water Agreement by opposing in bad faith United Park's 
applications to the State Engineer for extensions of time to resume use of certain water 
rights. (R. 2835-40) The Water Agreement reserves to United Park the prior right to 
use for "mining, milling and related purposes" up to 2850 gallons per minute from eleven 
underground water claims. These reservations include five claims that United Park is not 
currently using, but will use if mining activity resumes. When United Park is not using 
the water, the Water Agreement gives GPCC and Royal Street the right and the 
affirmative obligation to use the water to protect it from forfeiture. Royal Street has 
not used this water and GPCC refuses to tell United Park whether it uses the water, how 
it uses the water, or how much it uses. (R. 4825; 4831) 
,2The district court held that United Park's breach of contract claims, to the extent 
those claims arose before May 1980, were barred by the six year statute of limitations. 
While erroneous in certain respects, this conclusion is irrelevant because United Park 
seeks recovery only for breaches occurring after that date. 
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To protect its right to use the water in the future, United Park filed the 
applications for extensions with the State Engineer in April 1987. GPCC and Royal 
Street filed written protests and opposed the applications at a hearing, jeopardizing both 
title to the water rights and United Park's prior reservation for future use. (R. 4831-
32) These actions violate Paragraph 14 of the Water Agreement, which prohibits GPCC 
and Royal Street from taking any action without the written approval of United Park 
"which will or might jeopardize or impair the rights of the parties with relation to the 
Purchased Flow or the Purchased Rights." (R. 5098) Their protests were made in bad 
faith and are continuing violations of the Water Agreement. 
United Park's Fifth Claim alleges in part that GPCC has breached Paragraph 5 of 
the Water Agreement, by refusing to pay the cost of treating water from the portal of 
United Park's Ontario No. 2 Drain Tunnel. (R. 2818-19) Paragraph 5 requires that GPCC 
shall accept water "in the condition in which it reaches the point of delivery11 and "at its 
sole expense, treat or purify the Purchased Flow to the extent that the same is necessary 
before it may be used for the purposes of" GPCC. (R. 5091) Because water from the 
Ontario No. 2 Drain Tunnel flows into the Provo River, federal and state law require it 
to be treated when it flows from the tunnel portal. For the past several years, United 
Park has treated the water at a cost of $2,650,000 (R. 4833), even though Paragraph 5 
of the Water Agreement clearly imposes the obligation and cost of treatment on GPCC. 
Since 1985, United Park has repeatedly demanded that GPCC pay the treatment costs, 
which increase each year, but GPCC has refused. Id. 
United Park's Fifth Claim also alleges that GPCC and Royal Street have 
understated their lift revenue and paid United Park substantially less than United Park 
is entitled to receive under the Ski Leases. (R. 2819-26) United Park audited the lift 
revenue accounting records for the first time in 1985, and discovered that GPCC and 
Royal Street have been exchanging lift passes for goods and services, and issuing 
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complimentary or discounted passes. GPCC and Royal Street have failed to include the 
value of the exchanges and discounts in the lift revenues, resulting in an underpayment 
to United Park. (R. 4787-88) 
The district court erred in dismissing these claims. First, the fact that GPCC and 
Royal Street made final payment under the Water Agreement in January 1990 does not 
render moot United Park's claims for breach of that Agreement. GPCC and Royal Street 
have breached contractual obligations — to pay for water treatment and to avoid 
jeopardizing United Park's water rights — that are clearly continuing in nature. Those 
obligations are not extinguished upon payment of the purchase price. 
Second, the district court's finding that United Park has waived or is estopped 
from asserting these claims is nonsensicaL The district court based its findings of waiver 
and estoppel solely on statements in United Park Annual Reports between 1976 and 1984 
to the effect that defendants were current on all obligations under the Resort 
Agreements, and on certifications United Park made to the escrow agent that the 
defendants had paid all sums due under the Ski Leases. 
These general statements cannot constitute waiver or estoppel.33 United Park 
cannot have waived its claims for understatement of lift revenue when United Park did 
not discover the understatements until it first audited the records in 1985. (R. 4787) 
And United Park cannot have waived its claims for payment of water treatment when 
United Park has demanded that GPCC pay these costs since 1985. (R. 4833) None of the 
statements in the Annual Reports or to the escrow agent support a finding that United 
Park intentionally relinquished a known right. 
33Again, waiver requires proof of an existing right, knowledge of its existence, and 
an intention to relinquish it. Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989). 
Estoppel requires proof of a statement or act by the party asserting the claim 
inconsistent with the claim, action by the other party in reliance on the statement or act, 
and injury to the party from the reliance. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
CommTn, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
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The district court 's findings also fail to address the two crucial elements of 
estoppel. There is no evidence that defendants relied to their detriment on statements 
in the Annual Reports or to the escrow agent. Defendants cannot show how the 
statements caused them to protest in bad faith United Park's applications for extensions, 
to fail to pay the costs of water treatment, or to understate lift revenue. Nor can they 
show detriment or injury as a result. The only effect has been to their benefit, because 
GPCC and Royal Street have paid less to United Park than they are required, and GPCC 
has wrongfully avoided paying the costs of water treatment. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S TRESPASS CLAIMS. 
United Park's Seventh Claim for Relief alleges that GPCC has committed trespass 
by constructing a maintenance building and a ski lift tower (the "Town Lift") on United 
Park property not leased to GPCC. The district court erroneously found that both 
trespass claims "fail" because of United Park's contractual duties of cooperation with 
GPCC under Paragraph 19 of the Land Purchase Agreement (R. 7845, 11 23), because of 
United Park's "written and verbal consent to GPCC's use of the land in question," id., 
and because the Town Lift was constructed on property subject to the Resort Area Lease. 
(R. 7844-45, 11 22) These findings were error. 
Contrary to the district court 's finding, paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement does 
not require United Park to grant easements for the maintenance building or for the 
construction of ski lifts on United Park's property.34 Further, United Park did not 
Paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement only provides that United Park 
will, upon request, grant to [GPCC] such easements over its 
properties as may be reasonably necessary for ingress and 
egress to and from any of the Subject Properties, provided 
that the nature and duration of such easements shall be 
subject to the approval of [United Park] and the use thereof 
shall be subject to such reasonable conditions and restrictions 
as [United Park] shall impose. (R. 4913) 
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consent to GPCCfs construction of the maintenance building or the Town Lift. (R. 4849-
52):* 
Finally, the district court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the Town Lift 
property was subject to the Resort Area Lease. (R. 7844-45, H 22) Paragraph 14 of the 
Resort Area Lease gives United Park the right to sell certain ski lease property to third 
parties if the lessee is not using the property. (R. 5319-21) In 1980, United Park gave 
John Sweeney an option to purchase 75 acres, including the property where GPCC built 
the Town Lift. The Resort Area lease gave GPCC a right of first refusal to match 
Sweeney's offer, but GPCC did not do so. (R. 4854) Sweeney never exercised the 
option, which expired in 1984. (R. 4855) 
In December 1980, United Park, GPCC and GPI entered into the Third Amendment 
to the Resort Area Lease, which deleted the Sweeney option parcel from the lands subject 
to the Resort Area Lease. (R. 5379-83; 4854) At the time, United Park and GPCC both 
knew that Sweeney had an option to purchase the property, and that, by definition, 
options need not be exercised. The Third Amendment to the Resort Area Lease makes no 
mention of the Sweeney option and is not conditioned in any way on Sweeney's exercise 
of the option. The district court's conclusion that the Amendment became effective only 
if United Park sold the property (R. 7844-45, U 22) is inexplicable, unsupported, and 
squarely contradicted by the plain language of the Amendment. United Park and GPCC 
removed the Town Lift property from the resort area lease in 1980, whether or not 
In the court below, GPCC flatly misrepresented the deposition testimony of LaMar 
Osika when it claims Mr. Osika testified that United Park consented to GPCC's use of 
these United Park properties. (R. 3733). In fact, Mr. Osika testified that, in response 
to a letter (R. 7976) from GPCC to United Park dated July 15, 1974, requesting that 
United Park give GPCC a blanket agreement permitting GPCC to use United Park lands 
for ski lifts and skiing, "I don't think [the requested agreement] was provided . . . . 
(R. 7945, p.214). Similarly, certain correspondence cited by GPCC (R. 7155-58; 7976, 
Ex. 50, 51) only involved proposed easements over the Thaynes and Spiro Tunnel mining 
reservations for ski lifts and run. It provided no support for the claim that United Park 
consented to the maintenance building trespass or the Town Lift trespass. 
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Sweeney ever purchased it. GPCC's construction of the Town Lift, in the face of United 
Park's protest, is trespass. At a minimum, these facts precluded summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment dismissing United Park's Amended Complaint must be reversed and 
the case remanded for the completion of discovery and trial. 
DATED this I f day of December, 1990. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
DAVID B. WATKISS 
PERRIN R. LOVE 
CAROLYN COX 
Attorneys for 
United Park City Mines Company 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, et al. 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER 
Civil No. C-86-3347 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants Atlantic Richfield Company's ("ARCO") and 
Defendant ASARCO, Inc.'s ("ASARCO") Motions for Summary Judgment 
came on for hearing before the court, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, Judge, on April 4, 1990. Richard D. Burbidge and Stephen 
B. Mitchell of Burbidge 4 Mitchell appeared on behalf of 
Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company, Merlin O. Baker of Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of Defendant ASARCO, and 
David K. Watkiss and David B. Watkiss of Watkiss & Saperstein 
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff United Park City Mines Company. 
The court having considered the Memoranda, Affidavits and 
Exhibits filed in connection with the motions by the parties, 
having taken the matter under advisement, and having previously 
entered its Memorandum Decision granting the motions, finds that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1975, three "independent" directors served on the 
United Park City Mines Company's ("UPCM") Board of Directors 
when the restructuring plans and Resort Agreements involving the 
Greater Park City Company ("GPCC") were considered and approved 
by the seven-member Board of Directors. 
2. At the time the restructuring agreement was 
approved, ARCO and ASARCO each had two directors on the UPCM 
Board of Directors. There were also three independent directors 
serving on the Board. 
3. The independent directors of UPCM had full knowledge 
concerning the terms of the restructuring and its effect upon 
UPCM and voted in favor of the restructuring. 
4. The three independent directors were not implicated 
in any alleged wrong-doing, did not have any conflict of 
interest and were fully informed of all the material facts 
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involving the 1975 restructuring plan and the subsequent 
execution of the Resort Agreements. 
5. The leases and agreements relating to the 1975 
Resort Agreements, involving the restructuring of GPCC, were 
reviewed and approved by the three independent members on the 
UPCM Board of Directors. 
6. At the annual meeting of shareholders of UPCM held 
in May, 1975, the shareholders were informed of the 
restructuring proposals and were informed that these proposals 
would be submitted to a vote of the shareholders in October, 
1975. 
7. On or about September 2, 1975, a proxy statement was 
sent to all shareholders of UPCM, which stated in detail what 
UPCM was giving and what it was receiving as part of the 
proposed restructuring. 
8. Shortly before the special meeting of shareholders 
on October 7, 1975, the UPCM Board of Directors received several 
written complaints from shareholders, including a detailed 
milti-paged letter from Jerome Gartner, an attorney representing 
a shareholder named Timothy Donath. 
9. Shareholder Donath demanded that the meeting be 
postponed and that the directors reconsider their"decision to 
approve the restructuring. Several shareholders complained that 
the restructuring was unfair to UPCM and that the proxy sent to 
shareholders was incomplete and missing important information. 
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10. Shareholder Donath's letter was reviewed and 
discussed by the Board of Directors of UPCM, including the 
independent directors. The directors voted to proceed with the 
shareholders meeting. Donath's letter was disclosed to the 
shareholders at the special meeting on October 7, 1975. 
11. The special shareholders meeting was held on 
October 7, 1975, and more than ninety percent (90%) of the 
shareholders approved the restructuring plan. 
12. In 1975, the shareholders of UPCM had actual 
knowledge of the restructuring plan and the leases and 
agreements relating thereto, or they were put on notice of facts 
which would lead a person of ordinary prudence to discover the 
alleged wrong-doing, sufficient to commence the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
13. In 1985, Loeb Investments purchased all of the 
stock of ARCO and ASARCO in UPCM. Loeb does not dispute that it 
paid a fair price for the stock. The stock was purchased with 
knowledge that the assets of UPCM did not include those which 
had been given up in the 1975 restructuring. 
The court, having made its Findings of Fact, now makes 
and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In 1975, UPCM, through three independent directors 
on its seven-member Board of Directors, and through several 
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shareholders, knew or should have known of any alleged wrong-
doing resulting from the 1975 restructuring plan and the 
execution of numerous leases and agreements relating to the 1975 
restructuring plan and Resort Agreements. 
2. The claims against ARCO and ASARC0 contained in the 
First and Second Claims for Relief of UPCMfs Complaint are 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-27. 
3. It would be inequitable and constitute a windfall 
for Loeb Investments or the Bamberger Group, which together now 
control UPCM, to receive any benefit resulting from suit against 
ARCO and ASARCO from whom the control stock was purchased. 
4. Therefore, the First, Second, Third and Fourth 
Claims for Relief are also precluded by the doctrine enunciated 
in Banaor-Punta Operations v. Bangor and A.R. Co. 
5. No genuine issues of material fact exist regarding 
UPCMfs allegations against ARCO and ASARCO. Therefore, 
Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law 
dismissing all claims for relief contained in UPCM's Complaint. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Summary 
Judgment shall be and the same hereby is entered in favor of 
Atlantic Richfield Company and ASARCO, Inc. and against 
Plaintiff United Park City Mines Company dismissing with 
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prejudice the Amended Complaint on file herein in its entirety 
against Defendants Atlantic Richfield Company and ASARCO. 
DATED this /S day of j$H&. 
BY THE COJ f THE COPRTi: ^ 2 
Le^i^yJ 
THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
js arco\findord 
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79 South Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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David K. Watkiss 
Stuart W. Hinckley 
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Randy L. Dryer, Esq. 
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Howard L. Edwards, Esq, 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Greater Park City Company and 
Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. 
GIAUQUE, WILCOX & BENDINGER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Royal Street Land Company, 
Royal Street Development Company, 
Inc., Deer Valley Resort Company 
and Royal Street of Utah 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Greater Properties, Inc. 
Park Properties, Inc. 
Morgan Guaranty & Trust 
Company of New York and 
Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; et al., 
Defendants. 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
Intervenor. 
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
MCE. YEATES 
IELOZAHLER 
•ntr*I.Sult*900 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a national banking 
association; et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
GRANTING MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS 
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, 
ALPINE MEADOWS OF TAHOE, 
INC., MORGAN GUARANTY 
TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 
FIDELITY BANK OF 
PHILADELPHIA, GREATER 
PROPERTIES, INC., PARK 
PROPERTIES, INC., ROYAL 
STREET LAND COMPANY, DEER 
VALLEY RESORT COMPANY, 
ROYAL STREET OF UTAH, 
ROYAL STREET DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, INC., and 
INTERVENOR WELLS FARGO 
BANK, N.A. 
Civil No. C-86-3347 
and 
Civil No. C-86-8907 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The Motions to Dismiss of defendants Atlantic 
Richfield Company ("ARCO"); ASARCO, Inc. ("ASARCO"); Greater 
Park City Company ("GPCC"); Royal Street Land Company, Deer 
Valley Resort Company, Royal Street of Utah and Royal Street 
Development Company, Inc. (all collectively referred to as 
"Royal Street- or the "Royal Street defendants"); Alpine 
tteadows of Tahoe, Inc. ("AMOT"); Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 
of New York ("Morgan"); Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia 
("Fidelity"); Greater Properties, Inc. ("GPI"); Park 
Properties, Inc. ("PPI"); and intervenor Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
("Wells Fargo"), pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b), and for Summary 
Judgment, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56, seeking dismissal of 
plaintiff United Park City Mines Company's ("UPCM") Amended 
Complaint came on for hearing before the Court on April 4, 1990. 
All parties were represented by counsel. Plaintiff 
UPCM was represented by its counsel, David K. Watkiss, David B. 
Watkiss and Perrin R. Love; defendant ARCO was represented by 
its counsel, Richard D. Burbidge and Stephen B. Mitchell; 
defendant ASARCO was represented by its counsel, Merlin 0. 
Baker and Jonathan A. Dibble; defendants GPCC and AMOT were 
represented by their counsel, Gordon Strachan and James A. 
Boevers; defendants Morgan, Fidelity, GPI and PPI were 
represented by their counsel, Gordon Roberts and Elisabeth R. 
Blattner; the Royal Street defendants were represented by their 
counsel, Wendy A. Faber and Richard W. Giauque; and intervenor 
Wells Fargo was represented by its counsel, Michael F. Jones. 
Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted voluminous 
legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits. The Court heard oral 
argument from all parties for approximately 3-1/2 hours. 
Thereafter, all parties filed proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at the Court's request. The Court, having 
read the memoranda and affidavits, having heard oral argument, 
having considered the proposed Findings and Conclusions, and 
having entered Memorandum Decisions with respect to each of the 
defendants' and intervener's motions, hereby makes the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order with 
respect to the motions to dismiss or for summary judgment of 
defendants GPCC, Royal Street, AMOT, Morgan, Fidelity, GPI, PPI 
and intervenor Wells Fargo. These Findings and Conclusions 
constitute the written statement of the grounds for the Court's 
decision under U.R.C.P. 52(a). 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. UPCM has had adequate opportunity to conduct 
discovery relating to the issues in the motions to dismiss or 
for summary judgment. 
2. Based upon the record, there is no genuine 
dispute as to any of the following material facts. 
RINCC YEATES 
i QELOZAHLCR 
C«ntr«l,Sult«900 
£*»t Fourth South 
A. BACKGROUND 
3. In February, 1971, GPCC entered into the 
following Resort Agreements with UPCM. 
4. Pursuant to the Land Purchase Agreement UPCM 
agreed to sell to GPCC approximately 4,200 acres of real 
property for commercial, condominium and subdivision 
development, including the base facilities, golf course, other 
resort improvements and the personal property of the existing 
resort operations for the sum of $5.4 million, payable over 
time. 
5. UPCM entered into three separate ski leases with 
GPCC wherein it leased 432 acres known as Crescent Ridge [Lease 
(Crescent Ridge)], 470 acres in Deer Valley [Lease (Deer 
Valley)] and 5,631 acres which included the then existing ski 
runs [Lease (Resort Area)]. 
6. Pursuant to the Water Rights Purchase Agreement 
UPCM agreed to sell its water rights to GPCC for $500,000, but 
reserved the right to use a portion of the water for mining and 
related activities. 
7. In 1975, the shareholders of GPCC (including 
UPCM, Royal Street, Morgan, Fidelity and non-party Union 
America) decided to restructure GPCC to solve certain financial 
problems GPCC had encountered. 
8. In 1975, ARCO owned 18.4% of UPCM's stock and 
ASARCO owned 12.7%. 
B. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE THIRD AND 
FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN, FIDELITY) 
9. In 1975, three directors independent of ARCO and 
ASARCO served on the UPCM Board of Directors when the 
restructuring plans and Resort Agreements involving GPCC were 
considered and approved by the seven-member UPCM Board of 
Directors. 
10. At the time the restructuring agreement was 
approved, ARCO and ASARCO each had two directors on the UPCM 
Board of Directors, in addition to the three independent 
directors serving on the Board. 
11. The independent directors of UPCM had full 
knowledge concerning the terms of the restructuring and its 
effect upon UPCM and voted in favor of the restructuring. 
12. The three independent directors were not 
implicated in any alleged wrongdoing, did not have any conflict 
of interest and were fully informed of all the material facts 
involving the 1975 restructuring plan and the subsequent 
execution of the Resort Agreements. 
13. The leases and other agreements relating to the 
1975 Resort Agreements involving the restructuring of GPCC were 
approved by the three independent Board members on UPCM's Board 
of Directors. 
14. At the annual meeting of UPCM shareholders held 
in May, 1975, the shareholders were informed of the 
restructuring proposals and were told that these proposals 
would be submitted to a vote of the shareholders in October, 
1975. 
15. On or about September 2, 1975, a proxy statement 
was sent to all shareholders of UPCM. The proxy statement 
stated in detail what UPCM was giving and what it was receiving 
as part of the proposed restructuring. 
16. Shortly before the special meeting of 
shareholders on October 7, 1975, the UPCM Board of Directors 
received several written complaints from shareholders, 
including a detailed multi-page letter from Jerome Gartner, an 
attorney representing a shareholder named Timothy Donath. 
17. Shareholder Donath demanded that the meeting be 
postponed and that the directors reconsider their decision to 
approve the restructuring. Several shareholders complained 
that the restructuring was unfair to UPCM and that the proxy 
statement sent to shareholders was incomplete and missing 
important information. 
18. Shareholder Donath*s letter was reviewed and 
discussed by the UPCM Board of Directors, including the 
independent directors. The directors voted to proceed with the 
shareholders meeting. Donath's letter was disclosed to the 
UPCM shareholders at the special meeting on October 7, 1975. 
19. At the UPCM special shareholders meeting held on 
October 7, 1975, 96.4 percent in interest of the shareholders 
who voted approved the restructuring plan either at the meeting 
or by proxy, which represented 60.2 percent of the total 
outstanding shares. 
20. In 1975, the shareholders of UPCM had actual 
knowledge of the restructuring plan and the leases and 
agreements relating thereto or they were put on notice of facts 
which would lead a person of ordinary prudence to discover the 
alleged wrongdoing, sufficient to commence the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
C. THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT) 
21. The adversary relationship in 1975 between AMOT 
as the buyer of GPCC, and UPCM as the seller, precluded any 
fiduciary duty from AMOT to UPCM. No such duty was created by 
AMOT's pre-October 7, 1975 assistance in opening the resort for 
the 1975-1976 ski season. All parties benefitted from the 
timely opening of the ski resort. 
22. AMOT did not induce or encourage any person, 
party or entity to breach any alleged fiduciary duties. 
23. AMOT's participation was minimal in preparing and 
approving the proposed restructuring, including the two 20-year 
extensions of the Lease (Resort Area), These transactions were 
agreed upon in substance by the other parties and UPCM prior to 
being presented to AMOT for approval. 
24. Prior to being presented to AMOT, the 
restructuring proposal had been rejected by other potential 
investors. 
25. The statements of AMOT's Board Chairman, Mr. 
Badami, at the October 7, 1975 UPCM shareholders meeting, 
called to approve the proposed restructuring, were opinions 
only and were not detrimentally relied upon by the UPCM 
shareholders. 
26. More than 62 percent in interest of the UPCM 
stockholders had voted by proxy on the proposed restructuring 
and did not attend the October 7, 1975 meeting. 
27. AMOT did not participate in the preparation or 
submission of the proxy materials sent to UPCM shareholders. 
28. AMOT was not involved in the restructuring plan 
until 1975. 
29. AMOT had no business relationship with any of the 
participants in the restructuring proposal until 1975. 
30o In 1975, AMOT did not have knowledge superior to 
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UPCM officers and directors, who were independent of ARCO and 
ASARCO, including, among others, UPCM President and Director 
Miles Romney, UPCM Director Harold Steele, and UPCM Secretary-
Treasurer Lamar Osika. These individuals also either served on 
GPCC's Board or attended the critical GPCC Board meetings 
relating to the restructuring proposals. 
31. AMOT also had no knowledge of any alleged 
breaches of fiduciary duty by the other parties involved in the 
restructuring plan. 
32. AMOT was not a substantial participant in 
preparing or consummating the 1975 restructuring. 
D. THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (GPCC) 
33. In 1975, UPCM was a controlling shareholder in 
GPCC, owning 39 percent of the common stock and two-thirds of 
the preferred stock. Therefore, GPCC owed no fiduciary duties 
to UPCM in 1975. 
34. GPCC neither induced nor aided and abetted 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by third parties in 1975. 
E. FIFTH, SIXTH AND TENTH CLAIMS (GPI, PPI) 
35. GPI was formed by Morgan and Fidelity pursuant to 
the 1975 restructuring of GPCC to act as their agent for the 
purpose of receiving an assignment of the Lease (Resort Area) 
and Lease (Cresent Ridge) between UPCM and GPCC. 
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36. GPI was not assigned an interest under the Lease 
(Deer Valley). 
37. GPI leased back the assigned ski run leases to 
GPCC in return for payment of a certain percentage of the ski 
lift revenues collected each year. 
38. PPI was formed by Morgan and Fidelity to act as 
their agent for the purpose of receiving an assignment of 
certain ski resort properties being purchased from UPCM by GPCC 
under the Land Purchase Agreement. 
39. PPI was not assigned any interest under the 
UPCM/GPCC ski run leases or the Lease (Deer Valley). 
40. PPI leased back the assigned properties to GPCC 
in return for payment of a certain percentage of the ski lift 
revenues collected each year. 
41. UPCM expressly consented to the assignments of 
the ski run leases and ski properties to GPI and PPI. 
42. UPCM expressly agreed to look solely to GPCC (and 
not to GPI or PPI) for performance of the underlying lease and 
purchase obligations. 
43. UPCM is suing GPI and PPI for alleged breaches of 
the ski run leases by GPCC. The factual bases upon which GPI 
and PPI relied in seeking dismissal of plaintiffs Fifth, Sixth 
and Tenth Claims for Relief against them in the Amended 
Complaint were not rebutted by UPCM. 
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F. THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, NINTH, TENTH 
AND TWELFTH CLAIMS (ROYAL STREET) 
44. As the result of the restructure of GPCC in 1975, 
Royal Street Land Company (Land) acquired, with UPCM approval, 
the following rights in the 1971 contracts between GPCC and 
UPCM. 
45. GPCC conveyed to Land GPCC's interest in the 
property located in Deer Valley which was subject to the Land 
Purchase Agreement with UPCM. Land's interest was assigned, 
with UPCM's consent, to Royal Street of Utah (RSU) and then to 
Deer Valley Resort Company (Deer Valley)-
46. GPCC assigned an undivided one-half of its rights 
under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement to Land. 
47. GPCC assigned to Land the right to lease 1,834 
acres for skiing purposes in an expanded Lease (Deer Valley). 
This Lease was amended on May 21, 1979 and July 31, 1980. 
Land's interest was then assigned, with UPCM's consent, to RSU 
and then to Deer Valley. The primary term of the lease runs 
until April 30, 1991 and may be extended at the option of Deer 
Valley for three 20-year periods. 
G. 1981 AND 1982 ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATES 
(WELLS FARGO/ROYAL STREET) 
48. In 1981, $6.6 million of bonds (1981 Bonds) were 
issued for the benefit of Deer Valley and purchased by Wells 
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Fargo, and the proceeds were paid to or for the benefit of Deer 
Valley. Such 1981 Bonds are secured by the 1981 Mortgage (as 
identified in the Complaint in Intervention, paragraph 4a), 
under which Mortgage is pledged the entire real estate 
[including the land leased under the Lease (Deer Valley)] and 
personal property consisting of the operating ski resort known 
as "Deer Valley Resort". 
49. UPCM gave Wells Fargo an Estoppel Certificate 
(1981 Estoppel Certificate) and a Consent and Agreement (1981 
Consent and Agreement) to induce Wells Fargo to accept the 1981 
Mortgage and as a stated "condition precedent" to the purchase 
of the 1981 Bonds. 
50. Wells Fargo1s purchase of the 1981 Bonds was made 
in reliance upon the affirmative assurances and rights given to 
it by UPCM in the 1981 Estoppel Certificate and the 1981 
Consent and Agreement concerning the Lease (Deer Valley). 
51- In 1982, $6,000,000 of bonds (1982 Bonds) were 
issued for the benefit of Deer Valley and purchased by Merrill 
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Incorporated (Merrill Lynch), and 
the proceeds thereof were paid to or for the benefit of Deer 
Valley. A material inducement to Merrill Lynch's purchasing 
such bonds was Wells Fargo's issuance of a Letter of Credit 
(1982 Letter of Credit) in the amount of $6,742,500 as 
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collateral which, in addition to the Deer Valley Resort itself, 
secured the 1982 Bonds. The Letter of Credit was issued 
pursuant to a Letter of Credit Agreement (1982 Letter of Credit 
Agreement) entered into by Deer Valley with Wells Fargo as an 
integral part of the subject 1982 Bonds transaction. The 1982 
Letter of Credit and Letter of Credit Agreement are secured by 
the 1982 Mortgage (as identified in the Complaint in 
Intervention, paragraph 4b). The Deer Valley Resort is pledged 
under the 1982 Mortgage. 
52. As a part of the 1982 Bonds transaction, for the 
purpose of providing Wells Fargo the same condition precedent, 
affirmative assurances and rights concerning the Lease (Deer 
Valley), UPCM executed and delivered to Wells Fargo an Estoppel 
Certificate (1982 Estoppel Certificate) which is identical in 
all material respects to that provided in 1981; and gave Wells 
Fargo a Consent and Agreement (1982 Consent and Agreement) 
likewise identical in all material respects to the 1981 Consent 
and Agreement. 
53. Wells Fargo's extension of credit in connection 
with the 1982 Bonds transaction was made in reliance upon the 
assurances and rights under the 1982 Estoppel Certificate and 
the 1982 Consent and Agreement concerning the Lease (Deer 
Valley). 
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54. Wells Fargo has also provided Deer Valley with a 
revolving Line of Credit (Line of Credit) of approximately $4.5 
million in principal amount, which Line of Credit is secured by 
various parcels of real property that are contiguous to and/or 
in the immediate vicinity of the Deer Valley Resort (Line of 
Credit Collateral Property), the value of which parcels is 
dependant upon Deer Valley's continuing as the operator of the 
Deer Valley Resort as a ski resort. 
H. RESCISSION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENTS SOUGHT BY THE THIRD 
AND FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN, FIDELITY) 
55. UPCM does not seek to rescind the Royal Street 
Defendants' interests under the Land Purchase Agreement or seek 
the return of any land parcels already released to Royal Street 
II 
or GPCC. Royal Street has received all land parcels to which 
it is entitled. 
56. As of May 10, 1988 Land had received deeds to all 
of its parcels under the Land Purchase Agreement. 
57. UPCM is estopped from asserting rescission or 
reformation of the 1975 agreements because UPCM continued to 
accept the benefits and performance of the agreements both 
before and after its claims for rescission and reformation were 
filed. 
58. For example, after the original Complaint was 
filed in May, 1986, UPCM continued to accept payments under the 
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Lease (Resort Area) and Lease (Deer Valley) through November 7, 
1989/ as well as under other Resort Agreements, and to 
authorize the release of parcels under the Land Purchase 
Agreement. 
I. INSTRUMENTS OF TITLE IN ESCROW 
59. Title to the water sold to and paid for by GPCC 
and Royal Street under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement 
remains in escrow as do certain instruments of title paid for 
under the Land Purchase Agreement. 
J. THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH AND TENTH CLAIMS 
ALLEGING CONTRACT DEFAULTS (GPCC, ROYAL STREET, GPI, PPI) 
60. GPCC and Royal Street have made payment in full 
under the Land Purchase Agreement and Water Rights Purchase 
Agreement, curing any alleged defaults pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of these agreements. UPCM does not allege that 
GPCC or Royal Street has committed any defaults under the Land 
Purchase Agreement. 
61. UPCM has waived and is estopped from asserting 
all contractual defaults alleged to have occurred prior to 
August, 1985, and all alleged continuing defaults alleged to 
have begun prior to that time, based on statements in its 
annual reports that GPCC and Royal Street were current on all 
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agreements, and its certifications to the escrow agent that 
GPCC and Royal Street had paid all amounts of lift revenue that 
were owed. 
62. There was no concealment of alleged GPCC 
contractual defaults from UPCM, because UPCM had one or more 
representatives on GPCC's Board until August, 1985 pursuant to 
paragraph 17 of the Lease (Resort Area) as amended. 
K. SEVENTH CLAIM (GPCC) 
63. Regarding the Seventh Claim for trespass against 
GPCC, the sale of the Town Lift property to Sweeney never 
occurred, and his option to purchase the property expired. 
64. Prior to August, 1985, UPCM gave its written and 
verbal consent to GPCC to use the rest of the land which 
involves the trespass allegations. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. No genuine issues of material fact exist 
regarding any of the defendants' and interveners' motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment. All defendants and intervenor 
are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
A. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE THIRD AND FOURTH 
CLAIMS (AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN, FIDELITY) 
2. In 1975, UPCM, through three independent 
directors and several shareholders, knew or should have known 
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of any alleged wrongdoing in connection with the 1975 
restructuring plan and the execution of numerous leases and 
agreements relating to the 1975 restructuring plan and Resort 
Agreements- Accordingly, there is no basis for tolling the 
statutes of limitations applicable to the claims arising from 
the restructuring, which statutes began to run in 1975. 
3. The Third and Fourth Claims against GPCC, Royal 
Street, Morgan and Fidelity, for breach of fiduciary duty or 
inducing or aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and 
against AMOT, for inducing or aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty, are barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations contained in U.C.A. 78-12-25(3). 
B. THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT) 
4. The only duties owed by AMOT Board Chairman, Mr. 
Badami, in 1975, were to AMOT's shareholders, UPCM 
shareholders had no basis to rely on opinions expressed by Mr. 
Badami at the October 7, 1975 meeting. 
5. The Third and Fourth Claims in the Amended 
Complaint do not state a cause of action against defendant AMOT. 
C. THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (GPCC) 
6. The Third and Fourth Claims fail to state a cause 
of action against GPCC for inducing, aiding or abetting, or for 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
D. RESCISSION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENTS SOUGHT BY THE THIRD AND 
FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN, FIDELITY) 
7. The Third and Fourth Claims against GPCC, Royal 
Street, Morgan, Fidelity and AMOT are also barred to the extent 
they seek to rescind or reform the Resort Agreements, because 
of UPCM's continued acceptance of benefits and performance of 
the agreements both before and after claims for reformation and 
recission were filed, and because of payment in full under the 
Land Purchase Agreement and Water Rights Purchase Agreement by 
GPCC and Royal Street. 
E, THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH AND TENTH CLAIMS 
ALLEGING CONTRACT DEFAULTS (GPCC, ROYAL STREET, GPI, PPI) 
8. All allegations of contractual defaults 
applicable to the claims against GPCC, Royal Street, GPI or PPI 
in the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth or Tenth Claims for Relief 
and which are alleged to have occurred prior to May 8, 1980, 
are precluded by the six-year statute of limitations, U.C.A. 
§ 78-12-23(2), and all new allegations of default alleged in 
the Amended Complaint to have occurred prior to June 20, 1982 
are precluded for the same reason. There is no basis for 
tolling this statute of limitations. 
9. All alleged contractual defaults applicable to 
the claims against GPCC, Royal Street, GPI or PPI, in the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth or Tenth Claims for Relief either 
are not defaults according to the terms of the Resort 
WINCE. YEATES 
A QELOZAHLEM 
atyC#otr»l,S4jit«*00 
Agreements, or have been performed, cured or waived. 
Alternatively, these alleged defaults are not material 
defaults, are not the subject of adequate notice required by 
the Resort Agreements and applicable law governing contractual 
forfeiture, are subject to the terms of the judicial 
ascertainment provisions of the Resort Agreements allowing cure 
after any final judgment determining defaults, or are subject 
to an adequate remedy in damages, and, thus, termination or 
forfeiture of these agreements is not permitted. The Court 
reserves for further determination the issue of whether UPCM 
has a claim for damages against GPCC based upon defaults under 
the Lease (Resort Area) alleged in paragraph 116(e)(ii) of the 
Amended Complaint. 
10. To the extent the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth or 
Tenth Claims against GPCC, Royal Street, GPI or PPI, are based 
on alleged breaches of the Land Purchase Agreement or Water 
Rights Purchase Agreement, these claims also must be dismissed 
based on payment in full under these agreements by GPCC and 
Royal Street. 
F. FIFTH, SIXTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH CLAIMS (GPI, PPI, 
MORGAN, FIDELITY) 
11. Because UPCM's claims that would provide a basis 
for contract termination or other equitable relief are being 
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dismissed, the Eleventh Claim for Relief against GPI, PPI, 
Morgan and Fidelity must also be dismissed as a matter of law. 
12. PPI was not assigned any interest under any of 
the UPCM/GPCC ski run leases. Therefore, UPCM's Fifth and 
Sixth Claims for Relief fail to state a claim against PPI. 
13. GPI was not assigned an interest under the Lease 
(Deer Valley). Therefore, UPCM's Sixth Claim for Relief fails 
to state a claim against GPI. 
14. UPCM expressly consented to the assignments of 
the GPCC ski run leases to GPI, thus limiting its right to 
recover, for any alleged breach, only against GPCC. 
15. UPCM expressly agreed it would not look to any 
assignee for performance under the agreements. Therefore, 
UPCM's Fifth Claim for Relief fails to state a claim against 
GPI. 
16. Any alleged duty of good faith arising out of the 
ski run leases and the property purchases is a contractual 
duty, and UPCM's express consent to the assignment of the GPCC 
ski run leases to GPI and the property purchases to PPI, and 
its limitation of its right to recover to GPCC, bars UPCM from 
recovering from PPI and GPI for any breach of that duty by 
GPCC. Therefore, UPCM's Tenth Claim for Relief fails to state 
a claim against PPI and GPI. 
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G. THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, TENTH AND TWELFTH CLAIMS 
(WELLS FARGO/ROYAL STREET) 
17. The doctrine of Equitable Estoppel precludes UPCM 
from asserting legal and equitable claims against Wells 
Fargo/Royal Street because UPCM negligently or intentionally 
made representations which Wells Fargo reasonably and 
justifiably relied on. UPCM is now estopped from pursuing any 
claims against Wells Fargo/Royal Street which are inconsistent 
with the plain language of the Estoppel Certificates and 
Consent and Agreement documents. 
18. If UPCM did not knowingly and willingly make the 
statements in the Estoppel Certificates, it was negligent in 
executing the Certificates, to the detrimental reliance of 
Wells Fargo. 
19. Having given the two Estoppel Certificates in 
1981 and 1982, expressly stating there were no defaults under 
the Lease (Deer Valley), and having given the two Consent and 
Agreement papers, which were silent regarding the Water Rights 
and Land Purchase Agreements, UPCM is bound by what the 
documents stated or omitted to state, irrespective of whether 
said silence was intentional or negligent, regarding the Lease 
(Deer Valley), the Water Rights and Land Purchase Agreements, 
and any other property rights necessary to the ownership and 
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operation of the Deer Valley Resort by Royal Street. UPCM is 
equitably estopped and has waived all of the claims for 
contract termination, forfeiture, rescission, reformation and 
declaratory relief sought against Royal Street in the Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth or Twelfth Claims for Relief in the 
Amended Complaint. 
H. INSTRUMENTS OF TITLE IN ESCROW 
20. All remaining unreleased instruments of title, 
deposited in escrow under either the Land Purchase Agreement or 
Water Rights Purchase Agreement, should be released from escrow 
by the escrow officer, defendant First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. The escrow agent should also release funds held in escrow 
to the party to which they are owed, including UPCM, GPI and 
PPI. First Security shall release these instruments as follows: 
a. To GPCC: 
(i) Original Conveyance covering resort 
facilities dated October 11, 1975, identified as 
document (dd) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement 
dated October 11, 1975 (-Substituted Escrow 
Agreement-). 
(ii) Original Special Warranty Deed (from UPCM 
to GPCC) covering Parcel 18 dated October 11, 1975, 
identified as document (ee) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement. 
(iii) Special Warranty Deeds to any other 
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parcels of the Development Properties (as that term is 
used in the Substituted Escrow Agreement), not 
previously delivered, including the Original Special 
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel 2E 
dated October 11, 1975, identified as document (j) in 
the Substituted Escrow Agreement (if not already 
delivered), and any undelivered Original Special 
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel 
7-2B. Further, UPCM is hereby ordered to deliver to 
GPCC any and all policies of title insurance required 
to be delivered under the provisions of the Land 
Purchase Agreement as amended. 
(iv) Original Conveyance dated October 11, 1975 
covering water rights purchased under the Water Rights 
Purchase Agreement as Amended, identified as document 
(ff) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement. 
(v) Original Lease (Crescent Ridge) dated May 1, 
1975 and identified as document (e) in the Substituted 
Escrow Agreement. 
b. To Royal Street Land Co./Deer Valley 
Resort Co.: 
Original Conveyance dated October 14, 1975 
covering an undivided one-half interest in water 
rights covered by the Water Rights Purchase Agreement 
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as Amended, identified as document (xx) in the 
Substituted Escrow Agreement, 
c, To PPI: 
(i) Original Special Warranty Deed (from GPCC to 
PPI) covering Parcel 2E dated October 14, 1975, 
identified as document (ccc) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement. 
(ii) Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC to 
PPI covering Parcel 7-2B dated October 14, 1975, 
identified as document (ddd) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement. 
(iii) Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC 
to PPI covering Parcel 18 dated October 14, 1975, 
identified as document (eee) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement. 
I. TWELFTH CLAIM (GPCC, ROYAL STREET) 
21. Because UPCM's Twelfth Claim against GPCC and 
Royal Street for reformation of the 1971 Water Rights Purchase 
Agreement is based on events that occurred subsequent to the 
execution of the agreement, and events that occurred subsequent 
to the 1975 amendments to that agreement, that Claim fails to 
state a cause of action upon which reformation may be granted. 
J. SEVENTH CLAIM (GPCC) 
22. Pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Lease (Resort 
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I Area) and the Third Amendment thereto, the sale of the Town 
Lift property by UPCM was required in order for the Third 
Amendment to become effective. Because that sale never 
occurred, the Town Lift property remains part of the Lease 
(Resort Area), and this portion of UPCM's Seventh Claim for 
I trespass against GPCC shall be dismissed, 
23. The balance of the Seventh Claim for trespass 
against GPCC fails because of UPCM's contractual duties of 
cooperation with GPCC under Paragraph 19 of the Land Purchase 
Agreement, and because of UPCM's written and verbal consent to 
GPCC's use of the land in question. 
III. ORDER 
1. Defendants' and intevenor's motions to dismiss or 
for summary judgment are granted. 
2. The Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice 
as to defendants AMOT, Morgan, Fidelity, GPI, PPI, Royal Street 
and intervenor Wells Fargo. 
3. The Amended Complaint is also dismissed with 
prejudice as to defendant GPCC, except that the Court reserves 
for further determination the issue of whether UPCM has a claim 
for damages against GPCC based upon defaults under the Lease 
(Resort Area) alleged in paragraph 116(e)(ii) of the Amended 
Complaint. 
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4. Defendant First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., is 
ordered to release certain instruments of title from escrow 
forthwith, as follows: 
a. To GPCC: 
(i) Original Conveyance covering resort 
facilities dated October 11, 1975, identified as 
document (dd) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement 
dated October 11, 1975 ("Substituted Escrow 
Agreement"). 
(ii) Original Special Warranty Deed (from UPCM 
to GPCC) covering Parcel 18 dated October 11, 1975, 
identified as document (ee) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement. 
(iii) Special Warranty Deeds to any other 
parcels of the Development Properties (as that term is 
used in the Substituted Escrow Agreement), not 
previously delivered, including the Original Special 
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel 2E 
dated October 11, 1975, identified as document (j) in 
the Substituted Escrow Agreement (if not already 
delivered), and any undelivered Original Special 
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel 
7-2B. Further, UPCM is hereby ordered to deliver to 
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GPCC any and all policies of title insurance required 
to be delivered under the provisions of the Land 
Purchase Agreement as amended, 
(iv) Original Conveyance dated October 11, 1975 
covering water rights purchased under the Water Rights 
Purchase Agreement as Amended, identified as document 
(ff) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement. 
(v) Original Lease (Crescent Ridge) dated May 1, 
1975 and identified as document (e) in the Substituted 
Escrow Agreement, 
b. To Royal Street Land Co./Deer Valley 
Resort Co.: 
Original Conveyance dated October 14, 1975 
covering an undivided one-half interest in water 
rights covered by the Water Rights Purchase Agreement 
as Amended, identified as document (xx) in the 
Substituted Escrow Agreement. 
c. ToJPPI: 
(i) Original Special Warranty Deed (from GPCC to 
PPI) covering Parcel 2E dated October 14, 1975, 
identified as document (ccc) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement. 
(ii) Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC to 
PPI covering Parcel 7-2B dated October 14, 1975, 
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identified as document (ddd) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement, 
(iii) Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC 
to PPI covering Parcel 18 dated October 14, 1975, 
identified as document (eee) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement. 
5. Defendant First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. is 
also ordered to release (at the same time the above instruments 
of title are released from escrow) funds held in escrow to the 
party to which they are owed, including UPCM, GPI and PPI. 
DATED this / 5 day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
SCZ^. 7^4, / 
PAT B. BRIAN 
Third District Court Judge 
IINCE, YEATES 
QELOZAHlEft 
C«ntrtl,Suit«900 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on the _/ day of May, 1990, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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David B. Watkiss 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
James A. Boevers 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East Fourth South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
139 East South Temple, #2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael F. Jones 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
Suite 1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gordon L. Roberts 
Randy L. Dryer 
Elisabeth R. Blattner 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Merlin O. Baker 
Jonathan A. Dibble 
Keith A. Kelly 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
PRINCE, YEATES 
ft OELOZAHLBI 
CltyC*nti»l,Sult»900 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
614 Main Street, Suite 401 
P.O. Box 4485 
Park City, Utah 84060-4485 
Philip C. Potter, Jr. 
Donald N. Dirks 
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL 
One Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, New York 10005 
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ADDENDUM C 
C-1 
78-12-25 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Chapter 6, Title 25, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, tion (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as 
upp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14. Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- changes in Subsection (1). 
tent, effective April 25,1988, inserted Subsec-
ADDENDUM D 
D-1 
78-12-27 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders or direc-
tors. 
Actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation to recover a pen-
alty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created, by law must be 
brought within three years after the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the 
facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability accrued, 
and in case of actions against stockholders of a bank pursuant to levy of 
assessment to ^oltect their statutory liability, such actions must be brought 
within three years after the levy of the assessment. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Liability of bank stockholders, Utah Const., 
Supp., 104-12-27. Art. XII, Sec. 18. 
Cross-References. — Corporations gener- Stock ownership by banks, § 7-3-21. 
ADDENDUM E 
E-1 
Rule 12 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
LTAH RLLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56 
(CJ Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, m his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided m 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
d) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff m an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300 00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall uDon motion of the dpfpndant on*** o^ ^w^~ J ^ 
ADDENDUM F 
F-l 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
ADDENDUM G 
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03 NORTHWESTERN REPORTER (Neb 
i instituted to reverse or modify it in i 
respect The appellees filed their re 
it for a stay thus acknowledging the 
Ilty of the decree and agreeing to its 
is It follows that both parties are bound 
eby and the appellees are estopped by 
recitals of that decree from pleading it 
ar to the prosecution of this s u i t After 
dgment or decree in rem a party to the 
rd is estopped from asserting any claim 
rary to the facts determined t h e n by 
tie orders made therein Rector v Rot 
3 Neb 171 McIIugh v Smilcj 17 Neb 
020 20 N W 29<> 24 N W 277 Spit ley 
rost (C C ) 15 I ed 304 South Omaha I 
ber Co v Central Inv Co 32 Neb 629, 
W 429 
may be conceded that the decree was 
leous and that if proceedings h id been 
u to reverse or modify it in an j man 
such proceedings would have been sus 
>d But It cannot be said tha t the de-
was void The court had jurisdiction 
le subject matter and the parties to tha t 
and its decree, even if erroneous, is 
ing alike upon all of them In the ap 
tion of the principle of res ju l i c i t a 
» is no difference between courts of law 
courts of equity When an issue of fact 
f law has been adjudicated upon the 
ts in either tribunal it cannot be again 
ited in another Black on Judgnu nts 
2, sec 518 A decree of a court of eq 
whenever the parties to a suit and the 
BCt of the controversy between them 
within its jurisdiction is a s binding as 
d be the judgment of a court of law 
the parties and their Interests regu 
within its cognizance Black on Judg 
s sec 517 By the terms of the decice 
is made subject to the lien of the $1 (MM) 
gage which is sought to be foreclosed 
is action Its effect was to preserve the 
of the mortgage and authorize its sub 
ent foreclosure The matter was thus 
ti out of the general rule abo \e mention 
It follows that the court eired in finding 
the former foreclosure was a bar to the 
^cution of this suit and in dismissing 
appellant's cause of action In any 
t under the facts in this case as dis 
d by the record the appellant was en 
1 to a foreclosure of its mortgage for 
valance due thereon 
B therefore lecoinmend tha t the decree 
tie district court be reversed and the 
B remanded, with instructions to the dis 
court tp render a decree of foreclosure 
tayed for in the appellant 's petition. 
DHAM and POUND, CC concur 
JR CURIAM The conclusions reached 
tie Commissioners are approved and it 
arlng tha t the adoption of the recom 
lations made will result in a right deci 
of the cause, it i t ordered tha t the de* 
of the district court be reversed, uud 
the cause remanded with directions to the 
distiiet court to enter a decree of foreclosure 
in favor of the appel lant 
HOME F I R E INS CO r B U t B C R et al 
(Supreme I ourt of Nehraska I eh 17 1903 ) 
CORPORATIONS — MISMAN VGPMPNT — STOCK 
HOLDERS—RIGHTS—COR1 OKVTh ENTITY—LQ 
UITABLE RIGHTS - CONTRACT OF EMPLOY 
MENT—CONTINUATION—PRESUMPTION 
1 Subsequent stockholders ha\e no stinding 
as a general rule to attack prior mismanage 
incut of the cori >ratiou 
2 Such a stallholder ought not to be allow 
ed to HiK unites tin mixinnmigenient or its 
effetts continue and are injurious to inui or it 
affects him specially aud peculuuly la some 
other manner 
3 Stockholders who have acquired their 
shares and thur interest in the coiporation 
from the ailt ged wrongdoers and through the 
prior mismanagement have DO standing to 
complain theieof 
4 Stockholdtis as such have no title to the 
corpoiate property whuh they may convey or 
incumber in their o\\ n name, but this is onlv 
another way of sayiug that the coiporation 
muht act through itb proper agents and in the 
prescribed way 
6 Where a corporation is pioceeding at law 
or wheie it is asserting a title to propeitv or 
the title to property is involved the eorpoia 
tiou is regarded as a person separate and dis 
tinct from its stockholders or any or all of 
them 
6 Put where it is proceeding in equity to as 
sert rights of an equitable nature or is seek 
ing relit f upon rules or print n i t s of equity the 
court of equity will not forget that the stock 
holders are the real and substantial bene-
hcianes of a recovery and if the stockholders 
have no standing in equitj and are not equita 
bly entitled to the remedy sought to be en 
forced by the corporation in their behalf and 
for their advantage the corporation will not 
be peimittcd to ret over 
t I he proposition announrod In the ft urth 
paragraph of the syllabus m l itrgtrald v Fit/ 
M raid 4 Mallory C onstnit lion Co ^9 N W 
K*8 41 Neb 374 was in tffttt if not express 
1> retracted on relit ann>, in I it/>,erald v Fitz 
gerald & Mallorj Constnn tion Co 62 N W 
990 44 Neb 473 and is disapproved 
8 A plaintiff must recover on the strength 
of his own case not on the weakness of the 
defendant s case It is his right not the de 
fendant a wrongdoing that is the basis of re-
coverv 
9 Where service undt r a/ contract of em 
plovment for a fixed peii>l continues aftei 
stub period has ex| ired it H irtsuiiud to be 
under the same contmtt but this pit sumption 
miM yield to evidtiue showing a change of 
terms 
10 The general manager of a corporation aft 
er o\t iration of a contiaot fixing his salary at 
$r> 000 per annum continued in the same em 
plo\ment without any new agreement and 
ufttiwards voluntaiily reduced his salaiy to 
$3 000 per annum drawing it from mouth to 
m« nth thereafter on tint basis for many years, 
until he gave up the office After the original 
I contract no action was taken by the directors 
with reference to his salary, but the evidence 
that he took the less sum from time to time in 
I full payment was clear and convincing Held 
that a judgment for bat k salary at the rate of 
$2 000 per annum could not be sustained | (Syllabus by the Court) 
Commissioners opinion Department No. 
2 Appeal from district court, Douglas coun-
ty, Keysor, Judge. 
Neb) HOME F I R B INS CO v BERBER 1025 
Action by the Home Fire Insurance Com 
pany against Charles J Barber and others 
Trom the judgment defendant Barber ap 
peals and certaiu other parties bring cross 
appeals Reversed 
Byron G Burbank and Halleck F Rose, 
for plaintiff W W Morsman and V O 
feti Ick lei for defendant Barber 
POUND, C The plaintiff is an insurance 
company organized in 1884 with a capital 
stock of $100 000, divided into 1 000 shares 
of $100 each Its business is conducted by a 
boaid of directors a finance committee an ex 
eeutive committee, and certain other officers 
Including a secretary and general manager 
It appears that the secretary and general 
manager, a t least down to December 1899 
was at all times intrusted with the active 
management and control of the company s 
affairs and the president and the remaining 
officers appear to have given very little if 
any, attention thereto The appellant and 
piincipal defendant Charles J Barber was 
one of the original incorporators of the com 
pany, and was a stockholder therein from its 
organization until December 2 1899 During 
that period he was secretary and general 
manager one of the directors and a member 
of the executive committee His codefend 
ants, Lovett Woodman and Reynolds were 
ilso original incorporators and stockholders 
ind from time to time from its organization 
jntil December 2 1899 were directors and 
members of the executive and finance com 
mittees On December 1899 the defendant 
Barber entered Into a contract with one 
funkhouser whereby he agreed to sell to 
said Funkhouser all of the shares of the cap-
ital stock of said company except 2 shares 
which be was to obtain if possible and to 
procure the resignation of all the officers and 
a majority of the directors He also agreed 
not to engage in the insurance business di 
rectly or indirectly for a period of three 
years By the terms of the contract he was 
to furnish to Funkhouser a t rue and complete 
statement of all the assets and liabilities of 
the company, and if, upon Investigation the 
statement of assets and liabilities proved to 
be correct and satisfactory to Funkhouser 
the latter was to pay the sum of $75 000 for 
said shares, less $200 for the two shares 
above mentioned in case they could not be 
obtained and a further sum of $40 000 as a 
bonus for obtaining all of the shares of stock 
and for procuring the resignation of the offi 
cere, relinquishing his control of the com 
pany, and agreeing not to engage further in 
the business of insurance On December 2 
1899 pursuant to said contract the defend 
an t Barber delivered to said Funkhouser all 
of the shares of the capital stock of said 
company, except 8 He also delivered an op-
tion contract for 6 of the remaining share* 
and subsequently procured and delivered the 
other 2 In payment therefor he received 
the sum of $04 880 80 In cash and $20,619 40 
9 3 N W - 6 5 
in assets of the company—namely $12 350 
of collateral loans which he hid agieed to 
accept at the time when the tonti ict of sale 
was made and cert un othei assets amount 
jng to $8 2oJ 40 which 1 unkhousei had re 
fused to accept a t the time when the list of 
assets was under consult lation \ccoidinjJy 
the s h u e s of stotk were t i insfe i ied on the 
books ot the eompiny undei the direction of 
Funkhousci to himself md certain others 
his associates in the ti lusiction and he and 
his said associates bicmie thereupon and 
now are the only stocl holeltis In the com 
pany None of them li ui held stock theiein 
theretofore At the sum tune puisuant to 
the contiact the defendant Raibci leslMicd 
his office and proem ed the lcsignation of the 
defendants Reynolds Woodmin and I ovett 
and of the other principil officers and direct 
ors of the comptiij a n ] a new he ud of di 
rectors was elected and m w ofh u s took 
charge On No\ember 20 18 H evidently in 
contemplation of a t rmsfer of ill his inter 
est in the corporation the detent! tut Barber 
drew out $2 200 of the comn my H moneys 
upon a claim of unpaid salaiy feubsetpieut 
to the change in management of the com 
pany this was discovered aud a controversy 
arose between B i rb t r and the new manage 
ment with reference thereto as a result of 
which suit was brought by the company to 
recover said sum Thereupon Barber made 
a counterclaim for some $10 000 of sal iry 
alleged to be due him and not withdiawn 
and as a lesult of examination and iiivesti 
gation of the company s I o >ks with refer 
ence to this claim certain uie^uhirities and 
mism inagement came to lifeht which weie 
set forth in an amended petition and fin 
nlshed the principal points of controversy in 
the case as linally tued 
Thus theie are two branches to the case 
Upon the one hand a suit by the eorpoiation 
to recover the money taken out by Barber as 
back salary just piior to the time he sold 
his stock and certain other moneys which 
a t vaiious times he is alleged to have appro 
priated wrongfully to his own use and on 
the otht i hand a suit to r t t ov t r for Barbel s 
mismanagement and for piohts made by him 
through the use of the conipin> s money at a 
time \*hcu he stood in a fiduciary lelation 
thereto The principal mismanagement con 
sisted In borrowing funds of the company to 
purchase its stock and in making a profit 
out of the purchase of the stock and the divi 
elends actiuing thereon At the time the 
stoek was bought with money borrowed from 
the company it was woi th about $55 per 
share But seven years later when the de-
fendant Barber sold out his interest in the 
company it had come to be woith $115 per 
share During that time dividends had ao 
crued in considerable amounts and had been 
paid to aud received by Barber The decree 
compels Barber to account for the profit* 
and for the dividends on the ground that the 
loan of the company s fund* and the use of 
1026 °3 NORTHWESTERN REPORTER (Neb 
those funds in purchase of the stock was un 
authorized and that the profits and the dlv 
idends belonged in equity to the company 
Upon the issue as to silary, the couit found 
t i n t Barber was entitled to recover for back. 
st laiy, as elalmed, and applied the amount 
found to be due him then on upon the 
amounts found due the company by leuson 
of his mismanagement 
I h e f a d s with refeience to the mismanage-
ment as found bj the eourt are substantial 
ly these In Januaiy 1802 and for some 
time piior to that date, the stoekholdeis of 
the company were dhlded into two factions 
The one consist*d of the defendants Barber, 
1 ovett Reynolds and Woodman who tuld 
237 shaies, and some other stockholders not 
sufficient, however, to constitute a majority 
The other faction was contioiled by one 
Hamilton, and held in tin aggicgate 507 
shaies As the cont ro \nsy liuatiie acute 
the Hamilton faction ic quit eel the Barber 
faction to pmchase theh 507 shares of stock 
or else to submit to the election of a board 
of directors who would choose a new secre-
tary and general manager and eutiiely alter 
the policy and management of the compiny 
It appears that Barber and his assoe iates 
were experienced Insuiance men while Ham 
Hton and his faction weie not and the court 
has found that Baiber, Lovett Woodman and 
Reynolds believed it to be for the best in 
terests of the company, as well as for their 
own interest, that the company should be 
managed by persons of experience in the 
business Accordingly they ogieed among 
themselves to purchase the 507 shares and 
thus preserve control of the compuny For 
that purpose they agreed also to procure mon 
ey temporarily by borrowing of banks on 
their own notes paying said notes with mon 
ey which they could boriow from the com 
pany as soon as they could obtulu control 
thereof, unless In the meantime they were 
able to sell enough of the shares purchased 
to pay off their notes or to pay,them off by 
the sale of other property In pursuance of 
this design, they boirowed the neeessaiy 
funds of banks purchased the shares and 
distributed them among themselves, the ma 
jonty going to the defend nit Barber A pe-
uod of financial depnssion was Imminent, 
and after the purchase it became Impossible 
to dispose of the shaies as the defendants 
had hefped so that It was mnsHuiy to bor 
row of the company in oidti to pay off tin lr 
notes at the banks Accordingly the defend 
ants resorted to the company s funds bor 
rowing a portion upon real estate secuiity, 
and another portion upon notes secured by 
pledge of the stock 
As to the money borrowed upon real estate 
security, the court has found that the loans 
were made In good faith, with bona fide In 
tendon of repaying them In full piincipal 
and interest, that the security was fair and 
reasonable, that the loans were made ac 
coidlng to the usual mode of business of the 
company were entered upon the books In the 
regulai \va} weie known to the officers, dl 
rectois and stockholders of the compiny, 
were in large p i r t included in the annini re 
poits of the company and have all been paid 
In full either by (ash or com < t u r n s of 
piopertv to the compiny evcept the intuc^t 
on a uioitgige loan to the defendant Bube i 
The loans on collateral secuiity on the con 
trary, were not earned on the books of the 
company openly in the name of the pu t i e s 
who obtained them The3 weie not such 
loans as the statute authonzed the company 
to make and fie court has found that they 
weie not properly secured The court has 
also found that It was agieed between the 
defendants Baiber lovet t , and Remolds 
when these collateial loans were originally 
obtained fiom the company that they would 
pay no interest thereon, and that aftt r a 
short time tin y ceased to pay any 'these 
loans weie kept standing on the books In 
one foim or another until the sale of the 
stock to I unkhouser in December 1800 when 
the collateial loin account which consisted of 
these items was turned over to Baibei as 
abo\e stated Ihe eouit found on this point 
that the appoitlomm nt of the consideration 
which Funkhousei was to pay and did pay 
to Baiber for all the shares of stock in the 
company, as provided for In the contract, 
w hereby $75 000 was stated to be the consid 
eratlon for the shares of stock, and the re 
malniug $40 000 a bonus, was made after 
the sale was practically consummated, to en 
able Barber to buy in the shares of the com 
pany held by other stockholders for the pur 
l*>se or selling and delivering them, and that 
the real value of the stock and the true con 
sldeiatlon received therefor was not $75,000 
but the full sum of $115 000 Upon this 
basis the court found that the portion of said 
507 shaies of stock which was covered by 
the collateral loans namely 203% shares was 
at all times after the sale by Hamilton in 
equity the property of the company and that 
the company was entitled to reco\ei the full 
consideiatlon which Funkhouser paid Barbei 
therefor namely, $115 per shaie 
Another item of mismanagement grew out 
of a mortgage loan to the defendant Wood" 
man In 1880 Woodman and his wife bor 
rowed $1,400 of the plaintiff upon a moit 
gage In January, 1808 there was $l,b00 
clue upon the loan and on that date Wood 
man a l igned to Baiber his half Interest in 
75 shares of the stock purchased from Hamll 
ton and his associates which had been ap 
portioned to I ovett and Woodman as part 
ners Thereupon the company released the 
moitga tee and Baiber charged the $1000 on 
the books of the company as cash This 
item was carried on the books in various 
ways until December 1, 1890, when Barber 
paid it I h e court considered that this 
amounted to a use of $1 GOO of the company's 
funds In the purchase of the stock, and that 
the profits on 87Mi shares, amounting to $2, 
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612 50, should be Accounted for to the com 
pany. 
A similar item grows out of the put chase 
by Barber from the plaintiff of 20 shares of 
stock, originally held by the wife of the de-
fendant Reynolds This stock was sold to 
the company on August 1, 1809, and applied 
on a mortgage of $2,700, given by her and 
her husband to the company The court 
found that Barber purchased the stock of 
the company, giving his note for a portion, 
and carrying the remainder upon the books 
of the company by various devices uiitJi De 
cember 1, 1809, when the whole was paid 
It held, therefore, that he was liable to the 
company for the pioflt on these shares 
A further Item of mismanagement glows 
out of a mortgage for $2,600 executed by one 
Raff In January, 1894, an Installment of 
principal and a large amount of acciued in 
terest and taxes had fallen due At that time 
the mortgage was assigned by Its then holder 
to the defendant Baiber for about the sum 
of $1,300 The court has found that Barber 
knew at the time that foreclosure would be 
necessary, and Immediately instituted a suit 
In his own name for that purpose Pending a 
stay, on order of sale pursuant to decree in 
the foreclosure suit. Barber assigned the I 
moitgage to the plaintiff company as collat 
eral security for a note which he owed it, • 
and afterwards drew out $2 500 of the com 
pany's money In payment therefor Subse 
quently the foieclosure sale was confirmed, 
and a large deficiency judgment entered 
This judgment was never assigned to the 
company, but, after receiving a mas t e r s 
deed in the foreclosure proceedings, he con 
veyed the property by warranty deed to the 
plaintiff The court found that the company 
paid taxes amounting to nearly $1 200 and 
taking this Into account, held that the total 
amount of the company's money used in the 
transaction was over $5,100 I t found, fur 
ther, that this was an Improvident and un 
lawful Investment, In case the mortgage was 
bought originally for the company, as Barber 
alleged, and that, If it was not so bought 
originally, the sale to the company pending 
stay In the foreclosure suit was a violation of 
his trust, so that In either event he did not 
act for the best Interests of the compinv 
and upon reconveyance should account to it 
101 said sum of $5,100. 1 
The other items are of a different natuie 
In 1895 Barber, while secretary and man 
ager of the company, drew two checks, for 
$1 500 each—one to the defendant Reynolds 
and the other to the defendant Lovett 1 he se 
checks were Indorsed and deposited by Bai 
ber In his personal account Thereupon he 
drew his check in favor of the company for 
the aggregate sum, deposited it to the credit 
of the company, and credited said sum of 
$3 000 on collateral notes signed by himself 
and said defendants, as a payment thereon 
these checks were issued In payment of al 
leged claims for services rendered by Lovett I 
[ and Reynolds In preventing legislation hos 
tile to the compiny and other s imihr n n t 
teis and the court has found t in t such claims 
weie not bom tide and weie b i n e d by the 
statute of limit itions and t i n t the t in i s t c 
tlon was in eflect a convcibion of $3 0(H) of 
the compiny s money It has also found that 
at various times the defend int collected sums 
amounting to $237 37 belonging to the com 
p i n j , for which he failed to account We 
think that the item of interest on the moit 
gage loan above mentioned is to be put in 
the same category 
[ And here belongs also the elilm for $2 200 
of the compiny s funds wilhli iwn by Bar 
ber on N o u m h i 20 is »') on iccount of back 
salary Upon the issues as to s i l u y the 
court found t i n t in 1S00 a contract w is en 
teied into between B u l e i and the compiny 
whereby he was to receive a ccit i iu silaiy 
for the remainder of t in t 3ear and for the 
year 1891 and from Januaiy 1 1S02 to J in 
uary 10 I8J0 a s i l u y at the nt< of $HMM> 
per annum The tenn of employment untl 1 
the contract was for five ycu& Baibei st 1 \ 
ed, however continuously from the ineeptien 
of the conflict until December 2 lb.)0 and 
after the e\pii it ion of the tcnn piovided no 
action of any kind was ever t iken by the 
company by its board of duectors or by any 
committee or othcer other thin Barber, with 
reference to the amount of salary But in 
1895, on account of general financial depies 
slon, It became necessary to reduce the sai l 
rles of all employes and at that time Bat 
ber voluntuilv reduceel his own salaiv to 
$3 000 per annum rlhe court finds that fremi 
I that date he drew his sulaiy from mouth to 
month substantially on the basis of such ie 
ductlon until he terminated his connection 
with the company I h e evidence tends to 
show that dm lug the peiioel fiom lS*>i to 
18f)9 he nneh lepeited admissions t i n t his 
salary was pud that he made state me ids of 
the condition of the company fiom which it Is 
evident be considered his sahay was $$000 
per year and that the statement of the assx U 
and liabilities which he m ide to I unkhouser 
pursuant to his contract was m ule upon the 
I same basis. I h e court found howevci, t in t 
he was not estopped bv his volunt uy action 
but was entitled to receive s i l i r y at the 1 itc 
of $5 000 per annum dming the whole pen *l 
fiom 1S0~» and that theie was due him on 
account of undiuwn salaiy the sum of $0 
4S"i 22 
t hus as already Indicated this suit In 
\olves two distinct questions Ihe Inblhtv 
of the defendant B11 ber to aecount to the 
company as at present constitute d for hh 
mismanagement and uiiauthotizcd dealings 
with the company s funds piior to the sale of 
all the stock to 1 unkhouser and hLs ass H lutes 
is one ejuestlon His liability to the company 
for moneys and ass< ts of the company with 
drawn and convcited to his owu use Is quite 
another eiuestiou Connected with this last 
question is his claim for unpaid salaiy 
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We shall first address ourselves to the ques-
tion of Barber's liability for mismanagement. 
Complaint is made of the findings of tact of 
the trial judge upon the several items with 
respect to which mismanagement is charged. 
The evidence on these points Is very volumi-
nous, and in some respects is conflicting. 
Much of it takes the form of expert testi-
mony with reference to the company's books, I 
and is made up of conclusions deduced by 
accountants from their examinations of the 
books and papers of the company, which are 
difficult to follow, and at times are somewhat 
conjectural. But upon review of the evidence I 
we are satisfied that the findings of fact are 
accurate and complete, and are well sustained 
by competent and credible evidence. We 
have no disposition to interfere with any of 
them. Accepting these findings of fact, how-
ever, several important questions of law arise, 
with reference to which the decree rendered 
must be tested. 
Counsel for appellant makes three points. 
The first is that the several transactions re-
?ited amounted to loans of the company's 
iioney to Barber, and that, as the money 
jorrowed has been repaid, he and not the 
company is entitled to the profits. We can- J 
tot assent to this proposition. The use of 
he company's money amounted, as the court 
ias found, to a speculation by one of the ©fil-
ers In violation of his trust, which resulted j 
i a profit. Were this an ordinary case, we 
bink there can be no question that the cor-
oratiou would be entitled to sue, or a stock-
older on Its behalf and for the benefit of all 
there. But it is urged tha t this is not an 
'dinary case. None of the present stock-
elders were owners of stock in the corpora-
cm at any time previous to December 2, 
S99. All of them acquired their interest In 
ie corporation by and through the sale from 
irber to Funkhouser on that date. Ac-
rdlngly, the second point made by counsel Is 
at as the defendant Barber came to own 
I of the stock, and the present stockholders 
quired their stock through him, there was a 
?rger in said defendant of all the claims , 
licb the corporation or its stockholders 
gbt have held against him, and such claims 
came extinguished thereby. We do not 
nk this point is well taken. The trial 
irt has, found, upon conflicting evidence, 
it the defendant was never the owner of all 
j stock In the corporation, but was only 
s agent of some of those whose stock he 
•cured and sold to the present stockholders. 
?re Is ample evidence to show that tbis Is 
e, and that as to several shares of stock 
had at no time any beneficial interest. 
s third and most serious point Is that a 
>very in the present case would be en-
ly for the advantage and Inure to the 
eflt of the present stockholders. It would 
>unt, In substance, to a recovery back by 
n of the purchase money which they paid 
defendant Barber for his stock, since the j 
ey, when recovered for the corporation, I 
| would be for distribution among them—the 
I sole stockholders of the company as now con-
stituted. 
This raises numerous and difficult ques-
! tious. It must be determined whether the 
present stockholders, or any of them, are 
entitled to complain of the acts of the de-
fendant and of his past management of the 
company; for, if any of them are so en-
titled, there can be no doubt of the right 
and duty of the corporation to maintain this 
suit. I t would be maintainable in such a 
case, even though the wrongdoers continued 
to be stockholders and would share In the 
proceeds. 1 Mora we tz, Private Corporations, 
S 2D4. We have, therefore, to consider first, 
how far, if at all, subsequent shareholders 
may complain of prior mismanagement of 
the corporation. Next we must consider how 
far subsequent shareholders may complain of 
mismanagement, when they bold through 
such mismanagement OR have acquired their 
[ shares from persons who participated there-
in. The third question to be considered is 
whether the result of a recovery in this case 
would be inequitable, as permitting the pres-
ent stockholders to recover back purchase 
money, or a portion thereof, for which they 
received full consideration, and to acquire 
shares worth $115 each at $55 per share, 
and, in addition thereto, recover and divide 
among themselves a further sum of $00 per 
share, imposed upon the defendant Barber 
for his delinquencies in matters which have 
In no way injured the present stockholders, 
or any of them, or their interests. Finally, 
assuming that, by reason of the foregoing 
propositions, the present stockholders are in 
no position to complain and have no stand-
ing in equity, may the court look beyond the 
coriH>ratlon to the ultimate and substantial 
iM'iiehYiarles of a recovery, or Is it bound to 
I deal with the corporation as a separate per-
son in all respectsV 
Sound reason and good authority sustain 
the rule that a purchaser of stock cannot 
complain of the prior acts and management 
of the corporation. Hawes v. Oakland. 104 
D. S. 450, 20 L. Ed. 827; Dlmpfel v. Ohio & 
M: R. Co., 110 U. S. 209, 3 Sup. Ct. 573, 28 
L. Ed. 121; Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U. S. 
481), 8 Sup. Ct. 1192, 32 L. Ed. 179; South-
west Natural Gas Co. v. Fayette FueLGas 
Co., 145 Pa. 13, 23 Atl. 224; Alexander v. 
Searcy, 81 Ga. 53G, 8 S. E. 630, 12 Am. St. 
Hep. 337; Clark v. American Coal Co., 86 
Iowa, 436. 53 N. W. 291, 17 L. R. A. 657; 
I United Electric Securities Co. T. Louisiana 
Electric Light Co. (C. C.) 08 Fed. 673; Venner 
v. AtchlsJi, T. & S. F. R. Co. (C. C.) 28 Fed. 
581, Heath v. Erie R. Co., 8 Blatchf. 847, 
Fed. Cas. No. 6,306; Danumeyer v. Coleman 
' (C. C.) 11 Fed. 97, 8 Sawy. 61; Pennsylvania 
Tack Works v. Sowers, 2 Walk. 416; 4 
Thomp. Corp. i 4569. In Alexander v. Sear-
cy, supra, the court says: "The weight of 
authority seems to be that a person who did 
not own stock at the time of the transac-
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tions complained of cannot complain or bring 
a suit to have them declared illegal." In 
United Electric Securities Company v. Louis-
iana Electric Light Company, it is said: "As 
a general proposition, the purchaser of stock 
In a corporation is not allowed to attack the 
acta and management of the company prior 
to the acquisition of his stock; otherwise, 
we might have a case where stock duly 
represented in a corporation consented to and 
participated In bad management and waste, 
and, after reaping the benefits of such trans-
actions, could be easily passed into the hands 
of a subsequent purchaser, who could make 
his harvest by appearing and contesting the 
very acts and conduct which his vendor had 
consented to." These remarks are not with-
out application to the case a t bar. The 
present shareholders are all subsequent pur-
chasers. They obtained then.- stock through 
the defendant Barber. They hold a large 
number of their shares under a purchase 
from him and his associates through the 
very mismanagement now complained of. A 
majority of the remaining shares come direct-
ly from Barber and his associates in the 
wrongs upon which this suit is based. In 
other words, the present stockholders are con-
testing acts through which they get title to 
a large portion of their stock, and acts which 
those through whom they derived the greater 
part of the remainder could not have chal-
lenged because they participated therein, and, 
by contesting these acts, which did not in-
jure any of the present stockholders In the 
least, are recovering back a large par t of 
the purchase price of stock which was ad-
mittedly worth all tha t they paid for i t 
Such cases illustrate forcibly the wisdom of 
confining complaints of this kind to those 
who were stockholders a t the time or their 
successors by operation of law. 
The rule tha t a suit for mismanagement 
cannot be maintained by one who was not 
a stockholder at the time has been criticized 
as based on jurisdictional considerations pe-
culiar to the federal courts and on obsolete 
common-law doctrines as to champerty and 
maintenance. 4 Thompson, Corporations, §S 
4569-4571; 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations, 
| 270. In our judgment it does not depend 
upon either. The federal equity rule, while 
designed in par t to prevent collusive pro-
ceedings in fraud of the jurisdiction of those 
courts, goes far beyond the requirements of 
such a purpose. If tha t were the sole pur-
pose of the rule, it should go no further than 
to prevent such suite where the vendor of 
the stock was a citizen of the same state 
as the corporation. If the vendor and pur-
chaser were citizens of the same state, and 
the vendor, an original stockholder, had nev-
er had the same citizenship as the corpora-
tion, no fraud on the jurisdiction of the court 
would be possible, and in such case, if re-
covery were proper and the purchaser's cause 
were meritorious, it would be highly unjust 
for the court to abrogate its jurisdiction. 
This consideration alone disposes of the criti-
cism. The rule has its foundation in a sound 
and wholesome principle of equity, namely, 
that the rules worked out by chancellors in 
furtherance of right and justice shall not be 
used, because of their technical character, 
as rules to reach inequitable or unjust re-
sults. Resting on this basis, "the value and 
importance of the rule * * * are con-
stantly manifested." Field, J., in IHmpfVl 
v. Ohio & M. K. Co., 110 II. S. 2<X), 3 Sup. 
Ct. 573, 28 L. Ed. 121. The right of the 
stockholder to sue exists because of special 
.Injury to him for which otherwise he is 
without redress. If his interest is trifling, 
and the injury thereto of no consequence, 
he cannot sue to compel righting of wrongs 
to the corporation. Mcllenry v. New York, 
P . & O. U. Co. (C. C.) 22 Fed. 130; Albers 
v. Merchants' Exchange, 45 Mo. App. 2<R>. 
Hence there is obvious reason for holding 
that one who held no stock at the time of 
the mismanagement ought not to be allowed 
to sue, unless the mismanagement or its ef-
fects continue and are injurious to him, or 
it affects him specially and peculiarly in some 
other mani»er. City of Chicago v. fa melon, 
22 111. App. 91, on appeal 120 111. 447, U N . K. 
899, is a case of the first type. Carson v. 
Iowa City Gaslight Co., 80 Iowa, 038, 45 N. W. 
1008, is of the second type. Except in such 
cases, the purchaser ought to take things as 
he found them when he voluntarily acquired 
an interest. If he was defrauded in the 
purchase, he should sue the vendor. As tc 
the corporation and its managers, so long as 
he is not injured in what he got when he 
purchased, and holds exactly what he got 
I and in the condition in which he got it, 
there is no ground of com plaint. Clark v. 
American Coal Co., 80 Iowa, 430. 53 N. W. 
291. 17 L. R. A. 557. 
The cases which bold that n subsequent 
stockholder may sue for mismanagement 
may be noticed briefly. Those commonly 
cited are : Ramsey v. Gould, 57 Barb. 398; 
Young v. Drake, 8 Hun, 01; Parsons v. Jo-
seph, 92 Ala. 403, 8 South. 788; Winsor v. 
Bailey, 55 N. II. 218; Forrester v. Boston 
& M. Consolidated Silver Min. Co., 21 Mont. 
544, 55 Pac. 229. 353. In Ramsey v. Gould, 
plaintiff, believing that there had been mis 
management, bought shares for the purpose 
of proceeding against the directors and oth 
cers and "bringing them to justice." The 
court permitted the suit upon the ground 
that plaintiff's motives were immaterial. 
But it assumed, without discussion, that he 
bad an interest to vindicate, and had suf-
fered some wrong, which is the real ques-
tion on which such cases depend. Moreover, 
it is by no means clear that the motives be-
hind a stockholder's suit are immaterial. 
Where stock is acquired for the purpose of 
bringing suit. It has been held that the com 
plainant Is a mere interloper, entitled to no 
consideration. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 TJ. S. 
I 401, 26 L. Ed. 827; Moore v. Silver Valley 
30 93 NORTHWESTERN REPORTER (Neb 
oing Co 104 N 0 534 10 S E 679, 
lgman v Rome W & O R Co 30 Hun 
Du Pout v Northern Pnc R Co (C 
18 Fed 407,471 And s tockholder suits 
In ought in good faith in the inteiests of 
corpoiation have been dismiss*d on that 
uud Beshoar v Chappell b Colo App 
40 Pae 244 Belmont v E n e R Co , 
Barb 637 In Young v Drake the court 
ow Ramsey v Gould The further point 
nade that ' tbe plaintiff acquired all the 
its of the person of whom he purchased " 
course in a case where those of whom 
purchased bad participated or acquiesced 
he mismanagement this view would pre-
le the purchaser from suing And he 
Id not sue as being a bona fide purchaser 
gnorance of the disability at taching to 
vendor, because shares of stock are not 
otiable and the sale cannot pass greater 
its than those possessed by the vendor 
rk v American Coal Co 86 Iowa 436, 
4 W 291, 17 L R A 557, 4 Thompson 
porations p 3410 But it may be doubt , 
whether a purchaser of stock buys or in 
Is to buy anything beyond the vendor s 
lent interest In the corporation and its | 
ts His vendor's causes of action for 
injuries and rights to complain of past 
management are scarcely in conteinpla 
of the parties We must not suffer our-
es to be deceived by speaking of causes 
ction of the corporation in this connec 
since causes of action of this character 
ng to the corporation for the beueflt and 
he interest of Its stockholders Parsons 
oseph and Winsor v Bailey adopt the 
r of Mr Morawetz that the rule announ 
by the federal courts Is a rule of practice 
d on Jurisdictional peculiarities of those 
ts and not of general application In 
ester v Mining Co the transaction was 
complete and still required ratification 
he stockholders The complainants al 
gh they bought after the acts were done 
1
 stockholders while the matter was still 
latlve, and bad an undoubted right to 
fere to prevent its consummation 
ce what Is said as to the point in ques 
Is dictum only 
ic fallacy In the view that one who has 
been injured by a transaction and Is not 
ted thereby can acquire a right to sue 
qulty to set It aside because he has 
ired the shares of the person injured, 
[posed In such cases as Graham v La 
se & M R Co, 102 U S 148 26 L 
106 and Hoffman v Bullock (C O) 34 
248 The right to complain of such 
tactions is one which the stockholders 
ed may or may not exercise as they 
se Where such transactions are not ab I 
t ly void, they may, If they so elect, 
lesce and treat them as binding The 
etlon whether to sue to set them aside 
acquiesce in and agree to them is in 
[>le of transfer If the new stock hold 
Injured there is another question In I 
i tha t case he also b i s a power of proceeding 
I or remaining inactive as he may prefer 
I Where he is not injured he can take no 
advantage of the power which was In his 
vendor and the latter did not care to exei 
else tn Graham v l a O o s s c A M R Co , 
supra the point was urged which Is so often 
made in connection with suits by subsequent 
s tockholder and upon which Mr Moiawetz 
I bases his statement that such stockholders 
should be allowed to sue Field J says 
"But it is contended that this is a case 
where the debtor corporation was defrauded 
of Its property and that, as the company 
had a right of proceeding for its recovery 
any of its judgment and execution creditors 
have an equal right that it is a property 
right and one that Inures to the benefit of 
creditors Conceding that as to creditors 
who were such when the fraudulent procure 
meut of the debtor s property occurred 
• • • the question still remains whether 
• • • subsequent creditors have such an 
Interest that they can reach the property for 
t) satisfaction of their debts We doubt 
whether any case going as far as this can 
be found * * • It seems clear that sub 
sequent creditors have no better right than 
subsequent purchasers to question a prevl 
ous transaction in which the debtor's fu*op 
erty was obtained from him by fraud, which 
he has acquiesced in and which he has man 
ifested no desire to disturb Yet In such 
case subsequent purchasers have no such 
r i g h t ' Hence, upon review of the author 
ities and the principles on which they ap 
pear to proceed notwithstanding the posi 
tion ot some of the text writers the sounder 
doctrine sustained by tbe better and more 
numerous adjudications appears to be that 
subsequent stockholders have no standing, 
as a general rule to attack prior mlsinan 
agement of the corporation 
I t appears to be well settled also that 
stockholders who have acquired their shares 
and their Interest in the corporation from 
the alleged wrongdoers and through the 
prior mismanagement have no standing to 
complain thereof Brown v Duluth M A 
N R Co (C C) 53 Fed 880, Matter of 
Application of Syracuse C & N Y It Co 
91 N Y 1, Schilling & Schneider Brewing 
Co v Schneider 110 Mo 83, 10 S W 67, 
Langdon v Fogg 14 Abb N C 435 Par 
sons v Hayes 18 Jones & H 4) , Uoliins 
v Ht Paul M & M It Co (Sup) 0 N V 
Supp 900, Clark • American Coal Co 86 
Iowa 430 53 N W 291 17 L R A 557, 
4 Thompson, Corporations p 3410, Cook, 
Corporations (f 40 736, note If a stock 
holder's predecessor in title has acquiesced 
in a course of mismanagement, it has even 
been held that he cannot maintain a suit to 
restrain its continuance Trimble v Am 
Sugar Refining Co 61 N J Eq 340, 48 Atl 
912 In Ihompson Corporations, supra, the 
learned author says But as share certlfl 
catcs do not, under any theory, rise to the 
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grade ot strictly negotiable paper, it should 
follow, and especially in regard of the trans 
fer of any litigious rights which may attach 
to tin m, that their holder cannot by se 11 
ing them to another transfer to that other 
any better litigious rights inhering in them, 
than he himself possesses If therefore he 
has by his conduct as a shareholder estop 
ped himself from maintaining a suit in equl 
ty to undo corporate action, this estoppel 
will at tend the shaies In the hands of his 
vendee" In consequence It would make no 
great difference tn the case a t bar as to the 
standing of the present shareholders of the 
company in a court of equity, if we held 
tha t subsequent shareholders could at tack 
prior mismanagement The present share 
holders hold 260 shares through a purchase 
from Barber, who acquired title through the 
acts complained of, and the money which 
they paid for those very shares, which they 
hold through such purchase, is now claimed 
to belong to the corporation, and is sought 
to be recovered from their vendor Nor is 
this all The greater par t of the remain 
ing shares were held by Barber and his as 
sociates when the alleged wrongs were com 
mitted, and a re now held by the present 
stockholders under a purchase from Barber 
To allow them to open up these transactions 
is to allow them to go counter to their own 
title to a large par t of the stock, and to 
assert rights and claims which their vendor 
could never have asserted and this too as 
to past transactions which have no present 
effect upon the value of their stock and do 
not continue to be felt in any way in the 
corporate management 
There is another and still stronger reason 
why the present stockholders have no stand 
ing in a court of equity to complain of the 
transactions on which this suit is based To 
permit them to recover, under the circum 
stances of the case a t bar, would be highly 
inequitable I t would be to give them mon 
eys to which they have no Just title or claim 
whatever, and enable them to speculate upon 
wrongs done to others with which they have 
no concern It would enable them to recov 
er back a large par t of tbe purchase money 
they paid and agreed to pay for the stock 
notwithstanding the stock was worth all tha t 
they paid for it, and notwithstanding they 
obtained and now retain all tha t they bar 
gained for So long as they received all that 
was contracted for there is no equity in 
allowing them to recover back a considera 
ble portion of what they paid merely be-
cause their vendor had previously wronged 
some one else who could have obtained 
redress In the name of the corporation which 
they are now able to use This is especially 
manifest in respect to the dividends As 
Barber and his associates acquired shares by 
unauthorized borrowings of the company's 
money, and so held them in trust for tbe 
corporation, as representing all the then 
stockholders, In equity the dividends paid 
upon such sh i res doubtless were r»< i\ 1 
impressed with the same t r u s t But who 
were the benefkiu ies of that t i n s t ' \ >t 
the othe r stoe 1 he Ide is onl> but Bube i tu t 
his assocntes together with suth Kimim 
ing stockbold is R u b e r and his tss ii tes 
held most of the stock outside of the s h u e s 
in question lnstt id of r e t ch ing all the 
dividends on those sh i res the} should have 
received m eqmtv the fen iter poiiion onh 
Had a stockholder gone into equity a t t i n t 
time and lecovercd the dividends for the 
comp my they would snnplj h ive been for 
disliibution tmong those who held the 
shaies not subject to a trust for the com 
p tny and R u b e r and bis isseuntes would 
still have been the heaviest benefiiiarhs 
For it is well se ttled th it a reeovt ly tn sue h 
case Inures to the bene tit of all stockholders 
as well those who wcie wton^doeis as those 
who were Innocent 4 Ihompson Corpora 
tlons § 4491 But after an entliely new set 
of stockholders have come in holding these 
shares under Barber and his associates and 
the re nninde r of the latter s sh i res under 
purchase fiom them to let them rceove i 
back these dividends is to let them reeliun 
over 60 per cent of the put chase money 
and recover from Birber moneys which in 
equity belonged to him when he took them 
The fact that a rel itivelj small portion be 
longed to others cannot alter the uncon 
scionable character of such a recovery so 
long as the present stockholders are not 
those others and have no st inding in equity 
as their representatives Recovery by or fo r 
the benefit of the present stocl holders means 
to put it plainly that through the instru 
mentality of a court of eciulty they are to 
get shares worth bv their own valuation 
$115 each for $>> c a h a ie to get back dlvl 
dends which never would h ive been p iy ih l e 
to them in any event m l we re not bni gained 
for when they bought and are to receive 
In addition to the 8h ires worth $1 15 on the 
dollar 00 cents more on each dollar inipos 
ed on Barber for his delinquencies Birber 
wronged the old stockholders His conduct 
in many respects was unconscionable and in 
defensible But his fellow st 1 holders wen 
supine for many years The y took no steps to 
Investigate what he wi s doing or to protect 
or asse it the ir rights Now third parties who 
bought all of Barbe r s share s tne hiding those 
wide h he hell as a re milt e>f tils wiougful 
manipulations seek to assert those ilj,hl«and 
reap a protlt t h e n by Because the Inequlta 
ble conduct of Barber shod s the conscience 
of the chancellor is no re ison why he should 
give his conscience a fin the r shock by allow 
ing I unkhouser and his associates to recover 
monejs to which they have no legal or eq 
uitable el lim 
Conceding then that all of the present 
Btocklioldeis are so chcunistanced t i n t no 
relief should be afforded them in a couit of 
equity may the corporation recover notwlth 
standing? We think n o t Where a corpora 
(Neb. 
tion is not asserting or endeavoring to protect 
a title to property, it can only maintain a suit 
in equity as the representative of its stock-
holders. If they have no standing In equity 
to entitle them to the relief sought for their 
benefit, they cannot obtain such relief through 
the corporation or in its own name. Ar-
kansas lliver Land Town & Canal Co. v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 13 Colo. .587, 22 
Pac. 954; Des Moines Gas Co. v. West, 50 
lorta, 16; Schilling & Schneider Brewing Co. 
v. Schneider, 110 Mo. 83, 19 S. W. 67; Flag-
ler Engraving Machine Co. v. Flagler (C. C.) 
19 Fed. 468; Parsons v. Hayes, 14 Abb. N. 
0. 419; Langdon v. Fogg, 14 Abb. N. C. 435. 
it would be a reproach to courts of equity 
1 this were not so. If a court of equity 
rould not look behind the corporation to the 
iharebolders, who are the real and substan-
lal beneficiaries, and ascertain whether 
bese ultimate bencticJaries of the relief it 
s asked to grant have any standing to de-
aand it, the maxim that equity looks to the 
ubstance, and not the form, would be very 
inch limited in its application. 'It is the 
rovince and delight of equity to brush away 
lere forms of law." Post, J., In Fitzgerald 
Fitzgerald ic Maliory Construction Com-
wy, 44 Neb. 403, 492, 62 N. W. 899. No-
here is It more necessary for courts of 
juity to adhere steadfastly to this maxim, 
id avoid the danger of allowing their rein-
ies to be abused, by penetrating all legal 
tions and disguises, than in the complex 
lations growing out of corporate affairs, 
cordingly, courts and text-writers have 
en In entire agreement that equity will 
ik behind the corporate entity, and con-
er who are the real and substantial par-
s in interest, whenever it becomes neces-
y to do so to promote Justice or obviate 
qultable results. In 4 Thompson, Corpo-
lons, $ 4479, the learned author says: "As 
point of substance and sense the corpora-
i consists of the aggregate body of Its 
reholders, it Is obvious that in the most 
stantlal sense the directors are trustees 
the shareholders, and that, In any action 
edregs breaches of trust on the part of the 
ctors, the shareholders are the real par 
in interest." Again: "For the purpose 
ubstantial right, though not for the con-
ences of legal procedure, the aggregate 
7 ot shareholders in a Joint-stock com-
r should be deemed the corporation." 1 
up son, Corporations, i 17. Mr. Mora-
; also writes very cogently to the same 
t: " I t Is essential to a clear under-
ling of many branches of the law of cor-
dons to bear in mind distinctly that the 
ence of a corporation Independently of 
hareholders Is a Action, and that the 
j and duties of an incorporated associa-
t e in reality the rights and duties of the 
ns who compose it, and not of an 1 na-
ry being." 1 Morawetz, Private Corpo-
is, f 1. "While a corporation may, 
one point of view, be considered as an 
I e^oJZ'XZTt t0 the eor~™ 
tbat a X ^ t C / r t ™ t n n e V M C , , t 
or thini; d i s t i l l f,.™. i* r e a , i t v a person The wtrrrP": ,risTrrr,rr-
name for the ^ r » J ™ I a C o , ,eetive 
compost , iZV ?*! 0T m e m l > e r s who 
In \ i« tat-orporated associat ion" T,i 
«soar: jhfc°L 04f s v T r ^ o m r r r 8 -
flciarv 11* recognized «« , u e Kai b e l ) e . 
«Ud 7 e „ r , e 7 , r ^ L a : w,"it"b,e «»* 
Quentiy
 w ere 1 h! V ' ^ * m , , i e d fre~ 
Sheldon
 T ^ . A t e ^ o r a t i o n s , | 2«2 : i uZ^r. klckeroeyer, »0 N. Y. 007 611 
Ho,e. Co. r. Wade. 97 U.
 8 . 1 3 , j * . J ^ ™ ' 
' ^o., the court s a v "Th« «„•! » X 1 * ? u e , n 
«ay. l / ie Action by which 
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an ideal legal entity is attributed to a duly 
formed incorporated company, existing sep-
arate and apart from the individuals com-
posing it, is of such general utility and appli-
cation as frequently to induce the belief that 
it must be universal, and be In all cases ad-
hered to, although the greatest frauds may 
be perpetrated under the fiction as a shierd. 
But modern cases, sustained by the best text 
writers, confine the fiction to the purposes for 
which it was adopted." It has likewise been 
applied to cases of estoppel. Thus Mr. 
Thompson says: "We may also conclude, 
from the premise that the body of stock-
holders are in substance the corporation, that 
estoppels are concurrent as between the 
stockholders and the corporation; in other 
words, that whatever will estop the stock-
holders will estop the corporation, and what-
ever will estop the corporation will estop the 
stockholders." 4 Thompson, Corporations, 8 
5269. But the commonest instance of appli-
cation of this principle Is in stockholders' 
suits for mismanagement. Ordinarily such 
suits are to be brought in the name of the 
corporation, a t the instance of the corporate 
authorities. But where, for some reason, 
this course is not open, the stockholders In-
jured will not be deprived of all remedy, but 
upon proper showing will be permitted to sue 
directly by*jolning the corporation as a de-
fendant. The very basis of these suits is 
that "courts of equity recognize that the 
stockholders are ultimately the only bene-
ficiaries." City of Chicago v. Cameron, 120 
111. 447, 11 N. E. 899. Stockholders are al-
lowed to sue, in order to obtain redress for 
such wrongs, "because in their effect and es-
sential character they are wrongs to the in-
dividual shareholder, inflicted upon his cor-
porate interests! by means of the control over 
those lnterestb secured through tht corpo-
rate organization and management." Brew-
er v. Boston Theater, 104 Mass. 378, 395. 
See, also, State v. Holmes, 60 Neb. 39, 42, 82 
N. W. 109. I t is but another application of 
the same principle to hold that where no 
question of title is involved, but some equi-
table remedy is sought in the corporate name, 
depending purely upon the doctrines of a 
court of equity, the court, to prevent abuse 
and perversion of its doctrines and remedies, 
will look through the corporation to the real 
parties in interest, and, if those parties have 
no standing hi equity, will refuse the rem-
edy. 
Cases of this kind must be differentiated 
sharply from those where the proceeding is 
at law, or where a question of title to the 
corporate property is involved. There is no 
question that stock holders, as such, have no 
title to the corporate property which they 
can convey or Incumber in their own names. 
Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, 11 
Sup. Ct. 779, 35 L. Ed. 473; Wheelock v. 
Moultou, 15 Vt. 519; Smith v. Hurd, 12 
Mete. (Mass.) 385, 46 Am. Dec. 690; Parker 
• . Bethel no t el Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 31 S. W. 
200, 81 L. R. A. 706; Button T. Hoffman, 61 
Wis. 20, 20 N. W. 607, 50 Am. Rep. 131; 
Spurloek v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 90 Mo. 200, 
2 S. W. 219. But this, in substance, is only 
another way of saying that the corporation 
must act through its proper agents and In the 
prescribed way. 4 Thompson, Corporations, 
§ 4476. It is also true, for convenience of 
legal procedure ami to avoid confusion, that 
restitution or redress, even where the injury 
has affected the interests of the stockholders. 
is to be sought primarily through the corpora-
tion. But this rule must always yield to the 
requirements of equity, and is cast aside in 
view of the fact that the stockholders are 
the real beneficiaries whenever the usual 
course is not opeti. Brewer v. Boston Thea-
ter, supra; 4 Thompson, Corporations. § 1177. 
Cases like the one at bar are obviously with-
in the same reason. To penult persons to 
recover through the medium of a court of 
equity that to which they are not entitled, 
simply because the nominal recovery is by a 
distinct person through whom they receive 
the whole actual and substantial benefit, and 
that nominal person would, in ordinary cases, 
as representing beneficiaries having a right 
to recover, be entitled to relief, is perversion 
of equity. It turns principles meant to do 
Justice into rules to be administered strictly 
without regard to the result. It is contrary 
to the very geuius of equity. When the cor 
poration comes into equity and seeks equi-
table relief, we ought to look at the sub 
stance of the proceeding, and, if the bene 
ficlarles of the judgment sought have no 
standing in equity to recover, we ought not 
to become befogged by the fiction of corpo-
rate individuality, and apply the principles of 
equity to reach an inequitable result. 
Hence, we think the rule to apply to such 
cases is this: Where a corporation is pro 
ceeding at law, or where it is asserting a title 
to property, or the title to property is in-
volved, the corporation is regarded as a per 
son separate and distinct from its stork 
holders, or any or all of them. But where 
it is proceeding in equity to assert rights of 
an equitable nature, or is seeking relief upon 
rules or principles of equity, the court of 
equity will not forget that the stoekholders 
are the real and substantial beneficiaries or 
a- recovery, and if the stockholders have no 
standing in equity, and are not equitably enti-
tled to the remedy sought to be enfoived by 
the corporation in their behalf and for their 
advantage, the eorporation will not be permit-
ted to recover. This rule finds many II 
lustrations in the authorities. 
In Arkansas River 1/and, Town & Canal 
Co. v. Farmers* l o a n & Trust Co., 13 CoJo. 
587, 22 Pac. 954, the court said: "It is true 
that , for some purposes, a body corporate 
is sometimes regarded as a legal entity, or a 
fictitious person having a distinct existence. 
This fiction is not recognized in equity. The 
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reason Is clear. Without organization and 
members, without officers and stockholders, 
a corporation is but a naked body. It may 
be authorized to exercise corporate fran-
chises, but is without means or Instrumen-
talities for such exercise. It is clear, there-
fore, that a body corporate cannot maintain 
u suit for equitable relief, except as the 
representative of the stockholders. It neces-
sarily follows that, If the shareholders a re 
without equity, they cannot, through the cor-
porate organization or In its name, obtain 
•elief either for themselves or for the cor-
poration. 'In equity the conception of a cor-
>orate entity is used merely as a formula 
'or working out the rights and equity of 
he real parties In interest, while a t law this 
igurative conception takes the shape of a 
logma, and is often applied rigorously, with-
>ut regard to its true purpose and meaning, 
n equity the relationship between the share-
lolders is recognized whenever this becomes 
lecessary to the at tainment of justice; a t 
iw this relationship Is not recognized a t 
11.' 1 Mor. Priv. Corp. 227. At the very 
utset of the discussion, then, it must be | 
ssumed that, in a suit of this nature, the 
orporation and the individual plaintiffs can-
ot be separated. It follows that, if the In-
ividual plaintiffs are not entitled to relief, 
s counsel admits, the corporation is not, 
nd the judgment dismissing the bill might 
ery properly be affirmed without further 
Iscussion." 
In Parsons v. Hayes, 14 Abb. N. C. 419, 
le court says: "Again, considering tha t 
le fundamental position Is that Catlow be-
tme, In fact, shareholder to the amount of 
1 the capital stock, the following was the 
Nation between the parties: The corpora-
on was the holder of the legal title of the 
•operty of the corporation, subject to cor-
d a t e uses. Excepting this legal title fbr 
•rporate uses, the shareholders were the 
trtles interested in the property, In fact, 
vnlng all of It, excepting the legal title, 
hich, a s against them, could be used for 
rporate purposes. The trustees were the 
atutory corporation. The shareholders 
ere members or a part of the corporation, 
tie corporation held legal title for the pe-
iniary benefit of the shareholders, having 
> beneficial or pecuniary benefit In i t On 
e claims for the plaintiff, the thing pos- : 
ssed is the right of the corporation to have 
! action against Its trustees for damages 
r their acts, which It is claimed were 
•ongful to the corporation. This right, if 
existed, was held by the same tenure and 
: the same purposes that other property 
>uld be held. The corporation would have 
bare title to it for the beneficial use of 
ireholders. I t seems to be evident tha t 
i corporation could not claim as damage 
its Interests what would be damage to 
i beneficial interest, when the owners of 
> latter had consented to the so-called in-
7 " 
j In Flagler Engraving Machine Co. v. 
Flagler (C. C.) 19 Fed. 468, the promoters 
and directors of a corporation put in cer 
tain patent rights as part of its capital. 
Afterwards by fraudulent practices they in-
duced others to buy stock at extravagant 
prices. The purchasers got control of the 
corporation, and brought a suit in equity in 
the name of the corporation against the for-
mer directors for mismanagement. The 
court said that the purchasers might have a 
! right to set aside the sales of stock made to 
them through fraud, but that they could not, 
by obtaining control of the company, set up 
an artificial case and recover through the 
company what was really their loss individ-
ually, and not as stockholders. 
In Schilling A Schneider Brewing Co. v. 
Schneider, 110 Mo, 83, 19 S. W. 07, a corpo-
ration brought suit against certaiu stock-
holders to have shares which they held de-
clared to be the property of the corporation. 
The court treated the remaining stockholders 
as the real parties in interest, and expressly 
referred to them as such, and held that, as 
their predecessors in interest could not have 
complained of the use of moneys of the cor-
poration in acquiring the shares, the stock-
holders in whose interest the suit was brought 
could not do so in their own name or in that 
of the corporation. 
The only decision which has been cited to 
the contrary is Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald & 
Mai lory Construction Co., 41 Neb. 374, 429, 
59 N. W. 838. There it was held that a suit 
for mismanagement was maintainable in 
equity as to a transaction in which four-fifths 
of the stockholders participated and the re-
mainder acquiesced. There had been no 
change in the stockholders. Suit was brought 
by one who had acquiesced to recover for the 
benefit of the corporation. It was said that 
the action was for the benefit of the corpo-
ration, which was a distinct person, and was 
not affected by the circumstance that the 
stockholder himself was in no position to 
complain. But a rehearing was granted, If 
we may judge from the motion and brief of 
counsel, on this very ground; and upon re-
hearing this branch of the case was decided 
upon an entirely different point, namely, that 
there had been no acquiescence on the part 
of the complaining stockholder. Fitzgerald v. 
Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co., 44 
Nel). 463, 62 N. W. 899. Hence, while there 
is no express retraction of the statement in 
the former opinion, we are satisfied that the 
court intended to recede from it, and that we 
are not bound thereby. We reach this con-
clusion the more readily because the proposi-
tion that acquiescence of all the stockholders 
does not preclude the right of the corpora-, 
tion to relief, as advanced In the first opinion; 
Is contrary to the uniform and long-estab-
lished course of decisions In all courts, and 
the understanding of all writers upon the sub-
ject. 2 Cook, Corporations, fg 278, 279; 4 
Thompson, Corporations, f 5269; 2 Beach, 
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Private Corporations, S 887; 1 Morawetz, j 
Corporations, §§ 262-264. The adjudications 
to the same effect as the statements of the 
text-writers cited are legion. 
But It is said the defendant Barber, by rea-
son of his delinquencies, Is In no position to 
ask that the court look behind the corpora-
tion to the real and substantial parties hi 
interest. The trial court took this view, say-
ing: "I have come to the conclusion that, 
there being no equities in this case in favor 
of Mr. Barber, it is not the duty of this court 
to look* behind the entity of the corporation." 
We do not think such a proposition can be 
maintained. It is not the function of courts 
of equity to administer punishment. When 
one person has wronged another in a matter 
within its jurisdiction, equity will spare no 
effort to redress the person injured, and will 
not suffer the wrongdoer to escape restitu-
tion to such person through any device or 
technicality. But this is because of its de-
sire to right wrongs, not because of a desire 
to punish all wrougdoers. If a wrongdoer 
deserves to be punished, it does not follow 
that others are to be enriched a t his expense 
by a court of equity. A plaintiff must re-
cover on the strength of his own case, not 
on the weakness of the defendant's case. I t 
is his right, not the defendant's wrongdoing, 
that is the basis of recovery; When it is dis-
closed that he has no standing in equity, the 
degree of wrongdoing of the defendant will 
not avail him. This principle can hardly 
need demonstration; but abundant illustra-
tions are a t hand. For instance, a creditor 
cannot complain of a fraudulent conveyance 
by his debtor, unless he is injured thereby. 
Baldwin v. Burt, 43 Neb. 245, 61 N. W. 601. 
The conduct of the debtor may have been 
ever so fraudulent. But, if it appears that 
th* creditor has not been prejudiced, he ac-
quires no right merely from the evil intent 
or unconscientious acts of the debtor. An-
other example may be seen in Roberts v. 
Northern Pac. R. Co., 158 U. S. 1, 13, 15 Sup. 
C t 756, 39 L. Ed. 873. In tha t case a county 
had granted land to a railroad company with-
out authority, and the grant, under statutes 
and decisions of the state, was of no effect. 
Afterwards the county sold the same land to 
an individual. The court said: "Whatever 
might be the result In a court of law of a con-
test between these respective grantees of the 
county, It may well be doubted whether a 
court of equity could be successfully appealed 
to by a purchaser from the county of prop-
erty worth upward of $200,000 for a nominal 
consideration of less than $400. If the coun-
ty had found that It had been overreached In 
Its bargain with the railroad company, or had 
learned that its grant of these lands was In-
valid for want of power, and had come into a 
court of equity, offering to return or account 
for the consideration received, the condition 
of things would have been different from 
what it now is. In such a proceeding, the 
rescission would have inured to the benefits I 
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of the taxpayers of the county; but, under 
the present claim, the benefit would go to a 
private party, who bought with knowledge of 
the county's previous sale, and who admits 
in his answer that he secured his own grant 
for a grossly Inadequate consideration be-
cause of the previous sale." In other words, 
the wrongdoing of the defendant will not 
blind a court to the fact that the plaintiff 
may have no standing in equity. 
Counsel say that the court will not look 
through the corporation to the real plaintiffs, 
in order to preserve to Barber the fruits of 
his wrongdoing. If such were the only pur-
pose, we should agree. But the court will 
bear In mind the real parties in Interest, In 
order to prevent those parties from misus-
ing equitable rules and remedies to obtain 
relief to which they have no right, and re 
cover back moneys which they paid out vol-
untarily upon full consideration, without any 
deception, and to which they cau assert no 
legal claim whatever. 
Turning, now, to those items which In-
volve withdrawal of moneys and assets of 
the company by Barber and conversion there-
of to his own use, it must be evident that 
the foregoing discussion does not apply there-
to. So far as its title to property and its 
right to its moneys and assets are concerned, 
a clear distinction between the company and 
its stockholders is aiways drawn. As we 
have seen, even if Barber had owned all the 
stock in the company, he would have had 
no title to the corporate property, so fur as 
to be able to deal with it in ids own rather 
than in the corporate name. But he was 
only a majority stockholder. When he with-
drew money or assets of the corporation, and 
converted it to his own use, there was as 
clear a conversion as if the transaction had 
taken place between natural persons. If he 
concealed and covered up those transactions 
by availing himself of the opportunities af-
forded him as secretary and manager of the 
company, and they were not discovered un-
til a change in management resulted in an 
investigation of the books, we see no reason 
why the company should not recover the 
sums so misappropriated. We are therefore 
of opinion that, so far as relates to the 
$3,000 converted under pretense of payment 
to Reynolds and Lovett for services as lobby-
ists, detailed in the twenty-third finding of 
the district court, and the conversion of the 
various collections, detailed in the twenty 
eighth finding, the plaintiff should have Judg-
ment. We think, likewise, that it ought to 
recover the interest oti the mortgage loan 
as found in the sixteenth finding. The trial 
court held that this loan was made In good 
faith, was duly entered on the books of the 
company, and properly secured and acqui-
esced in by the company and its officers. 
But It further found that a large amount 
of interest ou the loan remained unpaid. 
There is nothing in the record to justify any 
Inference,, much less a finding, that Barber 
* « w w 
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was not to pay all the interest on this loan. 
He had charge of the books and accounts 
of the company, and the evidence shows 
conclusively that he manipulated them in 
many ways so as to conceal the true nature 
of his dealings and the actual condition of 
the transactions between himself and his em-
ployer. As to this item of interest, the case 
stands the same as any other between debtor 
and creditor. 
The same considerations apply to the mon-
ey withdrawn on November 20, 1899. Un- i 
less the claim for back salary is a just and | 
valid one, this was simply a conversion of 
that amount of money of the company. I t 
becomes necessary, therefore, In this con-
nection, to pass upon the issues as to Bar-
ber's claim for unpaid salary, since the com-
pany has filed a cross-appeal from that por-
tion of the decree in which such claim Is 
allowed. Undoubtedly, as a general rule, 
when parties have contracted for perform-
ance of certain services for a definite period 
a t a fixed salary, and the employment con-
tinues beyond the period agreed upon, in the 
absence of any new contract, It will be pre-
sumed that the employment continued under 
the same contract and upon the terms orig-
inally fixed. Wallace • . Floyd, 20 Pa. 1&4, 
72 Am. Dec. 620; Crane Bros. Mfg. Co. v. 
Adams, 142 111. 125, 30 N. E. 1Q30. But this 
presumption must yield to evidence showing 
a change of terms. Hale v. Sheeban, 41 Neb. 
102, 59 N. W. 554; McCullough Iron Co. T. . 
Carpenter, 67 Md. 555, 11 Atl. 17(3; Common-
wealth Ins. Co. v. Crane, 6 Mete. (Mass.) I 
64. It may be conceded that It would take 
two to make the new agreement, and that 
a mere Intention on the part of Barber to 
accept a less sum, or even an express state-
ment by him that he would accept the less 
mm, would not of itself bind him so to 
lo. Richard Thompson Co. v. Brook (Com. 
PI.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 370. In tha t case cer-
ain employe* of a corporation agreed among 
hemselves to accept a reduction of salary, j 
[•he corporation was not a party to the 
greement, and it was never communicated 
o or acted on by the corporation or Its 
irectors. Such a case is very different 
rom the one a t bar. Here, while there 
fas no action by the corporation express-
7, the court has found that from the time 
arber as general manager reduced his own 
llary, along with the salaries of other 
nploy6s, to the t ime he ceased to be an 
fleer of the company, he drew his salary 
om time to time substantially on the basis I 
| of the reduction; and the evidence Is clear 
I and convincing that he took the moneys 
withdrawn in full satisfaction of his claim 
for salary, and had no thought of claiming 
more until his right to withdraw the $2,200 
was challenged after the new management 
took charge. We think these circumstances 
are sumeient to show that the company re-
lied on his voluntary action in reducing his 
own salary, and took no express action there-
ou, because none was necessary, and that it 
was understood by both parties that his sal-
ary was that which he had voluntarily fixed 
! upon. In Shade v. Sisson Mill & Lumber 
Co., 115 Cal. 357, 47 Pac. 135, the corpora-
tion rendered statements monthly to an em-
pJoy6, in which he was credited with a less 
salary per month than he should have re-
ceived. It was held that the employe^, by 
acquiescence in these statements so rendered 
him, was estopped to claim afterwards a 
salary in excess of that for which he was 
given credit. So long as Barber's reduction 
I of his own salary was carried out by him-
self for a long series of years, and even at 
the time when he withdrew the $2,200 he 
did not claim the right to withdraw any such 
sums as would be due to him if his present 
claims were allowed, we see no ground what-
ever on which to sustain the judgment in his 
favor in this behalf. Hence we are of opin-
ion that the company should recover the Item 
of $3,000 converted on April 17, 1895, the 
item of $237.37 for collections unaccounted 
for, the unpaid interest on the mortgage loan, 
amounting at the date of the decree in the 
lower court to $1,510, and the item of $2,200 
withdrawn on November 20, 1899. 
It is therefore recommended that the de-
cree of the district court be reversed, and 
the cause remanded, with directions to enter 
a new decree in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant Barber for the several 
sums last above stated and interest thereon 
at the rate by law provided. We further 
recommend that each party pay bis own 
| costs In this cour t 
BARNES and OLDHAM, CO.. concur. 
PER CURIAM. For the reasons stnted Jn 
the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the 
district court Is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded, with directions to enter a new 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant Barber In accordance with 
said opinion. It Is further ordered that each 
party pay his own costs In this cour t 
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CRIMINAL LAW—CREDIBILITY OP WITNESS-
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE—REVIEW—MISCON-
DUCT OF COUNSEL—SHOOTING WITH INTENT 
TO KILL. 
1. The credibility of witnesses and the proba-
tive value of their testimony are matters which 
it U th« peculiar function of the jury to deter-
mine. 
2. A verdict based upon substantially conflict-
ing evidence will not be set aside by this court. 
3. An appeal for conviction, based altogether 
upon the evidence, however fervent it may be, 
is not an abuse of the privilege of advocacy. 
4. Ordinarily a party who did not promptly 
object to an argument alleged as misconduct 
will b« held to nave waived his right to com-
plain. 
5. But where the misconduct of counsel is so 
flagrant and of such a character that neither 
a complete retraction nor any admonition or re-
buke from the court can entirely destroy its 
sinister influence, a new trial should be award-
ed, regardless of the want of an objection and 
exception. Chicago, B. & Q. It. Co. v. Kellogg, 
76 N. W. 462, 55 tfeb. 748. 
6. A person who has been found guilty of 
shooting with intent to kill cannot found a 
valid claim to judicial lenioncy upon his in-
ferior marksmanship. 
(Syllabus by the Court.) 
Error to district court, Boyd county; Har-
rington, Judge. 
Waltcv* W. Parker was found guilty of 
shooting with intent to kill, and brings er-
ror. Affirmed 
W. Q. Searo and W. T Wills, for plaintiff 
In error. Frank N. Prout, Atty. Gen., Nor-
rls Brown, Dep Atty. Gen., and William B. 
Rose, Asst. Atty. Gen , for the State. 
SULLIVAN, O. J. Section 16 of the Crim-
inal Code is as follows: "If any person shall 
maliciously shoot, stab cut, or shoot at any 
other person, with intent to kill, wound, or 
maim such person, every person so offending 
shall be imprisoned In the penitentiary not 
more than twenty years nor less than one 
year." Upon an Information charging a vio-
lation of this section the defendant, Parker, 
was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to im-
prisonment In the penitentiary for a term of 
ten years. 
The grounds upon which he claims a re-
versal of the judgment are (1) that the evi-
dence is insufficient to sustain the verdict, 
(2) misconduct of the county attorney in ad-
dressing the jury, and (3) t ha t the sentence 
is excessive. 
The defendant quarreled with his father-
in-law, Peter Hansen, and intentionally shot 
him, a t a livery stable In the village of Spen-
cer, in Boyd county. Thia is conceded, but 
whether the shooting was malicious, or done 
as a measure of necessary self-defense, is a 
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poini upon which the evidence is in irrecon-
cilable conflict. The credibility of the wit 
nesses and the probative value of their testi-
mony were matters which it was the peculiar 
function of the jury to determine, and we 
see no reason for interfering with their de-
termination or to seriously doubt its cor-
rectness. 
The alleged misconduct of the prosecuting 
attorney consisted of an appeal for convic-
tion in which the duty of the jury to the 
state, to society in general, and particularly 
to the people of Boyd county, was pointed out 
in forcible and impressive language. It 
seems probable from alfidavits filed by some 
of the jurors that counsel based his claim for 
conviction altogether upon the < v lence, and 
that he did not at all exceed the limits of 
legitimate discussion. Rut, in any view of 
the matter, it is certain that he committed 
no such serious fault as to make it the duty 
of the court to set aside the verdict. No 
objection was interposed by counsel for de-
fendant a t the time the remarks were made, 
and they were therefore neither approved 
j nor condemned by the trial court. Tills be 
| ing so, the following extract from the opin-
ion in Chicago, B. & Q. H. Co. v. Kellogg. r>.r> 
Neb. 748, 70 N. W. 462. Is pertinent: "Jn 
this case there was no formal objection, 
I and consequently no ruling, or contumacious 
refusal to rule, which we are authorized to 
review. Had the court, in response to a 
proper objection, vigorously condemned the 
remarks of counsel, we think they would 
have left no prejudicial impression on the 
minds of the Jury. By prompt action the tie 
fendant 's counsel might have obtained an ef-
fective antidote for the poison iu Shafer's 
speech; but be failed to act, and is there-
fore not in an att i tude to have his com-
plaint now considered. We do not, howev-
er, wish to be understood as holding that a 
rebuke from the court, or even a complete 
retraction by the offending counsel, is in ail 
cases of this kind a sovereign remedy. If 
the transgression be flagrant--if the offensive 
remark has stricken deep, and is of such a 
character that neither rebuke nor retrac-
tion can entirely destroy Its sinister infiuem-e 
—a new trial should be promptly awarded, 
regardless of the want of an objection and 
exception." 
In our opinion, the sentence imposed is 
not excessive. If the defendant 's aim had 
not been faulty, he might have been sen-
tenced to hang. A claim to leniency, based 
on inferior marksmanship, is not a very mer-
itorious or persuasive claim. The district 
court had a large discretionary power, and 
we cannot regard a sentence imposing half 
the maximum penalty as an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
I The judgment Is affirmed. 
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